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Preface
The necessity for a new understanding of (living) nature is the driving force behind this
book. The current relationship between humans and non-human nature clearly needs to
be modified or  improved if we are to master the escalating ecological crisis in time. The
central idea is that living nature is structured and organized in a language-like and com-
municative manner, i.e., that all organisms, including humans, are members of a global
community of communication. In this view of living nature, specific communication
rules must be adhered to if the community of communication is to survive. This idea
required an interdisciplinary approach combining  philosophy, biology and semiotics. 
It was clear to me that this would entail playing an intermediary role, i.e., explaining
well-known (to philosophers) philosophical positions to biologists and well-known (to
biologists) biological positions to philosophers. In any case, the point of departure would
have to be mankind´s understanding of itself (Selbstverständnis des Menschen) or, more
precisely, the understanding of human language and communication as a precondition for
formulating any kind of self-understanding:
Referring back to the rules of communicative rationality provides an opportunity to
answer questions of evolutionary logic and dynamics as questions of interaction logic
and  dynamics. Evolutionary history could then be understood as a developmental histo-
ry of interaction semioses. If we could further establish that the rules governing evolution
are equivalent to the communication rules behind the history of interaction, then we could
justify the view  that rule-governed sign-mediated behavior is a factor not only in
humans, but especially in non-human living nature.
A more detailed examination of research results in the biological sciences should yield
structures that can unequivocally be interpreted as communication rules. Viewing living
nature as a communication partner in a common shared, communicative  world would
establish it as a norm subject. Understanding nature would no longer be a metaphorical
expression of reductionistic explanatory models, but rather would mean understanding
interaction logic and dynamics in their regulative, constitutive, and generative (innova-
tive) dimensions. If living nature could be comprehended as a global community of com-
munication, then this understanding (preceded by an analysis of communication process-
es) might well extend to the pragmatic level, at least in the realm of human nature with its
capacity for self-consciousness. The very behavior of this self conscious nature should
reveal that it has understood the rules of a linguistically and communicatively structured
and organized living nature. Furthermore, it also adheres to these rules ( inasmuch as it
recognizes the validity of reasoned action), i.e., it acts in a manner conforming to norms
and - when the need arises - in a manner constituting norms.
The current contribution provides a blueprint for a philosophy of biology in the light of
pragmatics of  language. It distinguishes  itself from traditional natural philosophies in
that its foundation in philosophy of language builds upon and unifies both empirical and
transcendental-reflexive moments.
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Such „preliminary remarks on a theory of communicative nature“ can go beyond a new
perspective of non-human living nature to initiating a new understanding of human nature
itself. If living nature is a global community of communication, humans could view
themselves as members among many other (non-human) members in this community.
Universal-communicative, normative rules can also be derived from such a membership.
Their non-observance has led us into a historically unprecedented ecological crisis. In
light of this ecological crisis, future adherence to these rules will probably become the
greatest cultural and evolutionary challenge that mankind has ever faced. Should we be
unable to master the ecological crisis in time by adequately complying with these rules,
then our survival is as uncertain as that of most other biological species threatened by
mankind´s activities.
Viewed from this perspective, this book provides support for an ecologically oriented
ethics. It does not represent ethics in itself; rather, by opening the way to a new perception
of living nature, it wishes to provide the information we need to introduce and establish
norms of ecological ethics. 
To this end, the book primarily aims to prove that it is justified to refer to a linguistical-
ly structured and communicatively organized living nature. This leads to a range of
potential conclusions. It is beyond the scope of this book to treat this aspect in detail and
such conclusions are only briefly outlined here.
I wish to thank: Wilhelm Vossenkuhl (University of Munich), Thure von Uexküll
(Freiburg i.Br.), Manfred J. Sippl (Center of Applied Molecular Engineering, University
of Salzburg), Ludger Albers (German clinic for diagnostics, Wiesbaden)  for helpful dis-
cussions as well as a stimulating and critical correspondence. Michael Stachowitsch
(University of Vienna) for translating this book, which is a revised version of „Natur der
Sprache - Sprache der Natur“ (1993) .Wilhelm Hasenauer  for Layout.
Günther Witzany, January 2000
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1. Introduction
1.1. The need for a new understanding of nature
The development of human individuals and communities is accompanied or driven by
crises. As a rule, such crises affect humans in a very complex manner, and the formal
analysis of a „crisis“ as a decision structure that can principally be expressed and stored
in a binary code is initially entirely irrelevant for those affected by the crisis: solving
complex crisis situations requires wide-ranging consultations that cannot be reduced to
yes/no answers. Crises must be mastered because they call for irreversible decisions with-
out which a specific development would not be possible. From this perspective, they can
be viewed as structural features in the social evolution of cultural communities.
Today we find ourselves confronted with an ecological crisis. Both quantitatively and
qualitatively, this crisis transcends - in a unique manner - all those that have occurred in
the past: No longer is merely the survival of mankind at stake, but the survival of most
higher forms of life.
The existence of this ecological crisis is a fact that needs no further debate. Reports, stud-
ies, and research results outlining the details fill whole libraries. Never before has
mankind been confronted with an ecological crisis of global proportions in which the
future of human and non-human life is assured only if the problem is solved in time.
Today, the ecological crisis is understood as an interlinked collapse of ecospheres that
were previously largely self-regulating and self-stabilizing; it is a collapse stemming
from specific human interventions into nature.
Up until these massive interventions, initiated by one of nature’s own life forms, the bios-
phere produced an evolutionary dynamics and diversity having an amazing survival
potential. Up until these interventions, the interlinked, highly varied functions of these
ecospheres provided Earth with an ability to reproduce this variety that, although contin-
gent, was compatible with the foreseeable life span of the planet. Initially, the social evo-
lution of human cultures posed no threat to this ecological evolution.
The ecological crisis confronting us today is basically the result of a 100-year-long cul-
tural development, with the escalation of the crisis having taken place only over the last
40 years. In other words, the quality of mankind’s interventions in the past 40 years has
created an ecological crisis that goes beyond merely disturbing nature, to potentially
destroying the ecological balance developed and proven over millions of years.
The quality of this specific intervention reflects a form of human conduct that is based on
a clear anthropocentric relationship to nature. More precisely: As opposed to cosmo- or
biocentrically oriented cultural traditions, Western civilization adopted a world view that
made humans the focal point and undisputed beneficiary of the nature around us.
Within Western civilization, and particularly in its modern form, i.e., scientific-technical-
ly oriented industrial society, non-human nature was degraded to a mere resource.
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Moreover, people themselves and even society as a whole have, as „human capital“,
become the object of a pervasive economic cost-benefit calculation; this is increasingly
determining the system of values and norms of global cultural development.
The cultural specificity of this view of nature is discernible less in our conduct in and with
nature, but rather in the fact that we set out to extract, exploit, utilize, and consume virtu-
ally every useful subject and object on the planet. Using the media power and money,
Western culture and its proponents have, in fact, unleashed an entire series of successive
(internal and external) colonization strategies over history and thus irrevocably drawn
other cultures into their spell. The Western-Modern weltbild has come to dominate the
lifestyles of these cultures in the realm of production, organization, distribution, and con-
sumption, i.e., has increasingly penetrated the sphere of social and economic evolution.
This anthropocentric approach to nature, which is first exported and subsequently inter-
nalized by the affected cultures, pushes both the reproductive capacity of these societies
as well as the capacity of exploited natural resources to their limits. At this point,
Western-Modern society threatens not only the non-human nature in which it is set, but
also every other culture that it has externally and internally colonized. The effect is glob-
al: the respective techniques, technologies, and strategies are primed for worldwide
action.
How this situation came about and the reason behind the undeniable relationship between
the scientific-technically oriented industrial nations and the current global ecological cri-
sis is being systematically examined with varying success by a number of scientific disci-
plines.
I advocate a language-philosophical hypothesis: An ecological crisis of this dimension
could only develop because Western-Modern culture behaves communicative-pathologi-
cally toward (inner and outer) nature. This culture’s communication with nature is one-
sided in its structure and therefore distorted. My underlying premise here is that every
form of rule governed interaction between living individuals, within any behavioral con-
text or set of actions, can be termed communication.
In the natural sciences, the term „rule governed interaction“ is defined as a behavior sub-
ject to the laws of nature. And, in fact, the weltbild of natural science underlies western
civilization’s relationship to nature. Worldwide, natural scientists accept the language of
natural science as the universal communications tool in all matters dealing with nature.
Precisely here, however, in the cognitive-instrumental representational concentrate of our
modern culture, this linguistic-philosophical thesis (which upon closer examination
proves to be a communication-theoretical thesis) is no longer amenable to discussion.
The thesis that we communicate with nature and, moreover, that nature communicates
with us cannot be the object of scientific research. The task of natural sciences is to study
nature based on its inherent natural laws and to verify the obtained results in reproducible
experiments. Nature, in such experiments, is forced to react; interpreting this response as
nature’s „answer“, however, is a very „imprecise“ formulation because „nature is inca-
pable of speaking“.
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„Man discovered the possibility of explaining nature as a series of events. In order to take
advantage of this opportunity, however, nature had to be silenced. It was successfully
silenced, and the door was thus opened for explanations. The result is that it is impossible
to precisely determine whether nature is actually speaking: the very fact that it is not
speaking is the prerequisite for the precise determination“. (KRINGS, 1982, p. 391).
In the face of the ecological crisis, a phase of contemplation and reflection on the rela-
tionship between the possible repercussions of human activity along with the non-human
nature affected by such activity raises - in my mind - a key question: can we base suitable
strategies to save and preserve the remaining ecological resources on explanatory models
of nature handed to us by natural-scientific research institutions? Or, put differently, can
we afford to reorient our relationship to living nature - and can we burden non-human
nature - solely on the basis of knowledge stemming from natural-scientific disciplines,
even if this knowledge is possibly incomplete, fragmentary, or of only limited value in
coordinating appropriate rescue measures?
I contend that reducing the threat necessitates a broader understanding of nature, both
with respect to the nature of humans and to surrounding (non-human) nature. Expanding
upon my thesis on communication theory: we must learn to regard the rule governed
interactions between living beings as a communication process, and to understand nature
as acting in a communicative (transcendentally reflective) manner and behaving in a
communicative (empirical) manner.
The methodology of those sciences that allow us to grasp nature in the technical-cogni-
tive sense and that leave their results to be exploited by economic forces is incapable of
viewing nature as anything but a resource in a cost-benefit calculation. This demonstrates
that purely explanatory interpretations of nature, i.e., those that forego an explicit under-
standing of nature, construct a monological relationship between mankind and nature. In
such a relationship, human subjects are pitted against non-human objects.
Based on its methodology, it is beyond the bounds of natural science to recognize that
nature might be a co-subject of human beings, one with which mankind needs to deal  and
behave toward in a communicative manner if our access to nature is to go beyond
explanatory models to true understanding (thus making nature a norm subject of moral-
practical reason). Natural science has systematically excommunicated nature as a subject.
On the other hand, can nature be excommunicated as a subject? How does an excommu-
nicated nature react? How does it respond? It unequivocally forces us to take up the „con-
versation“ again (in the form of rule governed, interactive action or behavior); moreover,
the renewed conversation is enriched by the effort of re-communication, i.e., the effort
invested to again raise the excommunication motives as well as the practical aspects of
the excommunication. This is reflected in the treatment methods used in the field of psy-
chosomatics (compare UEXKÜLL, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1989) and is further evident in
groups of subjects who, in technocratically run businesses, have been degraded to num-
bered entities and who then use organizational skills to force management to deal with
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them as subjects again (inner nature). This is equally evident for example in the willful or
negligent disregard of ecological balances: the consequences of such an ecological imbal-
ance can confront the community within the destabilized ecosystem so massively that
there is no recourse but to repair the damage (external nature).
The ecological crisis, characterized by the destruction and subsequent collapse of mutu-
ally supportive ecospheres, forces mankind - as the perpetrator - to cope with a specific
cognitive developmental deficit: the survival of all living nature has, at an incredible pace,
become dependent not only upon whether, but rather how fast mankind will be able to
develop and enter into a relationship with nature that can avert the worst consequences of
the ecological crisis in time. This requires decisional qualities that have never been part of
the decision-making processes in the reproduction of societies.
1.2. Schelling’s natura naturans:
„We term ‘nature as productivity’ ‘nature as subject’“
The flip side of a monological relationship to nature is a communicative one. The com-
plementary aspect of explanatory models about nature would be the understanding of
nature, an understanding that orients rather than replaces the explanation.
„Understanding demands linguistic communication (text, speech, linguistically commu-
nicated action or interaction), demands the ‘co-subject’“. (KRINGS, 1982, p. 391)
Without recognizing nature as a subject, no transformation of the monological relation-
ship is possible (on one side: the human subject, on the other side: the exploitable natural
objects). A basic prerequisite for establishing and justifying such a recognition of nature
as a subject is proving that a language of nature exists, i.e., that nature is structured and
organized in a communicative manner.
Such proof would provide the opportunity to understand nature by understanding sign-
mediated, rule governed interactions and, subsequently, comprehending the signs and
rules underlying the respective sign usage.
This cannot be achieved without qualifying the strategic-exploitative perspective in favor
of a more communicative thought process and conduct. The goal is not merely to under-
stand the language and communication of man as a natural and cultural entity (although
this is the most readily accessible starting point), but to understand the languages and
communication processes of non-human nature.
The result, according to the present thesis, would be a better understanding of nature
itself; besides overcoming the monological relationship to nature, this could also lead to
the constitution of norms of conduct suitable for establishing a non-parasitic, evolution-
ary cooperation between human culture and non-human nature.
How can we establish, much less justify a premise such as the topos „language of
nature“? Doesn’t such an approach smack of an attempt to restore a metaphysical status,
or worse yet, a (mystical) re-enchantment of nature?
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No lesser a capacity than the philosopher F.W.J. Schelling devoted a major effort to the
problem of „nature as subject“. Hermann Krings can be credited for taking up Schelling’s
interpretations of nature and further developing them in the framework of communication
theory. Let us briefly examine his results.
According to Krings, Schelling’s  concept  is a counter-concept to Kant’s metaphysics of
science. In Kant’s concept, nature can be understood only indirectly: only by constructing
the terms relating to corporal natural objects and, more so, the representation of terms
apriori to a natural object does the possibility of an empirical and nomological science -
as in the case of physics - become apparent. In this case, physics must be initially under-
stood, and the comprehension of physics then leads to an understanding of nature - but
only indirectly.
Schelling stands this concept on its head: nature itself is the subject, which, among other
things, also scientifically constructs natural processes (e.g., mechanics). „Nature is the
original constructor; science turns out to be a reconstruction“. (KRINGS 1982, p. 383)
Furthermore: One and the same transcendental subjectivity is the empowering basis of
nature and intelligence. The phrase „nature as subject“, denoting nature that constructs, is
not a description but rather an expression of a geneticizing action of nature itself. The
original natural process is not the composition and dynamics (attracting and repelling
forces) of matter in space, but self-consciousness. Schelling himself „constructs“ this as
two originally opposed activities: One is absolutely productive, the other serves to limit
this productivity, whereby the former always asserts itself against this limit or hindrance
and thus dialectically reestablishes these opposing forces on a higher level.
„We term ‘nature as productivity’ (natura naturans) ‘nature as subject’ (this alone is the
goal of all theory)“ (SCHELLING, in: HECKMANN R. (Ed.) 1985, p. 114).
That which is absolute constructs itself as nature, and philosophy reconstructs the geneti-
cizing process of this absolute entity in a transcendental-terminological construction
(KRINGS). Accordingly, the task of transcendental philosophy is to trace our existence
back to an act of freedom and to regard its actual emergence as a self-emergence.
„The absolute activity constructs itself and the philosopher reconstructs the original self-
construction of nature“ (KRINGS, 1985, p. 116). Schelling considers the organism to be
the central phenomenon of nature. To him, non-living nature represents a still
„enveloped“ organism and thus preliminary evolution. Humans, on the other hand, can be
regarded as developed matter: while nature remains unconscious awareness, the mind
represents conscious nature. In the present work, this topos - treated from the perspective
of communication theory - will become a key point.
Schelling is convinced that „even that which we call reason is a mere interplay of higher
natural forces necessarily unknown to us“ (SCHELLING, in: KRINGS, 1982, p. 384).
Biology cannot be conducted according to the laws of biochemistry and biophysics, but
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vice versa: physics and chemistry are subject to the principles of biology. Only by com-
prehending self-awareness can we understand the organism, and the comprehension of
the organism is a prerequiste for understanding matter. „It is only ‘dynamically’ organ-
ized matter (in the sense of Schelling, not Kant) that enables us to understand reason as
nature“ (KRINGS, 1982, p. 384). For Schelling, this conclusion stems from the premise
that nature is unconscious mind, while mind is nature that has attained a conscious level.
From this point on, a hermeneutically oriented research program is called for. It is not
meant to replace the explanatory sciences, but can provide them with the necessary orien-
tation (in the normative sense as well), an orientation that they are unable to provide from
within themselves, as we will see when we turn to Manfred Eigen. The way mankind per-
ceives itself opens the door to understanding living nature. In Krings’ view, comprehend-
ing living nature enables us to understand matter. If nature that has become conscious (the
human mind) wishes to understand both itself and nature that has remained unconscious,
it can begin its inquiry with its own self-understanding (Selbstverständnis): nature as
productivity is identical in all its forms, both in the mind inside us and in the nature
surrounding us.
Furthermore, it is fully compatible with the geneticizing acting of nature when humans,
as natural beings, are dissatisfied with the claim of mathematics and physics to universal
answers about nature, but instead grasp their freedom and behave toward nature from the
vantage point of free reason. Mankind thereby transcends the position of explaining and
technically exploiting, transcends the position of „standing opposite nature“ to attain a
„together with“ and a „sharing with“ the common living world of nature and culture. He
elevates the freedom of nature to the same status as his own free reason. „This, after all,
is what distinguishes freedom: it can give rise to itself“ (KRINGS, 1982, p. 396).
This act of „dealing with nature“ or „sharing a common life-world (Lebenswelt) with
nature“ points to a type of communicative relationship between human culture and non-
human nature. Non-human nature becomes a co-subject in a world commonly shared
between mankind and nature, i.e., man is able to recognize the same form of productivity
in both. Man’s struggle for self-awareness is as much an expression of nature as produc-
tivity (and, in Schellings words, of „nature as subject“) as nature’s struggle to bring forth
its diversity of forms.
This marks the point at which a systematic understanding of nature can begin. This begin-
ning is therefore founded in the representation of human self-understanding
(Selbstverständnis). Since human cognition and human activity is mediated through lan-
guage, i.e., communicatively structured, and since mankind perceives itself solely as a
linguistic being (in and with language) or as acting in a communicative manner, a sys-
tematic understanding of a language of nature or of a communicatively organized and
structured living nature must be preceded by a systematic understanding of the nature of
(human) language. This precondition - understanding the nature of language - is system-
atically anchored in the realm of modern linguistics, pragmatic semiotics, and  universal
pragmatic theory of communication. The scientific research in these disciplines can serve
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as a key to understanding the nature of language (initially of humans) as well as a key for
human self-understanding (Selbstverständnis) (which has always been linguistically
mediated); this, in turn, provides the basis for understanding the language(s) of nature.
We can follow Schelling’s lead and interpret the avenue of research leading via the nature
of language to an understanding of the language of nature itself as a free act of conscious
nature (which opened up as a possibility during the development from „nature as uncon-
scious mind“ to „mind as nature that has attained consciousness“). In doing so, it would
certainly be appropriate to learn more about the historical evolutionary process of this
„conscious nature“. Efforts should concentrate on the stations of „conscious nature’s“
search for an understanding of itself, i.e., where it has determined its relationship to its
intrinsic and extrinsic nature. Such an approach to the historical self-enlightenment of
man as a natural being would be quite an extensive undertaking and would go beyond the
scope and aims of this contribution.
It could - programmatically - begin with the reconstruction of the relationship between
man and nature, based for example on archaic cultural traditions handed down through
history; these exist even today (albeit in very limited form) and their relationship to nature
could be summarized and reconstructed under the topos „premetaphysical cultural para-
digm“ (I). This would be followed by a representation of the „metaphysical cultural para-
digm“ (II), whose origins would lie in early Greek philosophy of nature and might culmi-
nate in modern concepts in the theory of science such as logical empiricism or critically
rationalism. This would then be followed by the current „postmetaphysical cultural para-
digm“ (III) in which the human intellect has gained access to the precondition underlying
all cognition - to language itself.
This point in the reconstruction (i.e., mankind’s search for its relationship to its intrinsic
and extrinsic nature) marks the onset of the present discourse. This book will initially dis-
cuss the terms „language“ and „communication“ as a prerequisite for all human self-
understanding (Selbstverständnis), and then procede to an understanding of living, non-
human nature.
1.3. The possibility and sense of an interdisciplinary dialog 
between biology and philosophy of language
In my study of current research in ethology, sociobiology, molecular biology, and bio-
chemistry I came upon descriptions of observed structures and organizational forms of
living nature that are based on the terms „language“ and „communication“, even though
these descriptions and observations referred to non-human nature. Those biological fields
of research that apply the terms language and communication mainly concentrate on
interactive processes between biological organisms and on the description of molecular
processes in biological organisms, whereby the ethologists and sociobiologists predomi-
nantly use „language“ and „communication“ in a linguistic-behavioristic manner, the
molecular biologists and biochemists in the sense of information theory.
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In my opinion, the very fact that the above disciplines use these terms to describe obser-
vations is interesting from the philosophy of language viewpoint. It raises the question
whether the use of either term in biology can be satisfactorily justified from this philo-
sophical perspective. Unfortunately, language philosophy has devoted little effort to this
topic, and modern, actiontheory-oriented language philosophy recognizes the possibility
of language and communication in the non-human realm - if at all - only in connection
with the most simple signal languages in the animal kingdom.
Beyond reducing the definition of the terms language and communication to a linguistic-
behavioristic and/or information theory context, the field of biology has neglected to
make any significant attempts at establishing a firm basis for using these concepts.
Semiotics assumes a certain mediating role here; it by no means restricts its investigations
of sign processes (semioses) to anthroposemioses (POSNER, 1990 c.), but takes up and
examines sign processes in all forms of living nature. Clearly, an interdisciplinary dialog
between biology and language philosophy could broaden the horizon of both disciplines.
In the case of biology it would help to adequately reflect upon and subsequently justify
the use of the terms language and communication. In language philosophy, it would help
in recognizing that language and communication are not exclusively human capabilities,
but can also be important in understanding non-human nature.
An interdisciplinary dialog between biology and language philosophy could also poten-
tially contribute to epistemological progress in both fields, whereby the mere explanation
of natural processes would be augmented by an understanding of these processes within
living nature. This book is my contribution to stimulating such an interdisciplinary dialog.
1.4. The structural format of this study
1.4.1. Language and communication
In a first step, I attempt to define the terms language and communication in their broadest
sense by briefly summarizing their current interpretation in  linguistics (I), in semiotic
pragmatism (II), and in the universal-pragmatic theory of communication (III). 
Ultimately, the results of the universal-pragmatic communication theory represent the
most relevant approach in the framework of the present study: these results can help avoid
deficits of modern linguistics and semiotics in determining how communication functions.
Examining their meaning in these three disciplines should clearly familiarize the reader
with the terminological background underlying research in the various realms of living
nature. In the next step I formulate those paradigmatic realms predominantly affected by
such research: interorganismic (I), intraorganismic (II), and metaorganismic (III) commu-
nication.
1.4.2. Sign-mediated interactions in honeybees in the northern hemisphere
The actual investigation on whether living nature is linguistically structured and  commu-
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nicatively organized begins with the representation of inter-organismic communication.
The example selected here is the sign-mediated interactions between members of a social
animal community - the honeybees of the northern hemisphere. Karl von Frisch was
awarded the Nobel Prize for his pioneering ethological studies in this field, and his col-
leagues considerably expanded upon the results of his research. Based on examples of
this positive association and behavioral coordination, I attempt to show how critical the
success of sign-mediated interactions is for the survival of this animal community. This
approach revealed that the use of signs is inseparably connected with species-specific
interaction logic and interaction dynamics. The evidence that the sign-mediated interac-
tions of honeybees from warmer latitudes differ fundamentally from those of the northern
hemisphere leads to a discussion about how certain capabilities and skills on the molecu-
lar level are genetically fixed, in the nuclei of the cells of organisms, culminating in the
paradigmatic realm of intra-organismic communication.
1.4.3. Sign-mediated interactions in and between cells
One of the central research topics in this work is the representation of sign-mediated
interactions in cells of organisms (intracellular communication) and between cells (inter-
cellular communication). The interest focuses on the constitution and structure of the so-
called nucleic acid and amino acid language, which clearly bear features amenable to
classification by sign theory. Both „languages“ have to a large extent been decoded, and
mankind is on the brink of mastering the technology to use a language whose origin is not
specifically human in nature.
The discussion of several examples of faulty intra- and intercellular communication
underlines the complexity and reliability of sign-mediated interactions in the intra-organ-
ismic realm.The constitution and organization of natural defence mechanisms by the so-
called immune system provides an insight into the mechanisms by which genetic
sequences are duplicated, altered, repaired, or even generated. The demonstration of cer-
tain rules underlying sequence processing in the molecular realm shows that such
processes are determined less by chance than by protein individuals that are competent in
sequence processing and that are highly specialized for their respective task. This section
of the present contribution strives to show that if we are going to talk about a universal
„language of nature“, then the nucleic acid language - which is essential in constituting
all forms of life - justifiably earns this designation.
1.4.4. Critique of the language and communication terminology 
of molecular biology
I explicate the terms language and communication as they pertain to and define molecu-
lar biology and biochemistry by referring to one of the foremost proponents of this termi-
nology, Manfred Eigen. After pointing out several deficits in Eigen’s language and com-
munication concepts, I attempt to expand upon this terminology using key research
results from the field of action theory-oriented  pragmatics of language. With this
approach I hope to convince the reader that, both for language philosophy in the broad
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sense and for the above-mentioned biological subdisciplines, one can justifiably speak of
language and communication as the central structure and organizational form of living
nature.
This second, central research topic in the present contribution is undertaken with the
express intention of initiating the interdisciplinary dialog mentioned earlier; at the same
time, it should also show that there is no adequate foundation for using the terms lan-
guage and communication in a systems theoretical sense (i.e. information theory) to
explain the phenomena of living nature.
1.4.5. The apriori of pragmatic 
situations of understanding (Verständigungssituationen)
After depicting specific explanatory deficits in molecular biology by explaining and jus-
tifying (systems theoretically) the terms language and communication, I offer an
approach that can lead to a semiotic expansion of these two terms in biology. I use two
examples to exemplify the apriori of the pragmatic situation of understanding  both for a
(non-human) language in nature and for intra- and intercellular, sign-mediated communi-
cation processes.
Recognizing the apriori of the pragmatic communicative situation enables both an under-
standing and a plausible explanation of sign-mediated communication processes in living
nature, from humans down to the simplest enzyme proteins. Under these prerequisites,
language and communication become the ideally suited means to change, expand, or even
fundamentally overstep existing rules.
1.4.6. The representation of types and forms of communication in living nature
Based on the semiotic expansion of the terms language and communication, I attempt to
arrive at a description of various forms of communication that affect living beings
throughout their life. I attempt to systematize the basic forms of communication in living
nature in a manner analogous to modern taxonomy, which defines 5 kingdoms of organ-
isms into which all known life forms can be definitively arranged. Since these organismic
kingdoms historically evolved in a certain sequence, the communicative relationship
between them might well be described as being semicompatible: each successively devel-
oped kingdom of organisms always bears communication rules of the preceeding one,
never vice versa.
1.4.7. Evolution as generative linguistic behavior 
The development of ever new biological species and, ultimately, their differentiation into
distinct organismic kingdoms, confronts us with a phenomenon that evolutionary theory
has largely explained based on a continuity principle. For the realms of molecular, organ-
ismic, and cultural evolution I attempt to show that, assuming a communicatively struc-
tured and organized living nature, the origin of new entities as well as the incremental
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nature of this development process no longer represent a major problem; rather, they can
be viewed as being downright typical, and the assumptions about the significance of
„mutations“ for the evolutionary process can be discarded.
1.4.8. Nature as a „norm subject“: living nature as a 
global community of communication
In the last section of this book I broach the possible consequences of the above theses: in
a living world that is organized and structured in a language-like and communicative
manner, humans - as cultural entities - would also have an interactive relationship with
the entire living world. Seen holistically, such a world would have incredible powers of
survival. Should mankind continue to cling to its monological relationship with living
nature, my thesis predicts that we will not be in a position to develop, much less apply,
those systems of values and norms necessary to master the ecological crisis in time. On
the other hand, transforming this monological relationship with living, non-human nature
into a communicative one would be evidence for the evolutionary capacity of culture; this
step remains to be taken, but represents a positive alternative to the current communica-
tion pathology between man and nature.
1.5. Language and communication as a precondition and content of 
the interdisciplinary dialog: a word on the suspicion of anthropomorphism
Investigating language and communication as central structural and organizational ele-
ments in living nature appears to be a promising mediating grounds between biology and
the philosophy of language: neither discipline is capable of constituting its field of
research - or of discussing language and communication - without language and commu-
nication. Cognition in virtually every field of inquiry is sign-mediated, and any attempt to
formulate cognition outside the realm of language and communication is doomed to fail-
ure. Since we are unable to disassociate ourselves from our language or to reflect outside
its realm, these two central terms are both a precondition and the content of the interdisci-
plinary dialog propagated by the present investigation. This exposes me to the potential
accusation that I transpose essential elements of human self-understanding
(Selbstverständnis) onto structures and organizational forms of non-human nature, i.e.,
that in representing living nature as a linguistically and communicatively structured and
organized entity I have developed a new variant of anthropomorphism. Even a cursory
glance shows that this is not the case: every conceivable statement about every conceivable
object of cognition in non-human nature is open to such an accusation, and we have little
choice but to accept the preconditions of language and communication for what they are.
What we can do, however, is to define our (pre-)understanding (Vorverständnis)  of these
two terms at the beginning of every discussion about a specific cognitive realm. Then the
reader will always be in a position to assimilate this level of reflection in his/her back-
ground knowledge.
The accusation of anthropomorphism appears to be more accurately leveled at the use of
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„language“ and „communication“ in the biological sciences and in medicine (f.e. neu-
roendocrinology, psychoendocrinology, immunology, etc.). They use phrases such as
„communication between cells“, „faulty communication between cells“, „genetic code“,
„genetic text sequence“, „chemical messengers“, „neuronal“ and „hormonal communica-
tion“, „transcription of the nucleic acid language“ „amino acid language“, „translation“,
„letter pairs“ of DNA, „restriction enzymes that recognize palindromes“, etc. Or another
example by James D.Watson: „But unlike other organs, in which cells exchange only a
few signals, communication is the business of the brain, and brain cells employ a complex
array of chemical and electrical signals“. (WATSON, 1992, p. 409) 
Since no foundation and justification for the use of these terms has been forwarded to
date, I attempt in this contribution to clarify the prerequisites under which this diction
could be established and justified, while avoiding the pitfall of anthropomorphism.
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PART
ONE

2. Language and communication - an approximation
Rather than being precise definitions, the description of the terms language and commu-
nication - as based on modern linguistics, semiotic pragmatis, and the universal-pragmat-
ic communication theory of Jürgen Habermas - is a cursory approximation in order to
apply the terms in the present study. Linguistic and semiotic-pragmatic interpretations are
presented primarily to underline their differences vis-à-vis the universal-pragmatic com-
munication theory in explaining and understanding communication. This is not meant to
lessen the scientific achievements of these two fields of science, but merely to point out
that Jürgen Habermas´ theory currently provide the best explanation of communication
processes.
2.1. Language and communication in modern linguistics
Modern linguistics does not examine language in its historical context or in its interlinks
with  lifeforms (Lebensformen) and ideologies, but rather in the framework of an empiri-
cal-analytical explanatory model. Language is treated as an instrument of communication
and as a system of signs agreed upon by social consensus (SPRACHE, 1973, p. 18).
Modern linguistics has therefore focused its research on explaining and analyzing the
instrumental character of language and defines the system of linguistic signs as a conven-
tionalistic one.
It distinguishes between the research topic involving language as a system and language
in its function. The investigation of language as a system of signs concentrates on analyz-
ing the relationship of the signs to one another and the rules governing the coupling of
these signs. The investigation of language in its function involves studying communica-
tion processes. Interactions are defined as the „totality of communicative processes taking
place between partners“ (ibid., p. 429).
Structural analysis in linguistics deals with the interrelationships of signs and the rules
governing how these signs are coupled, yet orients itself according to usages of language
in communication processes; the latter provides a framework for functional analyses of
the utilized or utilizable sentence forms. Above all, the analysis of communication
processes reveals a mastery of structure, i.e., in sentences expressed by sign-using sub-
jects the words are not aligned in a structureless manner but are coupled according to spe-
cific rules. 
In this field, language is investigated not only according to its basic elements such as
phonems, words, and sentences, but also according to the rules under which these ele-
ments are structured and generated. Ultimately, linguistics strives to explain how lan-
guage-using subjects gain and use the ability to form and understand the full range of cor-
rect sentences in a particular language.
A universal language as such does not exist, merely a series of different languages. In the
case of humans, a distinction can be made between natural and artificial languages (i.e.,
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scientific languages). Among the former, linguists are in a position to differentiate nearly
5000 different languages that are used as an instrument of communication.
2.1.1. The communication model in linguistics
The communication model in linguistics is built on the premise that a sender S sends a
signal S’ (expression) with a certain information I (content, meaning) to a receiver R via
a communication channel C. „Coupling this signal with its meaning is achieved by the
respective communication partners“ (SPRACHE, p. 35), whereby the common stock of
signs is termed a „code“. Modern linguistics relies largely on the following definitions of
communication:
a) „Communication is the exchange of information between a sender and a 
receiver.
b)  A sender is the element in a communicative process that produced the 
signal. 
c)  The channel is the material connection between the sender and the 
receiver.
d)  The code refers to the amount of signs that the sender and receiver use to 
communicate.
e)  The signal is the material condition of the channel.“ (SPRACHE, p. 36f.)
2.1.2. The sign model in linguistics
Signals distinguish themselves from other material conditions because they transport
„information“ from the sender to the receiver. This transport is only possible because the
signal is coupled with information. This coupling enables the sender to send a signal that
corresponds with a particular information and enables the receiver to extract the informa-
tion from the signal. 
This provides the basis for the linguistic definition of the term „sign“: „A sign is that unit
formed by the coupling of the signal with the information bound to that signal“
(SPRACHE, p. 34). Instead of „signal“ and „information“, linguistics also uses the pair of
terms „expression“ and „content“ or „expression“ and „meaning“. The coupling between
signal and information is „socially conditioned“ and is thus based on the „conventionali-
ty of the sign“. Such couplings must be learned before any communication with the signs
is possible.
2.1.3. Models of coding and decoding
In the sign-mediated communication between sender and receiver (or, to emphasize the
reversibility of the relationship, between speaker and listener), a coding-decoding process
takes place in which the ideas stored in the brain of the speaker are first coded into lan-
guage and are then decoded by the listener. This involves „the conversion of the speaker’s
picture into linguistic signs and the re-conversion of the linguistic signs into the listener’s
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picture“ (SPRACHE, p. 47). In linguistics, the capacity for this coding-decoding process
is termed linguistic competence. If use is made of this capacity, linguistics refers to lin-
guistic performance. Coding and decoding takes place in the framework of semantic, syn-
tactic and phonological rules. The speaker’s information is explicitly defined as „prese-
mantic in the realm of pure imagination“ (ibid., p. 55).
2.1.4. The structure of the linguistic code in linguistics
Coding and decoding takes place via a linguistic code that must exhibit certain structures
in order to guarantee flawless coding-decoding:
a) „The code must contain linguistic signs that impart the individual structural 
components of expression and content. 
b) The code must include syntactic rules which determine the relationship 
between the individual signs. 
c)  The code must contain rules according to which the individual expressive 
units can be adapted to the respective context.
d)  The code must have rules by which the individual units of content can be 
adapted to the respective context“. (SPRACHE, p. 55f.)
The terms expression and content can be substituted by „signal“ and „meaning“. The
more precise differentiation of the structural features of the linguistic code is the task of
grammar „with its subdivisions semantics, syntax, and phonology“ (ibid. p. 56).
Special initiatives in this field of research have been developed by „generative“ grammar“
and „linguistic structuralism“, which have an effort to analyze the rules of coupling and
usage. I will not delve more deeply into their results here. It suffices to say that research
into communicative processes is  mainly behavioristic in its approach: the observation
and explanation of  linguistic behavior is always a central element, even - or especially -
in the case of humans.
2.2. Language and communication in semiotic pragmatics
Ever since Charles Morris, semiotics has been based on the premise that every system
worthy of the designation „language“ must be describable grammatically, semantically,
and pragmatically. As opposed to linguistics, semiotic pragmatics bases its analysis on
the relationship between the sign user and the employed sign. „Pragmatics studies the
conditions an entity must fulfill, to be able to interpret signs as representing meaning in
semiosis“ (POSNER, 1990 b; p. 2). The focus thus centers on the prerequisites under
which a sign interpreter is in a position to identify signs in sign processes as bearing
meaning. 
Semiotics classifies basically all sign processes as semioses. In this sense, the sign inter-
preter can also be a system, for example a machine which reacts to a given sign - in a
manner corresponding to the meaning contained in that sign - that it has received through
a sign channel. Semiotic pragmatics distinguishes between a primitive use of signals and
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true communication. The designation communication signs is only accepted when a
„sender“ pursues a complex intention with its sign production and addresses a receiver.
When the receiver notices and correctly interprets this intention, semiotics refers to a
communication process.
Semiotics also recognizes simple, non-communicative sign processes, for example simple
sign interpretation. If a bird on the wing can identify the shade of a tree, then the shade
can be a sign that stimulates the interpretive behavior of the bird.
The term semiosis (sign process) combines the terms language and communication in a
characteristic manner into a processual phenomenon that is expressly not limited to
human language and communication. Thus, semiotic pragmatics recognizes various types
of sign processes:
a) „Something functions as a sign only insofar as it has an interpreter in whom it
elicits some interpretant. Therefore all semioses are signalling processes. For
some signals the interpretant consists in the formation of a belief in some mes-
sage. Where this is so, the semiosis is called an indication of this message. 
b) Some signs are tokens of signifiers which are correlated with signifieds through
a code. Where this is so, the semiosis is called signification. 
c) Some signs are not the result of natural processes but intentionally produced to
cause certain interpretants. The resulting semiosis is called manipulation. Some
manipulating signs are produced with the intention to cause an interpretant by
means of a recognition of this intention by the interpreter. The resulting semio-
sis is called communication. 
d) Signaling, indicating, manipulative and communicative signs can, but need not,
be signifying. Where someone intentionally produces a communicative sign
which signifies something different from what he intends to communicate with
it, the semiosis in question is called indirect communication“ (ibid. p. 9f.)
Semiotics shares, with linguistics, the sender-receiver model and the coding-decoding
model: „The sender interprets the intended message through a signified, encodes the sig-
nified in a signifier and produces the signifier as a sign. The addressee receives the sign as
a signifier, decodes the signifier into a signified, and interprets the signified as a message.
The sender’s and addressee’s interpretation activities are pragmatic processes in a narrow
sense“ (ibid. p. 15).
As opposed to linguistics, semiotics interprets sign process in a broader sense: Typically
enough, one of the editors of „Semiotics - A Handbook of the Sign-Theoretic
Foundations of Nature and Culture (Berlin 1990) is Thomas  A. Sebeok, the founder of
zoosemiotics, a field which has successfully dealt with the study of sign processes in ani-
mals. Beyond this, a discussion is taking place between ethology, sociobiology, and semi-
otics (for example in: Zeitschrift für Semiotik, Volume 8, „Zeichenverhalten der Tiere“,
Tübingen, 1986). The proponents of biological subdisciplines apparently have no prob-
lem with using sign-theoretic terms to explain observations in the animal kingdom (TEM-
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BROCK, 1971; TODT, 1986). Behavioral biology, sociobiology, and semiotics basically
agree that sign processes in the animal kingdom are a key prerequisite for successful
reproduction in biological species.
Furthermore, semiotics also recognizes codeless communicative signs; (ibid. p. 34f.).
When a member of one culture is thrust into an entirely different culture and needs to
communicate about something with local residents (for example about how to deal with a
dangerous situation), then they must communicate through signs; semiotics does not con-
sider such signs to be components of a commonly held stock of signs (code).
Semiotics does recognize signs outside of language and communication (codeless, non-
communicative signs; ibid. p. 35f.). These describe a specific environment that, as a situ-
ation, can gain the status of a sign. For an automobile driver on a side road, for example,
pedestrians crossing the main road can serve as a sign that there is only little traffic on the
main road.
2.3. Language and communication in universal-pragmatic communication theory
Neither the analysis of the communicative process with respect to conveying information
from a sender to a receiver through a transmission channel, i.e., the analysis of the infor-
mation transmission process, nor the coding patterns of private ideas into signs and the
subsequent decoding of these signs into the private ideas of the receiver, are the object of
language and communication analysis by universal pragmatics. 
Since linguistics and semiotics orient their language and communication analyses on
observing behavior and on describing and explaining these observations, they find virtu-
ally no links to a actiontheory-oriented language and communication concept: the action-
theory-oriented researcher derives this concept both from the analysis of and from the
context of direct and indirect social interactions, whereby the researcher is or may be a
partner in that interaction.
The field of inquiry pursued by universal pragmatics is the analysis of the formal rules
that underlie every conceivable sign-mediated intersubjective interaction. It is primarily
concerned with the „general prerequisites for communication“. In this sense, it focuses its
interest on the metacommunicative ability of colloquial languages (Umgangssprachen),
which permit a seamless transition between discourses on something about this world to
discourse about these discourses. Rather than splitting the various functions that lan-
guage can assume, such as calling, expressive, and representational functions, universal
pragmatics attempts to combine these in an analysis of universal rules underlying all pos-
sible symbol-mediated interactions.
The universal-pragmatic communication theory considers the real, social life-world
(Lebenswelt) of subjects (that share a common world) to be the basis of all language func-
tions (including the signifying function); it therefore principally binds language as a sign
system (in all its functions) to communication situations (HABERMAS, 1984, 1985, 1989).
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According to Habermas, the conventionality of the signs does not reflect a conventionali-
ty of the rules underlying successful sign-mediated interactions. Before communicating
with one another (a) about  something (b), fundamental rules must be fulfilled; these rules
predate any type of conventionality and are the focus of the universal-pragmatic analysis.
The real life-world (Lebenswelt) is what provides those situational contexts in which the
acquired and innate competence (linguistic and communicative as well as cognitive) in
applying an explicit or implicit consciousness of rules can be practiced, maintained,
expanded and altered.
Universal pragmatics also lays claim to being able to explain the innovative, generative
constitution of rules in both language and communication. It orients itself according to
the theory of the speech acts, which is also anchored in the concept of the life-world
(Lebenswelt). This theory investigates those situational contexts in which individual
members of a social life-form participate in different ways, in which these members
assume different perspectives in changing roles, in which they are coordinated according
to divergent expectations and, based on these expectations, take on positions from which
they articulate specific claims and intent. This explains the affinities of the universal-
pragmatic communication theory to social theory and sociolinguistics as well as its
recourse to the theory of science in its methodological discourse.
„Finally, communicative action is dependent on situational contexts, which represent in
turn segments of the life-world of the participants in interaction. The connection of action
theory to the basic concepts of social theory can be rendered secure by means of the con-
cept of the life-world; this will be introduced as a complementary concept to communica-
tive action via the analysis of background knowledge stimulated by Wittgenstein.“
(HABERMAS, 1985, p. 278 f.)
Thus, universal pragmatics is no longer interested in the universal rules of well-structured
sentences, but rather in the ability of subjects - in communicative situations - to achieve a
common, consensual understanding of the self and of the world. As opposed to the
„action - reaction“ explanatory model, it attempts to define the relationship between lan-
guage and communication based on the range of general communication prerequisites.
2.3.1. Several differences between the linguistic and the universal-pragmatic 
analysis of language and communication
One of the key differences is the following: The analysis of elementary units of language
(sentences) in linguistics stands in contrast to the analysis of elementary units of commu-
nication (utterances) in universal pragmatics. At the same time, the universal-pragmatic
communication theory distinguishes itself from earlier theories of communication (Ch.
Morris): it combined the model of language behaviorism („the symbolically mediated
behavioral reaction of the stimulated individual organism“) with the model of informa-
tion transmission („encoding and decoding  signals between sender and receiver for a
given channel and at - least -  partially - common  store of  signs“), and was thus unable
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to fully answer the question regarding the general preconditions for possible communica-
tion.
„For example, the intersubjectivity of meanings that are identical for at least two speakers
does not even become a problem (I) if the identity of meanings is reduced to extensional-
ly equivalent classes of behavioral properties, as is done in linguistic behaviorism; or (2)
if it is pre-established at the analytic level that there exists a common code and store of
signs between sender and receiver, as is done in information theory.“ (HABERMAS,
1979, p. 6)
The linguistic approach to language and communication is, according to Habermas, poor-
ly suited to reconstruct the preconditions for communication because the definition of its
basic tenets hardly penetrates the „level of accidental contexts“ (I) and arrives at no
assumption of binding  prerequisites for language and communication (II). At the same
time it attempts to fully grasp pragmatic relationships with the tools of logic and gram-
mar, such as in the case of the „syntactic explanation of the performative nature of speech
acts“. For example, the fact that logics of norms traces norms of action back to commands
shows that basic concepts are being formalized; these, according to Habermas, have been
thoroughly analyzed. According to Habermas, the „model of the isolated, purposive-
rational actor“ is simply not suited to adequately reconstruct central elements of commu-
nication like „the common ground in understanding identical meanings“ or the „aknowl-
edgment of intersubjective validity claims.“ (HABERMAS, 1979, p. 8).
Although linguistic expressions can, of course, be studied from various points of view,
universal pragmatics does appear to be uniquely suited to substantially enrich our under-
standing of language and communication by systematically investigating one aspect - the
establishment of an intersubjective relationship.
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Theoretical Level Object Domain
Linguistics Sentences
Grammar Sentences of an individual language
Grammatical theory Rules for generating sentences in 
any language whatever
Aspects of linguistic analysis
Phonetic theory Inscriptions (language sounds)
Syntactic theory Syntactical rules
Semantic theory Lexical units
Pragmatics Speech actions
Empirical pragmatics Context-bound speech actions
Universal pragmatics Rules for using sentences in utterances
Aspects of universal-pragmatic analysis
Theory of elementary propositions Acts of reference and predication
Theory of first-person sentences Linguistic expression of intentions
Theory of illocutionary acts Establishment of interpersonal relations
Fig. 1  Analytical levels (from: HABERMAS, 1979, p. 33)
„Phonetics investigates linguistic expressions as inscriptions in an underlying medium
(i.e., as formations of  sound). Syntactic theory investigates linguistic expressions with
regard to the formal connections of the smallest meaningful units. Semantic theory inves-
tigates the meaning content of linguistic expressions. (...) General pragmatic theory, on
the other hand, is occupied with reconstructing the rule system the underlies the abilidy of
a subject to utter sentences in any relevant Situation“ (HABERMAS, 1979, p. 32)
Within his theory of pragmatics, Habermas describes three general pragmatic functions
which „are the basis of all the particular functions that an utterance can assume in specif-
ic contexts“, i.e., especially (I) „with the help of a sentence, to represent something in the
world, (II) to express the speakers intentions, (III) and to establish legitimate interperson-
al relations.“ (ibid., p. 33)
The pragmatic theory expressly wishes to avoid confusing the relational aspect with the
information transmission aspect, or the assignment of the former to the latter. It is thus
one of the features of functioning everyday communication between communicating sub-
jects that the understandability of expressions largely depends on an indeterminable num-
ber of assumptions that are not explicitly stated in the expression, i.e., that are unspoken;
these assumptions are made both by the speaker and the listener and can perhaps best be
determined by analyzing lifeforms (Lebensformen) in a commonly shared life-world
(Lebenswelt).  An approach that characterizes everyday communication by dealing with
the coding of private ideas, the information transmission, and the decoding of syntactic-
semantic information by a receiver appears to neglect essential aspects of intersubjective
exchange.
This makes it imperative to differentiate between (a) linguistic and (b) communicative
systems of rules and the respective abilities to use these. While linguistic competence
describes the mastery of a system of rules that allows sequences of language expressions
to be produced, communicative competence describes the ability to master a system of
rules that allows intersubjective relationships to be established. The „grammar“ of lan-
guage play (communication process) is not to be confused with the grammar of a lan-
guage: language play refers to intersubjective  relationships, while language refers to a
system of signs.
2.3.2. Features of speech actions
Austin’s theory of speech acts certainly provided a major impetus for the universal-prag-
matic communication theory. In the framework of this theory, Austin attempted to inves-
tigate linguistic utterances as rule governed acts, within interactive contexts. The result
was the differentiation of speech acts according to three aspects:
(a) the locutionary aspect, or the verbal expression itself; 
(b) the illocutionary aspect, or the act that is fulfilled with this expression; this is
closely related to the implementational aspect (performative act); 
(c) the perlocutionary aspect, or the effect that an act of speech has on the listener.
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Here, focus is turned on linguistic utterances as acts carried out by interaction subjects in
dialog situations. 
The illocutionary aspect in particular - as the differentiation between the verbal utterance
itself and the act by which it is expressed - has been the subject of detailed study: the rela-
tionship between the utterance and the act of utterance can decide which meaning the
speaker attaches to the particular utterance, and this meaning may not even be explicit in
the content of the utterance. Illocutive aspects can therefore hardly be explained by ana-
lyzing the utterance syntactic-semantically because they gain their specific meaning pri-
marily from common assumptions, expectations, and role interpretations. 
Everyday communication provides a never ending spectrum of differentiated illocutive
aspects which, according to Habermas, can best be systematized by a universal-pragmat-
ic analysis of the conditions of possible understanding (Verständigung). In contrast, a
nominalistic theory of meaning, which restricts the meaning to the intention of the speak-
er, is up against a difficult task: it can hardly satisfactorily explicate those intersubjective
relationships that are central to illocutionary aspects, for example role playing, mutual
expectations, or the claims raised and redeemed in communicative actions. 
Habermas formulates 4 regions as the systematic site of language: „The“ World of
External Nature (I), „Our“ World of  Society (II), „My“ World of Internal Nature (III),
and language itself (IV). „The „ World of External Nature is the subject of expressions
dealing with objects and circumstances (from an objectifying perspective). These expres-
sions lay claim to truth. The expressions dealing with „Our“ World of Society mainly
involve a performative approach, whose claim lies in rightness. The main approaches
themselves can also be altered: „We can replace this confirmative attitude with an objec-
tivating attitude toward society; conversely, we can switch to a confirmative attitude in
domains in which (today) we normally behave objectivatingly - for example, in relation to
animals and plants.“ (ibid., p.66) 
The expressions referring to „My“ World of Internal Nature are predominantly of a per-
formative nature; these include the subjectively accessible experiences, the very personal
intentions to which I have privileged access. The intention expressed lays claim to truth-
fullness. We refer to language by using language expressions, and it is a very feature of
human language and communication that natural languages allow us to express ourselves
metalinguistically about utterances: in everyday communication, language and metalan-
guage are fully compatible with one another. The approach can therefore be either per-
formative or objectifying. Above all, linguistic utterances must principally lay claim to
comprehensibility if they wish to be elements of comprehensible speech.
„The model intuitively introduced here is that of a communication in which grammatical
sentences are embedded, by way of universal validity claims, in three relations to reality,
thereby assuming the corresponding pragmatic functions of representing facts, establish-
ing legitimate interpersonal relations, and expressing one´s own subjectivity“ (67).
37
Modes of General
Domains of Communication; Functions 
Reality Basic Attitudes Validity Claims of Speech
„The“ World of Cognitive: Truth Representation
External Nature Objectivating of Facts
Attitude
„Our“ World of Interactive: Rightness Establishment of
Society Conformative Legitimate Inter-
Attitude personal Relations
„My“ World of Expressive: Truthfullness Disclosure of
Internal Nature Expressive Speaker´s
Attitude Subjectivity
Language ––––––––––– Compre- –––––––––––
hensibility
Fig. 2   The universal-pragmatic model of language 
(from: HABERMAS, 1979, p. 68)
In speech acts, various types of sentences are used to produce utterances about the three
reference points mentioned above (and language itself). Accordingly, Habermas classifies
various acts of speech:
- constative speech-acts: elementary declarative sentences are used to refer to
something in the objective world; 
- expressive speech-acts: elementary sentences based in experience are used to
refer to something in the subjective world; 
- regulative speech-acts: the speaker uses elementary sentences of declaration
and intention to refer to something in the social, commonly shared world; 
- imperative speech-acts: the speaker refers to a condition of the world that
he/she desires and that he/she attempts to attain by influencing the decisions of
others to bring about this condition;
- communicative speech-acts serve to organize speech; 
- operative speech-acts serve to implement constructive rules, e.g., of logic,
grammar, and mathematics. „They serve at the same time to describe what one
does in constructing symbolic expressions in conformity with generative
rules“.(HABERMAS, 1985, p. 326)
This classification can be meaningfully expanded to include generative speech-acts (H.
Peukert terms these innovative speech acts; PEUKERT, 1978, p. 296f.). They serve to
constitute new, never-before present sentences and acts and may well go hand in hand
with the constitution of new language and communicative rules (to discover something,
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invent something, compose something, think up something, to write something, etc.).
New forms of action can be constituted with such speech acts.
2.3.3. Gaining the faculty for language and the possibilities of defining the ego
The universal-pragmatic communication theory attempts to explain the acquisition of
communicative competence by adolescents through their increasing ability to define their
ego.
„With training in the basic modes of language use, the growing child gains the ability to
demarcate the subjectivity of his own expressions from the objectivity of an external real-
ity, from the normativity of society, and from the intersubjectivity of the medium of lan-
guage itself. In learning to deal hypothetically with the corresponding validity claims, he
practices drawing the categorial distinctions between essence and appearance, being and
illusion, „is“ and „ought“, sign and meaning. With these modalities of being he gets hold
of the deceptive phenomena that first spring from the unwilling confusion between his
own subjectivity, on the one hand, and the domains of the objective, the normative, and
the intersubjective, on the other. He now knows how one can master the confusions, pro-
duce de-differentiations intentionally, and employ them in fiction, wit, irony, and the
like.“ (HABERMAS, 1985, p. 332)
The acquisition of this capability is also the prerequisite for meaningfullness in genera-
tive speech-acts: their constitutive character only crystallizes vis-à-vis the established
normativity in society, the subjectively experienced world, intersubjec-tivity, and the
interpretation of the circumstances in the objective world. Generative speech-acts change,
expand, or transform existing valuations and norms, establish new rules of a linguistic
and/or communicative nature, and function to broaden horizons in the communicative
constitution of the world, which is an intersubjective process.
With the acquisition of communicative competence and the ability to define the ego, one
gains the ability to modalize one’s actions.
Mode of Type of Thematic
Communication Speech Action Theme Validity Claim
Cognitive Constatives Propositional Truth
content
Interactive Regulatives Interpersonal Rightness
relation appropriateness
Expressive Avowals Speaker´s Truthfulness
intention
Fig. 3  Modes of communication (from: HABERMAS, 1979, p. 58)
„Up until now, we have determined the system of ego definition through regions („The“
World of External Nature, „Our“ World of society, „My“ World of internal Nature and
language itself) that can be experienced in a particular manner or that are „given“ (objec-
tivity, normativity, subjectivity, intersubjectivity), whereby the corresponding language
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use thematically accentuates certain claims (truth, rightness, truthfullness, comprehensi-
bility). As soon as these claims are hypothetically formulated and negate, the individual
regions become modalized.“ (HABERMAS, 1984, p.211)
According to Habermas, this can give rise to unintentional confusion, for example
between appearance and reality, reality and the ideal, etc., along with the potential to pro-
duce intentional confusion („...we are also in a position to intentionally bring about modal
confusion“, ibid. p. 213).
2.3.4. The communicative or the cognitive aspect of linguistic communication
The universal-pragmatic communication theory differentiates between linguistic utter-
ances (verbal utterances) and non-linguistic utterances (gestures, facial expressions, etc.).
According to Habermas, linguistic communication is only possible when the communi-
cating partners enter into two comcurrent levels of communication, namely (a) the level
of intersubjectivity and (b) the level of experiences and circumstances backed by com-
monly shared knowledge. From this perspective, linguistic communication is always
communication (a) with one another and (b) about something. If linguistic communica-
tion concentrates on the level of intersubjectivity (communicative aspect), then, although
the propositional content of the expression is mentioned, the main focus is on actions,
such as warning someone about something, promising something to someone, inviting
someone to do something, etc.
If the main focus in the linguistic communication is the cognitive aspect, then there is less
emphasis on illocutive than on locutive aspects; the thematization of the expressive con-
tent and the interpersonal, intersubjective relationship have only peripheral status.
2.3.5. Actions and behavior
The universal-pragmatic communication theory differentiates between actions and
behavior based on a concept of adherence to rules, whereby something can be construed
as action when the acting subject knows that it is following a rule and is perhaps even in
a position to state which rule it is following. Here, Habermas distinguishes between
human action and animal behavior:
„A private modification of this everyday pre-understanding allows us to interpret directed
animal behavior according to the model of conscious rule-adherence, whereby we can
attribute to the animal a fundamentally explicable awareness of rules (albeit one that is
not explicable to the animal itself).“ (HABERMAS, 1984, p. 273)
Habermas considers mere behavior to be the correct term to describe observations when
no implicit awareness of rules can be perceived, yet when the organism exhibits a mini-
mum capability to act, for example to distinguish - in some way - between action and
inaction, or action and suffering (ibid.). 
Habermas differentiates three types of action, namely to act instrumentally (I), the manip-
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ulation of objects; to act strategically (II), the exertion of influence on the decisions of
rationally acting subjects; to act  norm-regulated (III), the communication between sub-
jects in a commonly shared social life-world (Lebenswelt).
2.3.6. Human communication versus animal communication
The distinction between action and behavior already provides the foundation for differen-
tiating between human and animal communication. While the universal-pragmatic com-
munication theory by no means principally denies the possibility of animal communica-
tion, it does largely reduce it to the realm of simple signal languages. The theory does,
however, deny the possibility of using symbol languages in the sense of arbitrary sign
systems whose signs have conventional rather than natural meaning. Nevertheless, some
of Habermas’ comments do also acknowledge the symbolic character of non-verbal com-
munication (gestures, facial expressions, etc.):
„...  Or, I can understand the actions of the other creature as a symbolic  expression; in this
case the coherence of the successive actions should adhere to rules that specify a system
of symbols and that determine which physical characters function as signs and which
meanings can be attributed to them under which situations of use“. (HABERMAS, 1984,
p. 55).
Accordingly, the term symbol-mediated interaction can be interpreted broadly enough to
also be applicable in non-human communication processes. Habermas clearly believes
that the typical human, propositionally differentiated manner of speech is a separate enti-
ty:
„In this abstraction of propositional content from the asserted proposition, a fundamental
accomplishment of our language is expressed. Propositionally differentiated speech dis-
tinguishes itself therein from the symbollically mediated interaction we can already
observe among primates“ (ibid., p. 41)
The difference between human and animal languages is that, in the language communi-
ties of animals, the meanings of signs also constitute themselves in species-specific envi-
ronments, yet „without them being grasped by the organisms as meaning. This, however,
is precisely the condition that can be fulfilled at the level of communication conveyed
through symbolic meaning.“ (HABERMAS, 1984, p. 349).
Another proponent of philosophical  pragmatics freely relinquishes the investigation of
non-human language and communication to behavioristic interpretations, even if it means
abandoning suitable explanations of association processes, behavioral coordination, and
at least sign-mediated interactions in species-specific environments and in animal com-
munities. 
„In the case of  ’animal languages’ it is useful to attribute the individual communicating
partners with something along the lines of programming in the sense of an innate signal
code. In both cases it is neither necessary nor reasonable to attribute them with anything
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resembling metalinguistic and metacommunicative attendant awareness - basically an
understanding of communication as a symbol-mediated interaction between partners. In
this respect we are dealing here with „monologic“ communication models in the sense of
Habermas. They can, in fact, be ’explained’ by law-like hypotheses and peripheral condi-
tions (i.e., based on the postulated signal programs and the particular storage and trans-
mission conditions in or between the signal senders and receivers)“. (APEL, 1976, p. 298).
It may well be justified to assume the absence of metalanguage and metacommunicative
attendant awareness here (or the absence of an understanding of communication as sym-
bol-mediated interaction). Whether this is sufficient to relegate the communication forms
in living nature - as they pertain to possible communications types - to the explanatory
models of biology alone (within the framework of traditional natural science methodolo-
gy) remains questionable: Apel, in his work, has repeatedly argued in principle against
„monologic“ communication models, while conceding that they do present an opportuni-
ty to explain non-human communication. The possibility that more complex forms of lan-
guage and communication, beyond those forms found in humans and animals, could exist
is given no further thought; the same holds true for „understanding“ living nature.
Modern communication theories concentrate almost exclusively on the realm of human
interaction.
2.4. Language and communication - A working hypothesis
Those descriptions of observations made on non-human living nature that rely on the
terms „language and communication“ or „sign-mediated rule governed interaction“
appear to overwhelm communication theories that restrict the use of these terms to the
level of human action. 
Apparently there is no other option but to leave the analysis of „objective“ nature up to
biological research and its empirical use of language; this research uses language and
communication - based on the hypothesis of physically determinable laws of nature - as
metaphors for a representation function on the one hand (language) and a „stimulus-reac-
tion“ function (communication) on the other hand. This allows a postulated „Sein der
Dinge an sich“ to be approached in an infinite approximation.
This image is contradicted by the fact that biological research also needs greater insight
into its use of language in order to more precisely grasp the relationship: researcher - ver-
bal description of the research objectives - the object of study - theoretical explanation. 
Empirical research is expected to apply the empirical method to make reliable statements
about the language that it uses, for example about the conditions of possible understand-
ing in general. This leads to the paradox that empirical methods need to be applied to dis-
cover fundamental language principles that are already preconditions for any empirical
analysis. To the extent that the biological sciences work with the concepts language and
communication, one can recommend that this approach be supplemented by complemen-
tary methods that can analyze these two terms not empirically, but rather with regard to
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the essential conditions of language and communication, as they reveal themselves to
human self-understanding (Selbstverständnis) via the analysis of immediate and mediate
intersubjectivity. 
„I would like to advocate the thesis that we are unable to understand either causality itself
or the differences between lawful interlinks and accidental regularities in nature without
recurring to reflections on the effect of carrying out some act and some intended inter-
vention into the course of nature“ (v. WRIGHT, 1974, p. 68).
Research in the behavioral, socio- and molecular biological disciplines (and ultimately in
evolutionary theory and taxonomy) is called upon to orient our approximation of the
terms language and communication in the sense of depicting their major features at the
linguistic, pragmatic-semiotic, and universal-pragmatic/communication theoretical inter-
pretation level. This approach must always bear in mind that 
(a) empirical discussions about observations in the biological realm can operate
with a broader language and communication concept than can be substantiated
within an empiristic scientific language; 
(b) linguistic discussion, in the case of syntactic/semantic analyses, will never
fully clarify the terms language and communication; 
(c) semiotic discussions principally underline the significance of pragmatic analy-
ses, but, in focusing on the information transmission process, reduce these to
the framework of a coding-decoding model;
(d) Input from universal-pragmatics and communication theory can contribute to
our understanding of the preconditions for communication (an aspect neglect-
ed in the above-mentioned realms), yet restricts these to interaction processes
between human subjects.
In the present study, which investigates whether living nature is structured  and organized
in a language-like and communicative manner, I therefore suggest defining language and
communication such that 
(a) empirical observations whose explations rely on terms such as language and
communication are open to syntactic/grammatic, semantic, and pragmatic
analyses; 
(b) principally all potential structures and processes that appear in interaction
processes can be interpreted in the framework of sign processes (semioses)
which bear syntactic/grammatic, semantic, and pragmatic features (that imply
real sign users and sign interpreters). 
(c) the discussion against the backdrop of universal-pragmatic communica-
tion theory must always keep in mind that the sign users or interpreters
involved in a sign-mediated interaction do not represent monadologic, iso-
lated individuals; rather, they are members of a species-specific life-world
(Lebenswelt) that share an evolutionary heritage and whose behavior is
subject to a commonly shared repertoire of rules.
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In summary, I orward a useful working hypothesis that understands language and com-
munication as (a) a system of signs and (b) sign-mediated rule governed interactions
, that find use in real sign processes to coordinate behavior and to form associations
between organisms, and that are represented by real sign users and interpreters
sharing a common life-world (Lebenswelt).
2.4.1. Three communication types in living nature
Biological organisms are - according to my thesis - interwoven in three types of commu-
nication during the course of their lives.
(a) Every organism consists of cells. The investigation whether sign processes
(sign-mediated rule governed interactions) take place within the cell (intracel-
lularly) or between cells (intercellularly) can be subsumed under the title
„intraorganismic communication“. 
(b) The investigation of sign processes  (sign-mediated rule governed interactions)
between members of the same species can be subsumed under the title
„interorganismic communication. 
(c)  The investigation of sign processes (sign mediated rule governed interactions)
between organisms belonging to different species can be subsumed under the
title „metaorganismic communication“.
From this cursory treatment of the terms language and communication I will proceed to a
description of sign-mediated interactions in the field of ethology (interorganismic com-
munication) and subsequently to sign processes in the realm of molecular biology (intra-
organismic communication).
Only after a quite detailed treatment of the various processes (especially in the case of
intraorganismic communication) will I proceed to the next step. This involves analyzing
which assumptions biology makes in its definition of the terms language and communi-
cation and how potential definitional deficits might be removed by reflecting on the
results of the universal-pragmatic theory of communication. This would
a) enable biology in the broadest sense to employ the terms language and communication
consistently (in the language philosophical and communication theoretical sense as well);
this would contribute both to defining biology’s own self-understanding
(Selbstverständnis) and to explain biological processes that lie outside the realm of
human self-understanding; 
b) enable research in communication theory to not only understand human language and
communication but also to grasp that non-human nature is also structured and organized
in a language like and communicative manner.
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3. Languages in nature
Communication serves to promote understanding and to coordinate action and behavior
as well as to form associations between linguistic-competent individuals. The use of lin-
guistic signs takes place in specific language media, whereby actions or behaviors (in
sequences of actions or behaviors) can also assume sign-like character. This sign use
takes place in regulative, constative and - less frequently - in generative linguistic action
as well, or in linguistic behavior that is also characterized by regulative, constative and
generative features. The rules that underlie or govern linguistic behavior or linguistic
action stem largely from a social interaction process. The individual’s genetic makeup
gives it the ability to communicate in a species-specific environment. As I hope to show
later, the entire realm of genetic imprinting can be understood as intraorganismic com-
munication. 
The interorganismic communication we will discuss here, i.e., the rule-governed, sign-
mediated interaction between conspecifics is based on a genetically acquired ability. The
increased skill in following these rules goes hand in hand with the improved ability to use
linguistic signs within rule-governed interactions between individuals of a real, species-
specific, life-world (Lebenswelt). Non-human individuals are unaware of these underly-
ing rules, nor are they able to explicate the rules as rules.
In dealing with living organisms, behavioral biology is largely concerned with the inves-
tigation of rule-governed interactions in the animal kingdom. It has been able to discover
a wide range of rules governing trans-specific and species-specific interactions. From the
vantage point of language philosophy, the fact that rule-governed, sign-mediated interac-
tions do take place is more interesting than how they take place. The language and com-
munication of the honeybee, which has been studied in great detail, can serve as an exam-
ple for non-human language (FRISCH, 1952, 1953, 1955, 1965, 1971; LINDAUER,
1975, 1981; SEELEY, 1982; HEINRICH, 1981). This can be illustrated by two cases in
which communication, coordination of behavior, and the formation of associations are
achieved through linguistic signs.
3.1. Honeybees in the northern hemisphere
Honeybees originally stem from the warm regions of the Earth. The extension of their
range into the northern hemisphere brought with it the problem of how to deal with longer
cold periods. Winter requires the development of a specific survival strategy that was
unnecessary at the geographic and phylogenetic origins of honeybees.
Searching for and finding suitable overwintering sites is critical for the survival of honey-
bees in temperate and more northern latitudes. The complex communication and behav-
ioral coordination of individuals in this community requires correspondingly differentiat-
ed communication abilities and skills; without this, no suitable housing could be selected.
A mistake in the selection of a hive leaves no opportunity for a second attempt: the cor-
rect choice is a life or death situation for the bee colony. Today we know that only one
fourth of all newly established bee colonies survive the first winter (SEELEY, 1982).
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Once the bees survive the first winter in a well-chosen site, the probability of surviving
for another five years is high. How does the selection of an appropriate site take place?
3.1.1. The sign-mediated communication process
behind the founding of a new colony
In the cold season, the bee colony forms a tight aggregation in its hive. A great number of
bees join to form a type of outer shield; fine quivering movements of their flight muscles
help maintain an ambient temperature of at least 10˚ C in the colony. Abundant supplies
of honey ward off starvation. Spring marks the beginning of an intensive phase of brood
rearing, and newly emerging bees lead to dense colonies and reduced space in the hive.
Precisely this condition is a sign for the worker honey bees to construct queen cells in
which a number of future queens can be reared simultaneously (ibid.). The old queen uses
sound signs to communicate with the enclosed future queens. If one imitates the sounds
of the enclosed future queens with the appropriate instruments, then the old queen
answers these artificially produced sounds quite specifically. Although the queen is
known to communicate with the future queens, the subject of the communication remains
unknown. Before the replacements emerge and decide the future leadership of the colony
in a stinging duel, the mother queen leaves the nest with half the original colony.
The initial flight is rather short, in any case less than 50 m (ibid.). The queen alights on a
more or less suitable object and is immediately surrounded by a cluster of bees. As soon
as the cluster is completed, a few hundred so-called scouts swarm out to search the terrain
for a suitable new hive. These scouts are the oldest bees in the colony, i.e., those that have
already collected food for the original colony and are therefore already familiar with the
surroundings. 
The selection criteria for the new home are quite differentiated (ibid; LINDAUER, 1975,
p. 49): The height of the entrance hole must lie at least 2 m above the ground in order to
effectively rule out any disturbance of the colony by other animals. The opening of the
hole should be no larger than 50 cm in order to permit reliable regulation of the hive’s
internal climate in winter, even if the temperatures drop to very low values. The hole
should also face south: this enables the bees to swarm out and defecate at even the slight-
est outside temperature increases in winter. The volume of the entire hive should not be
less than 10  l in order to provide sufficient room for the honey stores the colony needs to
overwinter; at the same time, volumes in excess of 100 l make the regulation of the inside
temperature difficult. The presence of old honeycombs is a positive criterion because it
considerably reduces or even eliminates the time- and energy-consuming effort of honey-
comb construction (ibid.)
Each of the scouts that has swarmed out returns to the colony as soon as she has found a
site that seems suitable. She lands in the swarm and begins to carry out the characteristic
movements that researchers have been termed dances (LINDAUER, 1975, p. 32). Such
dances are displayed not only during the search for new hives, but also in locating suitable
feeding sites. The dances have a communicatory character and represent linguistic signs
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whose expression enables comprehensible information to be relayed to other bees.
Because the scouts do not return with pollen or nectar, the dance is not a message about
feeding sites but rather about where and in which direction a suitable place to build a hive
can be found. These so-called waggle dance resembles a figure-of-eight in whose central
section the abdomen is waggled. The waggle dance can be defined as constative linguis-
tic behavior (ibid. p. 62): The direction of the central section of the danced figure-eight
points into the direction of the new site in relation to the respective position of the sun
(LINDAUER, 1975, p. 121f.; v. FRISCH, 1965, p. 333f.). 
The greater the distance to the prospective site, the longer the waggling motion for that
particular stretch lasts. Four other scouts observe the waggle dance from close quarters.
Each scout advertizes her discovery with her own dance. The more suitable she believes
her discovery to be, the more vigorous the dance. The greater a scout’s doubt about her
own discovery, the more subdued her dance. The latter are quickly attracted to the dances
of their more agitated neighbors and follow up on the communication of one such danc-
ing bee: they fly to the site indicated by the dance and inspect the so avidly promoted
hive. After the inspection, these scouts return to the swarm: each scout that is more con-
vinced of the new hive than of the one she originally found, begins an agitated dance to
promote the new site. One after the other, all sites that were avidly promoted by scouts are
visited by the other scouts. This consensus-building process gradually leads to agreement
on one site (SEELEY, 1982)
It should be mentioned that the inspection of a potential hive site is a quite a precise
process: the bee walks up and down the entire hollow, often covering a distance of 50 m
(ibid.). This allows her to cover the entire inner surface of the cavity. When a scout gives
up her original, first discovery and consensually agrees with the other scouts on another
site, then the experienced scouts are in true agreement (ibid. )
The new bee hive can be up to 10 km away from the original site. The search lasts no
more than three to four days. If no suitable place is found, then the bees begin construct-
ing a hive directly at the first landing site and, since such hives cannot withstand the win-
ter weather, the colony dies during the first cold spell.
If, on the other hand, the scouts have agreed on a new site, they force their way to the sur-
face of the bee cluster in a zigzag course.  At this point the entire colony begins to beat its
wings in order to raise its temperature to 36˚ C (SEELEY, 1982; HEINRICH, 1981). This
is a necessary precondion for the bees to be able to fly after this quiescent state. If the
colony is knocked off balance before this temperature is reached, the whole swarm falls
to the ground. When, after a few minutes, the correct temperature is reached, the scouts
give the sign to take off: they force the aggregated bees apart in a series of so-called
buzzing runs. The entire swarm disperses and ascends into the air, forming a cloud of
bees with a diameter of approximately 10 m. Within this cloud, the scouts repeatedly take
off into the direction of the new site, thereby showing the other bees the correct bearing of
the destination. In the first 30 m the swarm makes only very slow progress, but it picks up
speed dramatically over the next 200 m. 
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Upon reaching the newly selected site, the scouts emit a sign (v. FRISCH, 1965, p. 236
with a reference to Lindauer). The nature of this sign is still unknown. At any rate, the
swarm reacts to this sign and comes to a standstill above the new hive. The scouts drop
from the stationary swarm, alight on the entrance of the new home, and precisely mark it
with a scent. Shortly thereafter the entire swarm takes over the hive. Within hours they
remove all dirt, begin immediately with building the combs, and fly in search of pollen
and nectar. This marks the end of this specific communication process until the following
year.
3.1.2. The sign-mediated communication process of foraging
The second display of honeybee language that I describe here picks up where the first left
off. It plays an equally important role in enabling the bee colony to survive over the win-
ter. 
So-called foraging bees are responsible for finding suitable food sources. Upon finding
such a site, the forager returns to the surface of the hive and begins her own waggle dance.
She brings along pollen and nectar, which not only informs the other bees that the dance
refers to a feeding site and not to a new hive site (FRISCH, 1955, 1970), but also provides
information on the quality and quantity of the food. The linguistic signs and the sequence
of these signs are the same as in the first communication process described above (in
which only scouts were involved). In this case, however, the waggle dance sequences are
relevant to all encountered foragers, prompting them to collect food in the described
direction and described distance. The constative linguistic behavior has changed into reg-
ulative linguistic behavior. The linguistic behavior is different, the communication
processes pursue different goals, yet the linguistic signs that are employed have remained
the same. 
The above scenario refers only to information on feeding sites that are more than 25 m
away. The bees again dance a figure-eight. The orientation of the central section of the
„8“ signals the direction of the feeding site in relation to the position of the sun. If the
dance takes place on a vertical honeycomb, the deviation in direction between the feeding
site and the sun’s position is accurately recreated as the deviation from the vertical (v.
FRISCH, 1965). As in the case of the first communication process, distances are depicted
temporally: the waggling in the central section of the „8“ lasts longer for longer stretches
than it does for short ones. Thus, waggling for one second can indicate a distance of 500
m, while waggling for two seconds can indicate two kilometers. Other bees follow the
waggle-dancing bee at close quarters, whereby certain odors provide additional informa-
tion about the site. Rather than approaching such places directly, the individual bees take
small detours. They orientate themselves according to distinctive landscape features.
These orientations are determined in an arbitrary manner and are specific for the individ-
ual bee: they are not communicated to the others. If certain orientational features are
experimentally altered, some bees can briefly become disoriented.
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3.2. Further features of communication in honeybees
3.2.1. The types of dances: Their sign characters and their meaning
To date, nine different dance types have been identified as linguistic signs (v. FRISCH,
1965):
1) The round-dance is a call to search for food in all directions within a radius of
25 m. 
2) The waggle-dance describes the direction of the destination in terms of the
respective position of the sun and defines the distance. 
3) The Rumpel-dance describes a conspicuous type of movement made by suc-
cessfully returning foragers. They hastily make their way across the honey-
comb, bumping into colony members and informing them that something is
going on, e.g., that food is available. 
4) The Ruck-dance is carried out by foragers that are emptying their honey sacs
and involves intermittent, directed tail wagging. It serves more to indicate a
general dancing mood than to impart any specific message. 
5) The sickel-dance has been observed in every bee species (with one exception)
in the transition between the round-dance and the waggle dance (figure-eight).
The opening of the „sickel“ in the dance pattern denotes the direction to the
feeding site. 
6) The buzzing run is the sign to disperse. Scouts barge through the interlocked
bees in the swarm in an undirected, zigzag course and audibly buzz their
wings. 
7) In the Putzlauf the bee shakes its body from one side to the other. 
8) In the vibration-dance, one bee takes up contact with another, whereby it rapid-
ly vibrates its abdomen. The meaning of this dance has not yet been deci-
phered, although their is strong evidence that it involves a communication form
combining dance and acoustic signals. 
9) Finally, the Zitter-dance is an expression of neurotic behavior and is disregard-
ed by the surrounding bees. Research has shown it to be a result of a traumatic
experience such as severe impact, poisoning, injury to appendages, or extreme
state of alarm.
The type of  sign use that we designate as dances is a genetically acquired linguistic com-
petence: even without prior socialization, i.e., the presence of older bees, juveniles devel-
op the ability to collect food, to dance, and to communicate messages that others can
understand and react to specifically. Nevertheless, subsequent social contact with bees of
the same age is important: carrying out linguistic behavior and heeding the calls for spe-
cific action require some degree of practice and experience in participating in mutual
interactions. 
While the ability of bees to take their bearings according to the respective position of the
sun is innate, the specific skills are gained and perfected in the course of a few days of fly-
49
ing experience. Interestingly, bees recognize the sun as having a 24-hour course, so that
they can carry out their dance at the correct angle vis-à-vis the sun even in the dark (v.
FRISCH, 1965; LINDAUER, 1975, p. 129f.).
3.2.2. Forms of communication beyond dance
Honeybees exhibit other forms of communication that are either combined with or sepa-
rate from the communicatory dances themselves. Various wing-beating frequencies or
abdominal vibrations can transmit movement frequencies on suitable substrates (KIRCH-
NER/TOWNE, 1994); other bees are able to identify their meaning. This is evident in the
specific reactions to certain frequencies (v. FRISCH, 1965, p. 285f.). 
Odors, which are actively employed, are apparently an even more significant form of
danceless communication (v. FRISCH, 1965, p. 504f., p. 22f.). During her nuptial flight,
the queen bee emits scents that attract the males (drones). The bees positioned at the
entrance hole of the hive beat their wings to waft the smell of their scent glands toward
the arriving workers and thus guide them to the entrance. 
The scent glands are also used to mark certain food sources, enabling other bees to find
these sites more easily. Bees that are threatened or attacked extend their sting and whir
their wings to exude an alarm scent which is not identical with bee poison. The alarm
induces members of the colony to attack. This attack is generally directed at moving
objects in the vicinity.
3.2.3. Humans can understand the bee language
Once one has understood the bees’ linguistic behavior and their use of linguistic signs at
the grammatic, semantic, and pragmatic level, it should be possible to identify the practi-
cal meaning of the information content. In fact, bee researchers, by observing the dances,
were able to locate the feeding sites down to the meter! The only deviations pertained to
direction, not to distance; humans are less adept than the studied bees at identifying the
bearing in relation to the sun’s position and potential sidewinds (v. FRISCH, 1965, p.
233f.).
3.2.4. Dialects of the bee language
Bee colonies form relative language communities that are distinguished by dialects.
Experimentally mixed colonies of Austrian and Italian bees revealed clear differences in
the interpretation of the dance tempo, which indicates the distance to the feeding site.
When the Austrian bees communicated a suitable feeding site at a distance of 300 m, for
example, the Italian bees executed the instruction in exactly the correct direction, yet over
a distance of 500 m. Vice versa, a 200 m dance by the Italian bees meant a much shorter
distance to the Austrian bees. Thus, despite applying identical rules to the same linguistic
signs, distinct differences existed in the meaning of the signs (v. FRISCH, 1965, p. 292f.)
In stingless bees, the use of symbolic signs in regulative and constative linguistic behav-
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ior to indicate direction and distance is not developed. These bees must accompany and
guide inexperienced conspecifics to every discovered food site.
3.2.5. Language and communication in bees
Twenty years before Karl von Frisch received the Nobel prize for his research into the bee
language, he was embroiled in a controversy involving so-called animal languages. He
was accused of improperly using the term language to describe specific behavioral feats.
His opponents argued that a very simple form of animal communication was involved,
but certainly not language. In his response („Sprache“ oder „Kommunikation“ der
Bienen?, 1953, p. 235f.), K. v. Frisch proves that it is justified to speak of the language of
bees because a system of signs is involved.
In this chapter I have discussed only two of many sign-mediated communication process-
es that can serve as examples of rule-governed, sign-mediated interactions between indi-
vidual bees in a colony. Each of these communication processes encompasses a series of
characteristic sign uses and sign combinations, whereby the context of usage clearly
determines the meaning of the utilized sign sequences. Furthermore, various forms of
behavior evidently take on sign character and, when combined, can take on meaning and
be understood as signs. The habitat specificity with which such language communities
apply their stock of signs is reflected in the different dialects of bee communities.
The communication of honeybees (a) with one another and (b) about something is neces-
sary to exchange information, coordinate behavior, and form associations between indi-
viduals of such social animal communities (LINDAUER, 1975, p. 145). Survival without
the sign-mediated interactions described above would be impossible. At the same time,
this example vividly illustrates how certain behavior can take on sign character within
behavior sequences.
Beyond using linguistic signs in regulative and constative linguistic behavior, bees must
originally have been able to perform generative linguistic behavior, thereby ultimately
constituting new life-forms. In order to survive the winter, the swarm first had to have
selected the correct overwintering site through appropriate communication. At some
point, the rules underlying this communication were innovatively generated, much in the
same way that the transition from signs with mere reference character (honey bees of
warmer latitudes) to symbolic sign systems (northern hemisphere bees) must have been a
marked innovative step. The ability to survive the winter eventually became fixed in the
genetic text of these surviving bee generations. We know that this happened, but can only
guess at how it happened.
The survival strategy of honeybees in colder latitudes clearly shows that communication
experience in generative linguistic behavior, which substantially and permanently
supercedes the originally innate language competence, can constitute an expanded com-
munication competence. This competence is hereditary in an expanded (or at least modi-
fied) form; in the context of social animals, it can be differentiated as broadened language
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play skills, for example through learning processes (LINDAUER, 1975, p. 138). How
else can the set of criteria for an ideal hive be so differentiated if the genetic imprinting
that orients the judgement on the potential of a new hive is not the result of rich, indeli-
able experience by previous generations of bees. Communication experience by real life-
forms can differentiate genetically imprinted and hereditary language and communica-
tion competence in a manner that expands and modifies the original genetic imprinting.
What, however, are the criteria behind the fact that certain experiences expand and
change the genetic text, while others do not? A fruitful discussion of this question calls
for prior examination of intraspecific communication. Examining the regulated interac-
tions between and within cells of an organism brings us closer to the constitution of the
genetic text.
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4. Intraorganismic communication
After having presented an example of interorganismic communication (bee language), I
would like to continue the investigation into whether living nature is structured and
organized in a linguistic and communicative manner by focusing on specific interactions
in and between cells. With the exception of the strictly unicellular organisms, all other
forms of life consist of a smaller or greater number of organs - specific associations of
cells - whose interaction enables the organism to function as a whole. Coordinated behav-
ior between these organs is a prerequisite for the survival of the overall organism and
enables it to interact with conspecifics as an individual in its specific environment. A
closer examination of the communication between cells of an organism (intercellular
communication) reveals that this, in turn, depends on successful behavioral coordination
of key regions within the cell. A meaningful discussion of intraorganismic communica-
tion must therefore begin with an account of intracellular communication. A considera-
tion of its basic principles is fundamental to understanding intercellular communication.
4.1. Intracellular communication
The range of interactions in and between cells of a living organism is the domain of
molecular biology. Thus, the term „cell communication“ was coined primarily by molec-
ular biologists to describe intercellular communication.
An initial analysis of living organisms shows them to be typically composed of a great
number of different cells rather than of a single cell whose size is variable. This multicel-
lularity, however, does not reflect the original condition of most organisms. At the very
beginning of its life, each organism consisted of a single cell. In order for this cell to give
rise to a multicellular organism required (1) a specific set of rules governing the produc-
tion of ever new cells, (2) the association of these cells to organs and tissues and (3) the
behavioral coordination between these cells. Reproductive capacity and metabolism are
two such coordinated behaviors performed by the individual cells and, later, by the entire
organism.
A prerequisite for a complex organism to develop from a single cell is the specific ability
of the cell to reproduce in a coordinated manner. The rules underlying this behavioral
coordination are contained in the nucleus of the cell, in the so-called genes. The cell’s
genes, in their totality, determine both the actual appearance of the fully developed organ-
ism and the course of the individual developmental stages. The totality of the genetic
information of an organism, along with its developmental blueprints, is termed the geno-
type, while the fully developed organism itself is the phenotype. The genotypes of the var-
ious genera, species, phyla, etc. clearly differ from one another, and the variety of pheno-
types provides visible evidence that the genetic codes and their ultimate expression are
different. At the same time, the underlying structure of each living cell of an organism is
basically very similar, as are its functions. The pathway leading from the genotype to the
phenotype is principally the same in all organisms.
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The manner in which the gene sequences constituting the genotype are formed, laid
down, and expressed resembles the production and application of written texts, which are
interpreted as transcripts of instructions, directives, as well as structural and production
blueprints. One can therefore refer to a genetic code - a symbolically encoded text (func-
tioning as linguistic signs) that defines the development and final configuration of an
organism. 
Chemical molecules are the building blocks in the sequences of linguistic signs. They are
joined to one another like letters are to words and words to sentences, the latter corre-
sponding to concrete behavioral directives. How is this genetic language, which is equal-
ly valid for all organisms, constructed? What does its grammer, semantics, and pragmat-
ics look like? Who or what are the sign users and what do the signs themselves really look
like? What is their meaning according to which rules and in which situational contexts?
Does something along the lines of communication processes exist here as well?
4.1.1. The sign-mediated communication process of protein synthesis
involving two intracellular languages
The genes of a cell consist of nucleic acids. These are themselves composed of
nucleotides, each of which consists of a phosphate group, a sugar, and a base. If the sugar
component is ribose, the nucleic acid is termed ribonucleic acid (RNA); if it is deoxyri-
bose, it is termed deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).
The nucleic acid language is almost exclusively composed of an alphabet consisting of 4
bases. DNA uses the bases A(denine), C(ytosine), G(uanine), and T(hymine), while RNA
uses the first three bases and replaces thymine with U(racil). The nucleic acid molecules
are strings of various lengths, without branches or interlinks. The bases are arranged lin-
early and are referred to as base sequences, which can them actually be recorded as writ-
ten sequences (WATSON, 1992; FELSENFELD, 1985; DARNELL, 1985).
At the same time, however, the nucleic acids constituting the genetic code are not ele-
ments of the language constituting protein molecules. The production of protein mole-
cules enables the cell to maintain and reproduce itself. The cell’s entire metabolism is
geared to this task. Proteins are formed by amino acid sequences. The amino acid lan-
guage consists of an alphabet of 20 different amino acids which can further be differenti-
ated into positively and negatively charged, into hydrophilic and hydrophobic (or
lipophilic) types (WATSON, 1992; FELSENFELD, 1985). 
Much like DNA and RNA molecules, proteins are linear molecules, whereby the
sequence of amino acids defines a protein individual. Based on the physico-chemical
features of amino acids and their interactions, a particular protein folds itself into a pre-
cisely determined spatial structure which is decisive for the function of that protein. 
A short amino acid strand with few amino acids is known as an oligopeptide chain, while
those with many are termed polypeptide chains. Proteins, in turn, are composed of 50 to
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2000 amino acids. The rules underlying the structure of the sequences are determined in
the DNA. How can DNA determine the structure of proteins when the latter are composed
of amino acids? (DOOLITTLE, 1985)
The production of protein molecules, which are necessary for cell growth, metabolism,
and reproduction, proceeds according to a stable set of rules. The central rule of comple-
mentary base pairs governs how the genetic code (as a text that defines the overall func-
tion and details of protein synthesis) functions: Thus, guanine shows a tendency to couple
with the opposing cytosine in the double-stranded DNA or RNA and vice versa. Adenine
has a tendency to couple with thymine in DNA and with uracil in RNA. This relates the
grammar of the nucleic acid language
Fig. 4   „Bases of nucleic acids“ (from: WATSON, 1992, p. 14)
In the DNA or RNA, three successive bases always form a unit, a so-called triplet (or
codon). Only in this form do the bases of the nucleic acids take on significance: as a
triplet, each symbolizes exactly one amino acid. The potential number of combinations in
the case of triplets is 64 variations. Of the 64 triplets, three serve as start and stop signals,
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i.e., they determine the beginning and end of the protein chain. The arrangement of the
remaining 61 triplets in the DNA regulates the sequence of amino acids in that each triplet
codes one amino acid.
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Fig. 5  „The base pairing of two DNA chains“ (from: WATSON, 1992, p. 21)
Each letter of the amino acid language corresponds to one or more „words“ formed by
three letters of the nucleic acid language. Namely, the genetic code is redundant: 61
triplets determine 20 amino acids. In the present context, „word“ means: a structure
(sequence of bases) that is meaningful for the grammar of the amino acid language.
Semantically, it behaves like the word of a language.
THREE-LETTER SINGLE-LETTER
AMINO ACID ABBREVIATION CODE
Glycine Gly G
Alanine Ala A
Valine Val V
Isoleucine Ile I
Leucine Leu L
Serine Ser S
Threonine Thr T
Proline Pro P
Aspartic acid Asp D
Glutamic acid Glu E
Lysine Lys K
Arginine Arg R
Asparagine Asn N
Glutamine Gln Q
Cysteine Cys C
Methionine Met M
Tryptophan Trp W
Phenylalanine Phe F
Tyrosine Tyr Y
Histidine His H
Fig. 6  The 20 amino acids in proteins (from: Watson, 1992, p. 4)
In protein synthesis, a protein-assembling entity must read the text of nucleic acid
sequences that codes for the amino acids, i.e., it must correctly decode the text and act on
this information according to a set of rules. This entity must begin with the first
nucleotide, combine the first three into a triplet, and must deliver the amino acid corre-
sponding to the triplet for the initial unit of the polypeptide chain, i.e., produce the initial
unit of the amino acid sequence. If, for whatever reason, the protein-assembling entity
neglects or fails to correctly read the first mononucleotide, then an incorrect sequence -
and an incorrect protein - arises, even if all the subsequent units are correct. A reading
error is a mistake in the grammar of the nucleic acid language and alters the semantic
meaning such that the result of the sign process no longer corresponds with the original
purpose. If, for example, the protein-assembling entity begins according to the RNA
sequences AUG UCC AAG GCU etc. (these four sequences code for  methionine, serine,
lysine, alanine), and this entity fails to read the adenine of AUG in the first sequence, then
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methionine will not be positioned at the beginning of the polypeptide chain. The result:
the entire protein has another spatial structure that corresponds with other functions.
FIRST SECOND POSITION THIRD
POSITION POSITION
(5´  END) U C A G (3´  END)
Phe Ser Tyr Cys U
U Phe Ser Tyr Cys C
Leu Ser Stop Stop A
Leu Ser Stop Trp G
Leu Pro His Arg U
C Leu Pro His Arg C
Leu Pro Gln Arg A
Leu Pro Gln Arg G
Ile Thr Asn Ser U
A Ile Thr Asn Ser C
Ile Thr Lys Arg A
Met Thr Lys Arg G
Val Ala Asp Gly U
G Val Ala Asp Gly C
Val Ala Glu Gly A
Val Ala Glu Gly G
„Note: Given the position of the bases in a codon, it is possible to find the corresponding amino acid. For
example, the codon (5´) AUG (3´) on mRNA specifies methionine, whereas CAU specifies histidine.
UAA, UAG, and UGA are termination signals. AUG is part of the initiation signal, and it codes for inter-
nal methionines as well. (From L. Stryer, Biochemestry, 3d ed., W.H. Freeman, 1988.)“
Fig. 7  The genetic code (from: WATSON, 1992, p. 41)
For the protein-assembling entity, the reading direction is irreversible: it can only read the
nucleic acid sequence in one direction. Were this not the case, then the grammar and
semantics of the nucleic acid language would have to have an entirely different constitu-
tion (WATSON, 1992). The nucleotide sequence UGA, for example, is coded as a stop-
triplet in the correct sequence. If it is read incorrectly (AGU) it would code for the amino
acid serine.
Molecular biology and biochemistry have interpreted this protein synthesis as a sign-
mediated production process; they are therefore able to decipher the genetic code (the
nucleic acid language) as a code, at least in the grammatic/semantic sense. They success-
fully determined which amino acids correspond to each of the 64 triplets. This led to the
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„SUPERCOILING IN DNA changes the shape and stability of the double helix. When a helix is formed into a
circle by a bond joining the ends (a), it lies flat in a plane because the DNA is relaxed. If the double helix is
untwisted several turns before the ends are joined (b), it tries to resume its normal twist, and so the backbone can
no longer lie in a plane. Here it has become a left-handed toroidal superhelix. A topologically equivalent form
(c) is a right-handed supercoil that is probably closer to the shape supercoiled DNA assumes in a cell.“
Fig. 8  Supercoiling in DNA (from: FELSENFELD, 1985, p. 50)
establishment of a code table which defines the grammar/semantics of the DNA/RNA
code in light of the protein/amino acid language. This „code catalog“ serves as a „dic-
tionary“: any DNA strand can be read as the text for protein synthesis. While this allows
the amino acid sequence that constitutes the protein to be predicted, predictions about its
spatial configuration (a prerequisite for any analysis of the respective protein function)
are currently possible only in a few cases (WATSON, 1992).
DNA consists of two complementary strands in which the respective codons and anti-
codons, i.e., the affine base pairs, bind via hydrogen bonds. Three-dimensionally, this
double strand takes on a helical form, which serves to stabilize the structure energetical-
ly. This specific, spirally coiled DNA is packed into the cell nucleus. 
The unique manner in which it is packaged serves to bring sequence elements that lie far
apart on the linear DNA closer together spatially. This proximity enables specific forms
of regulatory interaction which would not be possible at the distances involved on the lin-
ear DNA. The packaging is unique in that the basic coil is further folded into a supercoil
(WATSON, 1992; FELSENFELD, 1985), whereby the angles attained are just sufficient
to avoid damage to the basic coil.
This double helix is split apart during protein synthesis. Ribonucleic acid is formed at the
respective DNA strands. The DNA sequence is transcribed into an RNA sequence, which
docks onto the free DNA sections in a complementary fashion. It is termed messenger
RNA (mRNA) and serves as the template for the production of the protein. For this pur-
pose, the message of the mRNA is transported from the nucleus into the cytoplasm. 
The transcription from DNA to RNA is a complex process whose precision determines
whether the information fixed in the genetic text is successfully implemented. After the
mRNA is formed and transported out of the nucleus, it is attached in outstretched form to
the protein-assembling entity (the ribosomes).
This is the only configuration in which the mRNA can serve as an operational text or is
capable of delivering information. The amino acids corresponding to these codons of the
mRNA, which dock onto the ribosomes, do not attach directly, but rather to the anti-
codons of the tRNA (transfer RNA) which are complementary to the codons. Each tRNA
is charged with a corresponding amino acid produced by the cell and determined by the
respective anticodons; they make their way toward the surface of the ribosome.
This explains the designation transfer RNA (tRNA). The tRNA molecules consist of ca.
80 nucleotides (some contain up to 120) aligned in a chain. The middle loop of the clover-
leaf-shaped molecule is always the site of a triplet, for example CCA (cytosine-cytosine-
adenine). This anticodon attaches to the complemetary triplet, in this case AAC (adenine-
adenine-cytosine) of the mRNA. Thus, the tRNA molecule wanders to the ribosome
surface, bearing the amino acid that corresponds to its anticodon; there, on the out-
stretched mRNA molecule attached to the ribosome, it seeks the codon that fits its anti-
codon. Having found the codon, it remains in that position. Shortly thereafter, the next
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tRNA molecule, with its own complementary anticodon, docks onto the directly adjoin-
ing codon of the mRNA. Terminally, it also bears the amino acid corresponding to its
anticodon.
„The structure of a transfer RNA molecule. Base pairing within the single stranded molecule gives it its distinc-
tive shape. The anticodon loop is the portion that decodes messenger RNA. An amino acid attaches to the CCA
bases at the 3´end of the chain.“
Fig. 9  The structure of a transfer RNA molecule (from WATSON, 1992, p. 39)
Both amino acids are thus positioned next to one another and are joined by a peptide
bond. The first tRNA has fulfilled its function, detaches from the ribosome, and is free to
again pick up the same amino acid from the cell’s amino acid stores. In the meantime, a
third tRNA molecule with its anticodon and amino acid has arrived at the third codon of
the mRNA and a peptide bond is formed between amino acid 2 and amino acid 3.
With the help of this rule-governed interaction the polypeptide chain grows progressively
from one end until the stop codon appears, terminating the synthesis process.
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Error-free interaction processes in polypeptide chain formation are critical for the cell.
The transcription and translation of the genetic text only makes sense if it is error-free. A
single copying or translation mistake leads to insertion of a ‘wrong’ amino acid, resulting
in a ‘wrong’ protein which is incapable of fulfilling its task, for example catalyzing a spe-
cific metabolic reaction. The protein with such an altered amino acid sequence (due to the
transcription or translation error) is not incorrect in and of itself; within the rule-governed
interaction, however, the altered steric configuration means a change in the original
semantic content of the genetic information.
„At the ribosome, the codons of a messenger RNA molecule base-pair with the anticodons of transfer RNA´s,
which are charged with amino acids.“
Fig. 10  (from: WATSON, 1992, p. 40)
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The pragmatic aspect of such defective information lies in its actual effect on the metab-
olism of the cell or even of the entire organism. The molecular expression differs from
that specified by the genetic text.
„Messenger RNA carries genetic information from the DNA to the ribosomes, where it is translated into protein.
The polypeptide chains are elongated as ribosomes move along the mRNA molecules, with the 5´ends of the
mRNA being translated first..“
Fig. 11  (from: WATSON, 1992, p. 38)
The entire translation process of a gene into the corresponding protein is termed gene
expression. Generally spoken, all cells of an organism contain the same DNA, i.e., the full
complement of genetic information. On the other hand, not all genes are active in all cells
at the same time. This specific activation of particular genes is precisely what is responsi-
ble for the production of different enzyme proteins. 
These very different enzyme proteins, in turn, are a precondition for coordinating both the
production of very different cells and the interactions between these cells in a manner that
justifies referring to associations. This very specific „reading“ of selected genes is what
differentiates a blood cell from a liver cell, a nerve cell from a phagocyte in the immune
system, etc. (GEHRING, 1984, 1985).
63
„TRANSLATION of mRNA into protein at a ribosome follows the same steps in both eukaryotes and prokary-
otes. Each nucleotide triplet, or codon, on the mRNA chain encodes a specific amino acid. Each molecule of
tRNA in turn binds only the amino acid corresponding to a particular codon. A tRNA recognizes a codon by
means of a complementary nucleotide sequence called an anticodon. Here the addition of one amino acid to a
protein chain is shown. An incoming tRNA molecule carrying the amino acid tyrosine binds to the codon
exposed at a binding site on the ribosome (1). The tyrosine forms a peptide bond with serine, the last amino acid
on the protein chain (2). As the ribosome advances one codon (3), exposing the binding site to the next incom-
ing tRNA, the serine tRNA is released.“
Fig. 12   Translation of messenger RNA into protein (from: DARNELL, 1985, p. 58)
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Differentiated cell types are an underlying feature of multicellular organisms; they pro-
duce the different proteins that ensure the specific activities and functions of an organ.
The production process - as a rule-governed behavior - is the same in all cells. The pro-
duction products, however, differ. Thus, liver cells for example produce ca. 50 proteins
that are rare or absent in other cell types.
TYPE OF RNA* FUNCTION
mRNA Transfers information from
genes to protein-synthesizing
machinery
tRNA Carries activated amino acids
for protein synthesis
rRNA Protein synthesis
U1, U2, U4/6, U5 mRNA splicing
snRNAs
M1 RNA Catalytic unit of RNase P
Telomerase RNA Template for telomere
synthesis
Primer RNA Initiation of DNA replication
7S RNA Part of protein secretory
complex
ATP Carrier of energy-rich bonds
Coenzyme A A key molecule in intermediate
metabolism
* mRNA, messenger RNA; rRNA, ribosomal RNA; snRNA, small 
nuclear RNA; tRNA, transfer RNA.
Fig. 13  „Some functions of RNA and ribonucleotids“  (from: WATSON, 1992, p. 436)
Let us briefly return to the transcription of DNA into RNA, i.e., to the copying process.
The entire process begins when an enzyme, RNA polymerase, binds to a specific
sequence of bases. This enzyme unwinds the DNA double helix, yielding two individual
strands. One of them is copied, with the second one serving as a template: While the
enzyme runs down the DNA, the respective, complementary RNA nucleotide is attached
to the growing RNA chain. In fact, 3 different enzymes are involved in the copying
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process: RNA polymerase 1 transcribes the DNA of those genes that code for ribosomal
RNA (which goes on to form the ribosome as the protein-assembling entity) into rRNA.
RNA polymerase 2 catalyzes the synthesis of mRNA. Finally, RNA polymerase 3 synthe-
sizes tRNA and several small nuclear and cytoplasm RNAs. Thus, three enzymes are
responsible for the production of three RNAs.
An error in this transcription process leads to formation of a protein that is orthless for the
task it was designed to do.
The very first DNA copy, the mRNA, is not a one-to-one copy. This copy is heavily mod-
ified by enzyme proteins in the nucleus before it migrates into the cell’s cytoplasm
through pores in nuclear membrane:
Rather than consisting of an uninterrupted unit, many genes of cells with true nuclei are
composed of specific segments. Before mature RNA can form (i.e., an information
sequence whose entire scope and content is actually useful), worthless segments of the
primary copy are identified as such by enzyme proteins and cut out. This form of text pro-
cessing already takes place during transcription rather than upon completion of the entire
transcript.
Again, enzyme proteins are responsible for linking the remaining segments. Based on this
highly specific text processing activity, molecular biologists concluded that stable infor-
mation storage - such as that achieved in the DNA code - must have evolved later than the
comparatively malleable RNA. Historically, the gene-regulated production of proteins by
RNA presumably arose at the dawn of living cells; the reverse translation into DNA,
which functions as a more stable storage for genetic information (stabilized irreversibili-
ty), apparently developed much later (DARNELL, 1985).
This not only considerably improved the density of information, but also the intra- and
intercellular competence of cells (in implementing sign processes). The same holds true
for the organisms that these cells constitute: even everyday social interactions, which
must stand the test of experience, can be genetically coded. If crucial experience is gained
over the history of an organism, a cell association, or cell, then the existing genetic text of
the DNA can be expanded by additional, specific information contexts (in the form of
nucleic acid sequences); this will lead from less complex to successively more complex
and highly complex information structures. 
Thus, every DNA bears a greater or smaller number of genes that are useless for the
mRNA; these are spliced out to yield usable mRNA. This is the task of the so-called
nuclear ribonucleoproteins: they reliably identify as useless those sequences that are in
fact worthless in the specific application. The identification process underlies certain
rules. If they are followed, the intended protein can be successfully produced. We now
know that such identification rules for nuclear ribonucleoproteins actually exist, although
how they can be formulated remains unknown (WATSON, 1992).
Enzyme proteins process the RNA text before it enters into the cytoplasm. This process-
ing takes place during, not after, the transcription process. Since the tissue-specificity of
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„STRUCTURE OF DNA has a backbone (a) made up of bonded sugar and phosphate groups, to each of which
is attached one of four bases: guanine (G), cytosine (C), thymine (T) or adenine (A). The phosphate group is
represented by the structures with the P at the center, the sugar by the pentagon with an oxygen atom (O) at the
top. A phosphate group connects the 5´carbon atom of one sugar to the 3´carbon atom of the next. The combi-
nation of sugar-phosphate group and base constitutes a nucleotide (b). (The distances between atoms are not to
scale.) The nature of the hydrogen bonding of the bases is such that thymine always pairs with adenine and cyto-
sine always pairs with guanine. The structure that results is shown in two dimensions (c) and in three: the dou-
ble helix (d). In conveying the genetic message of DNA the sequence of the coding strand is transcribed into a
strand of messenger RNA, which serves to make a variety of proteins. The U in the strand of messenger RNA
stands for uracil, the RNA counterpart of thymine.“
Fig. 14 „Structure of DNA“ (from: FELSENFELD, 1985, p. 46)
proteins typically necessitates a highly differentiated processing of the underlying texts,
the decision regarding the prospective context must take place at this level. This decision
is invariably correct. Molecular biologists are still in the dark as to the rules governing
this decision.
Once the RNA strand has made its way to the end of the ribosome surface (this process is
often referred to metaphorically in terms of a zipper action: McKNIGHT, 1991), the pri-
mary structure of the polypeptide chain has already been established. The mRNA strand
can be reused. Upon full completion, the polypeptide chain folds into its so-called tertiary
structure. In certain cases the fusion of such tertiary structures leads to so-called quater-
nary structures. The spatial configuration of the completed enzyme protein can then serve
to produce the full range of substances that make up a complete cell. 
The amino acid sequence, which constitutes a protein depending on species, form, and
therefore function, is relatively simple to determine experimentally. The great number of
protein-constituting amino acid sequences known today corresponds to only a fraction of
the actually known three-dimensional protein structures. It is this three-dimensional
structure, however, that decides the functional competence of the protein; this spatial con-
figuration is also what enables a more precise analysis of its actual capabilities
(RICHARDS, 1991; SIPPL, 1995, 1996). For example, it took 23 years to determine the
structure of hemoglobin in detail; to date, we know the exact configuration of little over
100 proteins. As much as we have learned about the grammar and semantics of this sec-
ond, key intracellular language, all our attempts to decipher its pragmatic rules have
been painfully slow. These rules clearly cannot be reduced to or deduced from the gram-
matic/semantic level, but rather constitute a complementary function.
In any case, all three forms of RNA (mRNA, tRNA, and the rRNA forming the ribo-
some), along with the corresponding enzymes, represent the sign-mediated medium
between genetic text and finished protein. RNA enables enzyme proteins to be produced
in the precise sequence intended by the semantic text; in doing so, it unites the essential
sections of the text by identifying those that are unimportant, removing them from the text,
and then splicing the remaining text sections (DARNELL, 1985).
Humans, as linguistically talented beings, are unique in being able to explicate the rules
they follow when they speak and to formulate these as rules; in extension of this, they are
also in a position to learn and utilize the language in which the genetic information is
coded, e.g., in genetic engineering techniques. In fact, humans selectively employ
enzyme proteins for this process, enzyme proteins whose specific text-processing compe-
tence is known: this text-processing technique is much more precise and error-free than
any other approach currently available to mankind.
Evidence for the universality of this language in the protein synthesis of all living organ-
isms on this planet is that every organism investigated to date encodes its genetic text
according to the same rules and, in doing so, (principally) uses the same code words. The
mRNA, tRNA, and ribosomes of very different organisms are fully interchangeable in an
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extracellular environment; they even respond to artificially produced mRNA. Recently,
for example, a human growth hormone was successfully inserted into the genetic text of a
mouse in order to double its growth (WATSON, 1992, p. 255 ff.).
4.1.2. Proteins - products of intracellular communication
One can describe proteins as products of a behavior stipulated by the genetic text; the text
definitively prescribes the sense and aims of this behavior and details its implementation.
Every living organism consists of proteins. They possess the competence to associate
themselves or to interact with other molecules according to specific rules; the variability
of their three-dimensional structure enables them to differentiate the various forms of life
as defined in the respective genetic texts. They accelerate metabolic processes and code
the behavior necessary for their own reproduction.
Proteins are subject to a behavior governed by rules. They can assume highly differentiat-
ed functions depending on which rule underlies the protein in which interaction:
a) If the protein functions as a structural protein, its task is to associate proteins of the
same type. They unite to form a larger structure such as an artery, a leaf, a specific tissue
fiber, etc. 
b) If the protein serves as a messenger molecule, its task is to transmit information as a
linguistic  sign in linguistic behavior. It can serve to transmit messages between organs or
between individual cells, where it functions as a sensory organ in the cell membrane, i.e.,
a so-called receptor.
c) Proteins also serve as individual cell markers (to identify cells) for specific forms of
communication between cells of one or more organs.
d) Certain proteins enter into specific interactions with one another or with others
(DOOLITTLE, 1985).
Other proteins interact with DNA and regulate the expression performance of the genes.
Still others participate in copying and translating DNA and RNA into amino acids.
As briefly mentioned above, receptor proteins are embedded in the cell membrane and
selectively identify specific messenger molecules that function as linguistic signs in
information-transmitting linguistic behavior, for example as hormones or neurotransmit-
ters. As we will see later, violations of these rules occur and errors can crop up: these can
seriously impact the cell or even the entire organism. 
The interactions between proteins and such molecules depends on the relative amounts of
the substances involved and the strength of their bonds. Basically, this dependence
describes how well the molecules fit one another spatially and which electrostatic inter-
action rules, such as attraction and repulsion, are in force between the charged sections at
a given time.
The vast array of proteins is determined by the varying arrangement of 20 amino acids.
This arrangement is itself determined by the grammar and semantic content of the nucle-
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ic acid text. As indicated above, the actual characteristics of a protein molecule depend on
how it is folded spatially; this configuration begins to take shape directly at the protein’s
point of origin, the ribosome (UNWIN/HENDERSON, 1984). The folding follows a
pragmatic rule: the amount of free energy is held at the lowest level possible and the pro-
tein takes on its „most comfortable position“ (DOOLITTLE, 1985). This rule is consti-
tuted and regulated by the wide range of forces that affect the thousands of atoms in the
protein molecule, by interactions with the adjoining molecules, and by the rules govern-
ing interactions between amino acids themselves (KARPLUS & McCAMMON, 1986).
In the past, protein sequencing, i.e., determining the particular amino acid sequences, was
a laborious task. This changed when scientists realized that sequencing the nucleotides of
a DNA molecule was a much simpler procedure. The new approach involved determining
those DNA sections responsible for coding the proteins in question, i.e., determining the
codons corresponding to the amino acids of the protein. This led to a host of new prob-
lems: each codon represents a very specific amino acid. Most amino acids, however, can
be expressed by more than one codon. 
The role of proteins is not only a function of their specific spatial structure, but also of a
structure that is flexible. The atoms of every protein oscillate rapidly around their central
axis. This puts the entire protein into a constant state of motion and deformation, a pre-
requisite  for it to execute the full range of catalytic processes, for example the enzymes’
specific functions in protein synthesis itself or in the breakdown of energy-rich food. 
Proteins are composed of 50 to 500 amino acids, which corresponds to between 500 and
5000 atoms (KARPLUS & McCAMMON, 1986). The interaction between the atoms is
important for the structure of the protein, whereby the forces acting on each atom depend
on the momentary position of all the other atoms of the protein. The energetic intercon-
nection of each atom with all the other atoms of the protein defines the rule which ulti-
mately determines the spatial structure of that protein. This explains the difficulty
involved in determining protein configurations despite knowing the underlying grammat-
ic/semantic instructions in the genetic text. 
The actual changes in the protein’s position due to the constant motion of the atoms is
limited. The combined effect of many small movements, however, can be considerable:
individual, apparently undirected displacements can lead to coordinated movement. Such
small, rapid movements are a prerequisite for large, coordinated protein movement.
Energetically, a cell relies on interactions with its environment. Specifically, it takes up
energy-rich material, utilizes it for its own energy requirements, and excretes the energy-
poor waste material. Enzymes are responsible for all these tasks, and the operational
plans for these enzymes are in turn defined in the genetic text, in the DNA. This text
ensures a continuous production of identical copies of itself and asserts its competence to
express the bauplan defined in the genetic text by setting protein synthesis into motion
and regulating it in detail. In their interactions, the components of the cell - the nucleus
with the genetic text, plastids, mitochondria, dictyosomes, vacuoles and the endoplasmic
reticulum - are all geared to optimize metabolism.
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Every interactional element fulfils an important task that no other element can assume.
This form of intracellular communication, as a rule-governed interaction, must function if
intercellular communication (the exchange of information, the formation of associations,
and the coordination of behavior between cells and cell associations of an organism) is to
function. „Neighboring cells must be able to communicate with one another if they are to
coordinate their metabolism and generally work together as a tissue“ (UNWIN & HEN-
DERSON, 1984).
Intra- and intercellular communication are not independent entities. This is evident not
only in successful communication, but even more drastically when communication fails.
If intracellular communication is disturbed, then intercellular communication also
becomes deformed and distorted; disturbed intercellular communication can distort and
deform intracellular communication. Psychosomatics provides numerous well-docu-
mented examples for the latter condition (UEXKÜLL, 1989).
The organelles of a cell are surrounded by a thin layer of lipid and protein molecules (as
is the cell itself) . These membranes are interactionally competent and allow only those
substances to enter or exit that are important for the cell or the organelles and their func-
tion. A key function of such membranes is to segregate the individual interaction partners.
In doing so, they prevent the rule - less mixture of substances from different regions that
would undermine rule-governed interactions by the individual interaction partners. The
membrane enables rule-governed interactions tailored to specific capabilities of the pro-
teins enclosed within that membrane (UNWIN & HENDERSON; 1984; BERRIDGE,
1984, 1985).
Some proteins function as sensory organs by permitting the diffusion of specific mole-
cules or ions. Other proteins have a specific interaction competence with hormones or
with those substances that transport neuronal signals (SNYDER, 1985). They identify
these substances from a wide range of irrelevant substances (with a negligible error rate)
and identify foreign substances to which they also react very specifically. The proteins in
the cell membrane enable the cell to react to messenger substances in a rule-governed
manner, i.e., to interact communicatively  with the cells emitting these messenger sub-
stances. The cell membrane is in principle an organ responsible for the sensory perception
of the cell ( BERRIDGE, 1985).
Directly adjoining cells in a tissue or an organism must interact according to rules, i.e.,
communicate in a sign-mediated manner, if they are to coordinate their behavior (for exam-
ple their metabolism). The corresponding contact sites are termed connexins (two succes-
sive proteins). Each connexon is anchored in its cell membrane and projects into the inter-
cellular space, where it attaches to the connexon of the neighboring cell. These intercellular
tubes enable chemical substances that serve as linguistic signs in communication processes
to be exchanged and thus coordinate behavior. In living tissues, these intercellular connec-
tions open and close in reaction to changes in the cells. For example, this important feature
allows a living cell to hermetically seal itself off from a dying neighbor and thus prevent the
loss of vital nutrients (UNWIN & HENDERSON, 1984; BERRIDGE, 1985).
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Proteins also serve in the overall internal organization of the cell, i.e., of its cytoplasm. A
protein fiber, functioning as a cell framework, extends from the nucleus to the inner sur-
face of the cell membrane and plays an important role in shaping the cell, its movements,
and cell division (WEBER & OSBORN, 1985).  One type of protein fiber, the micro-
tubules, is important in cell division: at the onset of division, when the chromosomes
begin to divide into two sets, these proteins alter their structure. The product is a fiber
bundle consisting of parallel microtubules that extend from the opposite poles of the
dividing cells to the chromosomes in the middle; they also directly connect the poles.
These fiber bundles (mitotic spindle) then proceed to draw the chromosome sets to the
poles and also generate the necessary forces of motion. The conclusion drawn from this is
that the microtubules are probably the cytoskeletal factor responsible for precisely parti-
tioning the genetic material of a mother cell into both daughter cells (ibid.). Experiments
have shown that destroying the microtubules compromises the cell’s structure, causing it
to lose its form and function. The interaction with the other two cell types that form fiber
frameworks collapses. The cell loses its functional ability as a communication partner in
cell associations (ibid.).
As determined above, the production of enzymes is vital to the cell. The full complement
of key enzymes allows the cell to convert food into the many substances it needs to fully
develop its structure and to interact with associated cells in a rule-governed manner.
Multicellular organisms have quite different cell types with rather diverse functions and
characteristics. For example, only red blood corpuscles possess the hemoglobin pigment;
all others are colorless. The cells of the skeletal tissue are the only ones to secrete the
rigid substances that form skeletal structures (ibid.). Certain digestive enzymes are pro-
duced exclusively in specific glands. At the same time, each cell holds the entire genetic
text of the organism. What mechanisms and rules underlie the directed information trans-
fer in the cell regarding the production of a required enzyme? How can one explain an
information retrieval system that expresses the information of selected gene segments by
neglecting all other functions and activities?
As rule-governed behavior, enzyme production proceeds according to specific informa-
tion in the genetic text, information that defines how the correct enzyme is to be
expressed and that it be expressed at the right place and at the right time. Only when these
rules are broken can skin cells grow in the liver or can a leg replace an antenna on an
insect’s head (GEHRING, 1985). This information transfer is subject to the rules of econ-
omy, i.e., the cell produces only those enzymes that it needs at the time. The cell allocates
energy reserves for this highly selective information retrieval for specific enzymes and
thus improves its capacity to react to the specific demands of its environment. The ability
to read specific information in order to synthesize specific enzymes is hereditary. There is
even a special behavior coordinating gene that regulates these processes, the regulator
gene.
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4.1.2.1. Two intracellular communication processes in the regulation 
of enzyme protein synthesis
When the cell stops building proteins yet maintains amino acid production, many unnec-
essary amino acids begin to accumulate. Since cell function is guided by the principle of
minimal energy consumption, the cell can be expected to curb this overproduction. This is
achieved by a rule-governed interaction of the intracellular type.
The production of a single amino acid, arginine for example, proceeds in 4 steps; each
step requires an enzyme (i.e., for a total of 4) whose production is coded by 4 genes. The
4 enzymes work together, converting the raw product into the end-product (arginine). If a
particular enzyme is present at adequate levels, the superfluous enzymes are immediately
broken down. The genes corresponding to the amino acids lie next to one another in the
same sequence as the required enzymes. The genes that code for the enzymes necessary
to produce amino acids are termed structural genes. The so-called operator gene is posi-
tioned at the end of the chain of structural genes. It also codes for the inactivation of the
structural gene and contains information on whether the structural genes are to be activat-
ed or not. The operator gene does not control its own status. If it is turned on („open read-
ing grid“), then the structural genes can be transcribed; if it is turned off, transcription
stops (WATSON, 1992).
The regulator gene is positioned some distance away from the operator gene and the cor-
responding structural genes. It regulates the operator gene. While the operator gene acts
directly upon the neighboring structural genes, the regulator genes function by releasing
a substance into the cytoplasm. There, this substance binds with a substance of low-
molecular-weight, becomes activated, and shuts down the operator. This production-
inhibiting process is termed repression (1), and both elements involved - the regulator
gene and the low molecular weight substance - are termed apo-repressor and cro-repres-
sor. This correspondence enables a tailored amino acid production (ibid.). In addition to
this coordinated behavior in which the end-product itself, along with the regulator gene,
regulates production volume, fine tuning also takes place: the end-product (the amino
acid) acts directly on the first enzyme of the amino acid-assembling enzyme chain and
turns it off. Overall, this production process is regulated by a directed enzyme production
involving the regulation of information retrieval. This regulation follows very specific
rules. By interacting with the enzymes that formed it, the end-product regulates overall
production volume. Rough and fine tuning are complementary processes (ibid.). 
As a rule-governed interaction, this intracellular, sign-mediated communication process
that produces amino acids also finds use in other production processes of the cell, for
example in the production of growth factors, in cell division, and in DNA replication.
The intracellular type of sign-mediated communication process includes not only the pro-
duction, but also the consumption (2) of substances (ibid.). Energy-rich food must be bro-
ken down and utilized in order to release the energy that the cell requires to organize its
life. This process is also catalyzed by enzymes. Again, only those enzymes that are actu-
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ally needed are produced, and not all are produced at once. Here, the regulatory process-
es promote rather than inhibit enzyme production. Although this communication process
pursues a different goal, the underlying rule remains the same, i.e., the production of the
required enzymes is regulated by the same rules governing specific information retrieval,
enzyme production, and the blocking of enzyme production via interactions between end-
product and regulator gene (ibid.).
„Ribosomal protein levels control the translation of ribosomal protein mRNAs. When the rate of r-protein syn-
thesis exceeds the rate of rRNA synthesis, free r-proteins accumulate. Some of them bind to the Shine-Dalgarno
sequences on the r-protein mRNAs and prevent further translation. This mechanism ensures that r-proteins are
not synthesized faster than they can be used in making ribosomes.“
Fig. 15   „Translational Control is the second means of Controlling 
Protein Synthesis“ (from: WATSON, 1992, p. 55)
The situation becomes somewhat more complex in the case of highly developed, multi-
cellular organisms. Here, the temporal coordination of information retrieval is much more
important: the ladybird beetle larvae don’t need to develop the adult coloration, young
elephants don’t need mature tusks, and the human embryo doesn’t require fully function-
al eyes. Today we know that specific chrono-genes regulate the temporal coordination of
gene expression (GEHRING, 1985).
4.2. Intercellular communication
A typical unicellular organism such as an ameba is fully capable of executing all life-sus-
taining functions by itself. Multicellular organisms, on the other hand, rely on the suc-
cessfully coordinated behavior of numerous cell associations, tissues, and organs, which
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may lie far apart. Such coordinated behavior would be impossible without a functioning
communication between these components of multicellular organisms.
„The communication between cells or groups of cells is vital for the survival of every
multicellular organism“ (SNYDER, 1985). 
Intercellular communication  (cell-cell- communication) also involves chemical sub-
stances that transmit specific messages in the form of linguistic signs; they have therefore
been termed chemical messengers.
„The most important messenger substances in mammal cells are hormones, cyclic AMP
(adenosine monophosphate) and calcium. Hormones serve primarily in the communica-
tion between cells, while  cyclic AMP and calcium transmit messages within individual
cells“ (CHEUNG, 1982).
Cells communicate with each other via such chemical messengers and, more directly and
much quicker, via nerve cells. In neuronal communication, the linguistic signs are termed
neurotransmitters (SNYDER, 1985; IVERSEN, 1979). Cells may also communicate with
one another indirectly and in a slower manner. The linguistic signs in such hormonal
communication are hormones.
There are no clearcut borders between these two types of intercellular communication,
i.e., rather than being mutually exclusive, they are compatible to some degree. Evidence
for this is the fact that one and the same linguistic sign can be used differently in either
communication form („one messenger, several messages“; SNYDER, 1985). The prag-
matic sign rule, or the relationship of the  sign to the sign-using entity, follows the same
rule: specific cells send information via chemical messengers to specific target cells
(addressees). These, in turn, use their receptors (identification proteins in the cell mem-
brane) to identify the messenger substances as such and to pass them on into the cyto-
plasm. Only at this point does the cell react to the particular semantic content of the mes-
sage, i.e., it responds by a specific, rule-governed behavior tailored to the message and/or
by producing specific substances.
These communication  processes are also subject to misunderstandings and mistakes that
induce the cell to disregard the rules. A common reason for such behavior is that the
receptor in the cell membrane (the identification protein) either (I) confuses the semantic
content of one messenger with that of another, (II) entirely fails to identify it, or (III) mis-
takes a substance for a messenger when this is not the case (RUBENSTEIN, 1980;
HÖFER, 1977).
The result in any case is a disruption of intercellular communication. In autoimmune dis-
eases, which we will discuss later, these misunderstandings play a decisive role that can
severely impair the entire organism. 
Nerve cells send messages to the respective group of addressees (target cells), e.g., to
other nerve cells, gland cells, or muscle cells. The chemical messengers released by the
nerve cells reach the target cells via so-called synapses and synaptic clefts (intercellular
75
space). The target cells identify these substances with their receptors and pass them on to
the cell interior (LLINAS, 1982; BERRIDGE & IRVINE, 1984; BERRIDGE, 1985;
CARAFOLI & PENNISTON, 1985). 
There, a specific intracellular communication process ensures an intercellular response.
„In intercellular communication via neurons, the signal is transmitted across a narrow gap
at the synapse - the switching point between the nerve ends and the membranous region -
to the postsynaptic cell“ (SNYDER, 1985). Nerve cells communicate with each other
over relatively short distances within milliseconds.
Hormonal communication takes place via the internally secreting (endocrine) gland sys-
tem. A gland releases hormones that are identified as messenger substances by the recep-
tors of the target cells. The glands introduce the hormones into the circulatory system,
where they are intercepted by target cells that transmit the message into the cell’s interior.
The fact that hormones are transported by the circulatory system means they can reach
virtually any corner of the body. On the other hand, hormonal communication takes
longer, and minutes or even hours can pass before the message triggers a response in the
affected cell (SNYDER, 1985).
Two examples serve to illustrate how a chemical messenger can assume and ultimately
represent different meanings based on its different context in two different communication
processes.
Noradrenaline: Noradrenaline is a hormone secreted by the suprarenal gland. It promotes
heart contractions, dilates the bronchial tubes in the lung, and increases the contraction
force of the arm and leg muscles. If nerve cells of the sympathetic nervous system use the
neurotransmitter noradrenaline as a messenger substance, it constricts the blood vessels
and increases blood pressure.
Vasopressin: Vasopressin is secreted by the posterior lobes of the pituitary gland. As a
hormone it increases blood pressure by constricting the blood vessels and inhibits urine
production by increasing the kidney’s water resorption ability. Used as a neurotransmitter
by nerve cells, vasopressin is involved in memory formation in the brain (SNYDER,
1985).
4.2.1. Hormones as linguistic signs
Autocrine hormones serve as messenger substances by acting on the very cells that
released them. Paracrine hormones serve as messengers between directly adjoining cells.
Most hormones stem from the endocrine glands; these secrete hormones into the circula-
tory system, where they are transported as messenger substances until the receptors of the
target cells identify and bind them. In neuroendocrine communication processes the
nerve cells transmit their message by secreting substances that function as hormones and
that are released into the bloodstream. Nerve cells transmit their messages by releasing
neurotransmitters directly to the respective target cells (SNYDER, 1985). 
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„METHODS OF COMMUNICATION employed by the hormonal system are generally less direct than those
employed by the nervous system. Although autocrine hormones (a) act on the cell that releases them and
paracrine hormones (b) act on adjacent cells, most hormones are in the endocrine system and act on cells or
organs anywhere in the body. Endocrine glands (c) release hormone molecules into the bloodstream, where they
come in contact with specific receptors on target cells. A cell´s receptor recognize the hormones meant to act on
that cell and pull them out of the bloodstream. Neurons (d) communicate by releasing neurotransmitters close to
specific target cells. Neural communication is characterized by discrete messages sent over short distances.
Some neurons, however, have a role in the hormonal system: in neuroendocrine action (e) a neuron releases sub-
stances that act as hormones directly into the blood.“
Fig. 16  „Methods of Communication“ (from: SNYDER, 1985, p. 116)
The endocrine glands of humans are primarily influenced by the hypophysis. It coordinates
the functions of the other glands via hormonal communication, i.e., it releases hormones
that subsequently stimulate other glands to produce and secrete their own hormones. The
hypophysis itself is regulated by the hypothalmus (part of the diencephalon), which releas-
es certain substances; these induce the hypophysis to release its hormones as messengers to
the glands. In hormonal communication, glands function as linguistic sign users and hor-
mones as linguistic signs in specific, sign-mediated communication processes.
Principally, one can distinguish two chemically different types of hormone molecules.
The first include the steroid hormones, for example glucocorticoids, cortisol, corticos-
terone, but also mineral cortocoids like aldosterone and sex hormones like progesterone,
testosterone, and the estrogens; they regulate numerous metabolic processes, regulate the
electrolytic balance in the entire body, and are responsible for sexual behavior and pro-
ducing germ cells.
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The specific substances with which the hypothalmus stimulates the hypophysis to secrete
hormones, which in turn induce certain glands to secrete steroid hormones, are peptide
hormones rather than steroids. One of the most important of these is insulin, which is pro-
duced by the beta cells of the pancreas and regulates the blood sugar level in nearly every
cell of the body. It does this by inducing cells to take up glucose. Insulin also influences
fat metabolism. 
Some peptide hormones regulate the activity of the gastro-intestinal tract (gastrin,
somatostatin), while others regulate the evacuation of the gallbladder into the intestine
(cholecystokinin; it also serves as a neurotransmitter in the brain). As an intestinal hor-
mone, the vasoactive intestinal polypeptide controls peristalsis and also functions as a
specific neurotransmitter in the brain. The encephalins function like opiates in the brain;
in the gut they regulate peristaltic movements (SNYDER, 1985). 
The hormonal communication is the central field of investigation in neuroendocrinology,
immunology, psychoendocrinology and psychoimmunology, because the communication
processes by hormones between the central nervous system and the immune system are
responsible for the efficiency of the immune response. (HELLHAMMER, 1992,
KIRSCHBAUM 1999, BUSKE-KIRSCHBAUM et.al. 1999)
Both hormonal and neuronal communication use in part different and in part identical
messenger substances as linguistic signs in the various communication processes. The
same messengers assume different meanings in different sign-mediated communication
processes; these are identified in their different meanings by the respective addressees.
4.2.2. Neurotransmitters as linguistic signs
Only 20 years ago, the number of neurotransmitters was believed to be very low. Since
communication in nerve cells was interpreted as being solely inhibitory or stimulatory,
two such substances with messenger function appeared to be sufficient. In the meantime,
more than 50 neuropeptides that transmit very specific messages and thereby trigger com-
plex interactions have been isolated.
The membrane of cells adjoining a nerve cell contains various types of canals.
Neurotransmitters can selectively open or close these canals, enabling certain ions such
as chlorine, sodium, calcium, or potassium to pass through. There is a special canal type
for each ion, and a different signal is transmitted depending on the canal (BERRIDGE,
1985; CARAFOLI & PENNISTON, 1985; CHEUNG, 1982).
In neuronal communication, the interaction takes place between the end of one nerve
fiber and the next nerve fiber. „The typical feature of communication between neurons is
that they transmit directed messages over short distances“ (SNYDER, 1985). 
The gap that serves as an intercellular communication space is termed a synaptic cleft.
The terminal end of a nerve fiber bears vesicles filled with transmitter substances. The
arrival of an electric impulse at the end of the nerve fiber signals the vesicles to release
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„COMMUNICATION BETWEEN NEURONS takes place across gaps called synapses. In the classical axo-
dendritic synapse (a) synaptic vesicles in the axon of one neuron release neurotransmitter toward receptors on
the dentrite of a target neuron. It is also possible for a dendrite to pass a message to another dendrite; such mes-
sages are passed by way of dendrodendritic synapses. In a reciprocal dendrodendritic synapse (b) each dendrite
passes messages to the other by way of a separate synapse. In some other synapses, called axoaxonic synapses
(c), the axon of one neuron passes a message through the axon of another neuron to the dendrite of a third neu-
ron. In a synaptic glomerulus (d) the axon of one neuron passes messages to dendrites of two others; the den-
drites may pass messages to each other as well.“
Fig. 17 Communication between Neurons (from SNYDER, 1985, p. 120)
their contents into the narrow gap. The molecules cross the gap and are taken up by recep-
tors in the membrane of the next cell. The receptors interact only with the transmitter sub-
stance released by the electric signal and react to no other substances (ibid.). 
There are numerous rule-governed forms of interaction between nerve cells:
an axo-dendritic synapse releases synaptic vesicles (the substance in the vesicles) at the
end of a nerve fiber as a neurotransmitter. It docks on the receptors of a dendrite (plasma
process on the surface of nerve cells) of the adjoining cell; this transmits the signal that
triggers specific reactions within the framework of the rules governing a particular inter-
cellular, sign-mediated communication process. 
In the case of dendro-dendritic synapses, each dendrite relays a signal to the others via a
separate synapse. This represents a reciprocal interaction. 
In axo-axonic synapses, a message is transmitted from the axon of one nerve cell via the
axon of a second to a third nerve cell. 
„In a glomerular synapse, the nerve end relays messages to the dendrites of two other
nerve cells. These dendrites can also communicate with one another“ (SNYDER, 1985).
Neurologists and psychiatrists, who have implicitly or explicitly interpreted these inter-
cellular communication processes as sign-mediated communication and who have stud-
ied the rules underlying the process, can now themselves intervene in various inter- and
intracellular communication processes, specifically with artificial hormones. In the past,
all the medications used in neurology and psychiatry merely enhanced or suppressed the
effect of a specific neurotransmitter (SNYDER, 1985). The recently developed peptide
transmitters, on the other hand, can lead to the production of agents that influence the
cell’s own production and release of specific neuropeptides, including their receptor
effects. This allows psychosomatic illnesses such as heart palpitations, asthma, angina
pectoralis as well as endocrine depression to be more selectively treated. Such forms of
treatment would not have been possible without insight into the rules governing the use of
chemical messenger substances as linguistic signs in intercellular communication. This
treatment involves using chemical substances that ultimately repair intercellular commu-
nication disorders by therapeutically intervening in this communication and taking
advantage of the rule-governed use of the chemical messengers that act as linguistic
signs.
4.2.3. The organization of the cellular response
The information or message that reaches the cell as a messenger substance does not
induce an immediate response from the cell. The receptors of the cell identify the special
messenger molecule from among a wide range of other molecules. The receptor repre-
sents the cell’s organ of perception. From the receptor, the external message is transferred
into an internal signal transmission process (BERRIDGE, 1985). Once again, the infor-
mation in one linguistic system is transformed into another language, i.e., the message
encoded in one language is transformed into another one. Clearly, living nature as we
define it is particularly successful in creating different language systems and transform-
ing them to communicate, coordinate behavior, and differentiate species.
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It is the rule-governed behavior behind the internal transformation of the external mes-
sage that induces the targeted cell to initiate the correct response (e.g., secretion, contrac-
tion, metabolism, growth). After the external signal is transformed into an internal signal,
a secondary messenger forwards that signal. This second messenger substance generally
binds to the regulatory component of a protein kinase (enzyme), which then splits off its
catalytic unit. This detached subunit transfers phosphate groups to specific proteins and
initiates those processes commonly known as the cellular response (BERRIDGE, 1985;
RUBENSTEIN, 1980).
Two main signal pathways are recognized in cells today: while the first proceeds via the
secondary messenger cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cAMP), the second involves cal-
cium ions together with two additional substances. In both pathways, the receptor mole-
cule transfers the information from the cell surface through the cell membrane into the
cell interior by means of a family of so-called G proteins. 
In both cases these proteins activate an amplifier enzyme on the inner surface of the cell
membrane. This, in turn, transforms certain molecules into secondary messenger sub-
stances. These secondary messengers alter the spatial structure of cellular proteins: while
the proteins remain inactive in one three-dimensional configuration, they trigger func-
tions like secretion or contraction in another configuration. The message for the cell prop-
agates itself in the cell in the form of a (chemically modulated) messenger substance.
The main effect of one signal path is to modulate the signal sequence in the other. For
example, adrenalin in the heart influences the intracellular calcium content via this cAMP
signal pathway. Thus, a brief calcium influx regulates the strength of the heartbeat. The
cAMP signal pathway also regulates calcium transport in the muscle cells, secretory cells,
and nerve cells. Little by little, calcium is proving to be the most important second mes-
senger substance in cells (BERRIDGE, 1985; CARAFOLI & PENNISTON, 1985).
Cell reproduction occurs in various cycles. The cell growth necessary for this process is
triggered by secondary messengers. The first phase involves only cell enlargement. In the
second growth phase the chromosomes are replicated and prepare for cell division. In the
next phase the chromosomes divide. Directly thereafter, the decision is taken as to which
of two possible options will be adopted and carried out: the cell can divide again or
become differentiated for a specific function in the tissue of the overall organism (until
the late 90´s scientists thought, that nerve cells lose their  capacity to divide upon differ-
entiation, but this was an error) other cell types can enter into a renewed cycle of division.
This renewed activity is triggered by growth substances that are produced and released by
specific cells. They bind to the receptors of the cell membrane and give the signal for
DNA replication (BERRIDGE, 1985).
The fact that growth is a coordinated process clearly indicates successful cell communi-
cation. Uncontrolled growth leads to the development of tumors and shows that cell com-
munication is disturbed. Our next task will be to examine forms of disturbed cell commu-
nication and to determine the role they play in various illnesses. This investigation will
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lead us to yet another sign-mediated communication process, one that provides insight
into a very special communicative faculty of organisms: the immune system. 
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„KNOWN SIGNAL PATHWAYS IN CELLS are few in number. In functional terms they share a sequence of
events (left). External messengers arriving at receptor molecules in the plasma membrane (gray) activate a
closely related family of transducer molecules, which carry signals through the membrane, and amplifier
enzymes, which activate internal signals carried by „second messengers“. The pathway employing the second
messenger  cAMP (middle) has stimulatory receptors (R8) an inhibitory ones (Rj), which both communicate
with the amplifier adenylate cyclase (AC) by way of stimulatory and inhibitory transducers called G proteins
because they require guanosine triphosphate (GTP) to function. Adenylate cyclase converts ATP into cAMP.
The other major pathway (right) is not known to recognize inhibitory external signals. It employs a stimulatory
G protein to activate its amplifier, a phosphodiesterase (PDE) enzyme. The enzyme makes phosphatidylinositol
4,5 biphosphate (PIP2) into a pair of second messengers, diacylglycerol (DG) and inositol triphosphate (IP3). In
turn IP3 induces the cell to mobilize still another messenger: calcium ions (Ca2+). Moreover, the path somehow
induces the amplifier guanylate cyclase (GC) to convert GTP into the second messenger cyclic guanosine
monophosphate (cGMP). In general the second messengers bind to the regulatory component of a protein
kinase, an enzyme that activates a cellular response such as contraction or secretion by adding phosphate (PO4)
groups to particular proteins. Calcium binds to a family of proteins including calmodulin (CaM) and troponin C
(TnC). In turn CaM activates a protein kinase; TnC stimulates muscle contraction directly.“
Fig. 18  Signal Pathways in Cells (from: BERRIDGE, 1985, p. 126)
Before proceeding with our investigation into case studies of disturbed cell communica-
tion, I would like to present several examples of successful cell communication in which
specific messages of specific nerves and glands trigger specific responses in specific tis-
sues and organs:
EXTERNAL SIGNAL TISSUE CELLULAR RESPONSE
VASOPRESSION LIVER BREAKDOWN OF GLYCOGEN
ACETYLCHOLINE PANCREAS AMYLASE SECRETION
ACETYLCHOLINE SMOOTH MUSCLE CONTRACTION
ACETYLCHOLINE OOCYTES(XENOPUS) CHLORIDE PERMEABILITY
ACETYLCHOLINE PANCREATIC BETA CELLS INSULIN SECRETION
SEROTONIN SALIVARY GLAND (BLOWFLY) FLUID SECRETION
THROMBIN BLOOD PLATELETS PLATELET AGGREGATION
ANTIGEN LYMPHOCYTES DNA SYNTHESIS
ANTIGEN MAST CELLS HISTAMINE SECRETION
GROWTH FACTORS FIBROPLASTS DNA SYNTHESIS
LIGHT PHOTORECEPTORS (LIMULUS) PHOTOTRANSDUCTION
SPERMATOZOA SEA URCHIN EGGS FERTILIZATION
THYROTROPIN ANTERIOR LOBE OF PROLACTIN SECRETION
RELEASING HORMONE PITUITORY GLAND
Fig. 19 „DETAILS OF SIGNAL PATHWAYS“ (from: BERRIDGE, 1985, P. 129)
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5. Disturbances in intraorganismic communication
Any behavior of cells or cell associations that deviates from the rules can more or less
seriously compromise the overall organism. Disrupted communication between and with-
in cells can be triggered by a wide range of events ranging from psychological trauma to
attacks on the overall organism by viruses and bacteria, including damage to overall intra-
organismic communication competence through correspondingly severe defects in the
genetic text. The organism as a whole is usually not defenseless against such communi-
cation disturbances: rather, it is capable of organizing appropriate counterstrategies to re-
establish intraorganismic communication and ensure viable understanding (Verständi-
gung), association, and behavioral coordination between the individual components of
the overall organism.
5.1. Intercellular communication disturbance: Cholera as an example
Hormones and neurotransmitters serve as linguistic signs in sign-mediated communica-
tion processes between cells or cell associations (organs). Disturbances in intercellular
communication occur when the adressee of the intercellular message cannot identify the
signs in the sense in which the message was directed at the addressee by the sign user (for
example a specific organ, gland, or nerve cell). On the other hand, the addressee can also
interpret signs to be messages when these were never meant to be messenger substances.
The addressee can also act as if it received a messenger substance without ever having
actually received such a message. Alternately, a cell may lack or have damaged receptors
on its surface which block or severely limit its capacity to receive certain messages and/or
to respond appropriately. Finally, the receptors of a cell can confuse a particular messenger
with substances that closely resemble the messenger. An example of the latter type of com-
munication disturbance is the life-threatening disease cholera (RUBENSTEIN, 1980).
The small intestine of humans is the primary site of food digestion. It also releases the
digestive products that the body needs into the blood stream. Specific enzymes that are
produced and released by the pancreas and the small intestine break down the fats, carbo-
hydrates, and proteins contained in the food. When food enters the small intestine from
the stomach, a specific substance reacts with the receptors of the small intestine and
induces - via intracellular communication - the production of cAMP (cyclic adenosine
monophosphate) by these cells. This cAMP, in turn, induces the cells to excrete an alka-
line fluid into the intestinal canal. The fluid creates the optimal conditions for digestion.
As a rule, the cells involved produce two liters of fluid which are resorbed again at the
end of the small intestine and partially in the colon (ibid.).
The presence of the bacterium Vibrio cholerae into the small intestine would, in itself, not
elicit any reaction: it neither attacks nor in any way destroys intestinal tissue. The bacteri-
um cannot penetrate or force its way between the epithelial cells of the gut and actually
has no opportunity to reach the lymph ducts or enter into the blood stream. On the other
hand, the bacterium produces the toxin choleratoxin. The receptors in the cells of the
small intestine identify this substance as a messenger that signalizes the normal produc-
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tion of cAMP. Choleratoxin, however, induces the cells to activate the enzyme adenylate
cyclase (which converts adenosine triphosphate to cAMP) in such a manner that the cells
release twenty to thirty liters of fluid into the small intestine versus the normal two liters.
The cells are unable to resorb this amount of fluid, which is then lost in the form of vom-
iting or diarrhea. This severe fluid loss is life threatening and, in fact, 50% of all the
infected, untreated cases die due to this intercellular communication disturbance (ibid.).
5.2. Disturbance of coordinated behavior between cell associations through 
disturbance of sign-mediated communication
Associations of cells into tissues and organs involve specific regulatory interactions.
Successful regulatory communicative behavior between cells is a prerequisite for coordi-
nated behavior in metabolic reactions or in specific interactions with other organs, glands,
and nerve cells of the overall organism.
Many processes would be inconceivable without a highly complex communication
between cells. This is especially true in the case of cell division and in protein synthesis
during the growth of new cells, but is also valid for all the enzymes that these cells subse-
quently need (organ-specifically) in order to complete their full range of tasks. This
includes the purely quantitative replacement of dying cells in a timely and precise man-
ner. Communication disturbances here lead to variously grave adverse effects on the
organism as a whole. We can distinguish three representative paths known to disrupt com-
munication:
(a) environmental influences (e.g., chemicals, radiation, psychological trauma, etc.) can
permanently disturb intercellular communication, thereby deforming intracellular com-
munication and triggering abnormal cell behavior. For example, a cell that is unable to
orient its own reproduction according to the rules governing coordinated reproduction
within the organ may undergo unabated cell division. 
(b) Environmental influences can directly alter the cell’s genes so that, upon expression, a
gene coded to coordinate growth will produce proteins in an uncoordinated manner. A
change in the genetic text deforms the entire intracellular, sign-mediated communication
involved in protein synthesis. This can be triggered by damage to or change in a single
base of a single gene.
(c) The cell of an organ can be misused by being strategically conscripted by a virus or
retrovirus (the difference will be discussed later in the text). The virus inserts its informa-
tion in the cell’s DNA. During the sign-mediated communication process of protein syn-
thesis, the cell, rather than producing proteins for its own growth, produces viral proteins.
These, in turn, strategically conscript further cells until the whole organism suffers from
one or more tumors.
The resulting cancer cells are no longer bound to the rules of interaction inherent to a par-
ticular organ or organ complex, but exhibit abnormal behavior. They are permeable to
chemical substances whose uptake would be blocked under normal circumstances, use
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more energy than non-malignant cells, and also take on a somewhat different shape. As a
rule, cancer is lethal not because a cell loses its capacity for regulated growth and thus
develops into a tumor, but because such cells transcend their designated sphere of inter-
action, overstep their natural boundaries, and infest distant organs or tissues to form
colonies of cancerous cells or metastases (NICOLSON, 1979).
Skin cells can serve as an example to elucidate the various ways in which cell associa-
tions interact with one another according to specific rules:
The outer layer of the skin is termed epidermis and consists of a layer of basal cells. This
is overlayed by several layers of flat and scale-like cells. The epidermis undergoes con-
stant renewal, with cell division taking place in the lowest stratum of the basal layer
directly above the dermis (the latter represents an association of nutritive and skeletal
cells). Due to the uninterrupted division in the basal layer, cells are continuously being
pushed into the more superficial regions. There, they become differentiated according to
very specific rules: they become flatter, produce the insoluble protein keratin, and lose
their nucleus. They then form a layer of scales that eventually detaches from the epider-
mis surface. The relatively impermeable keratin layer is a first line of defense against our
immediate environment (CHAIRNS, 1985).
The development of epidermis cells is the product of a regulatory, sign-mediated commu-
nication process between dermis cells. The dermis cells must signal the basal cells in
order to initiate the division process. In the absence of such signals, the epidermis cells
cease dividing and immediately begin to differentiate. The regions containing sign-trans-
mitting dermis cells and sign-receiving basal cells are rather strictly delimited. Additional
regulatory communication processes coordinate the arrangement of hair roots, sweat
glands, and other structures in the epidermis. The sign-using dermis cells also specifical-
ly shape the surface features of the epidermis: if epidermal tissue is grafted from the
upper arm to the palm of the hand, it gradually becomes thicker and develops the typical
pattern of lines. If a patch of epidermis cells is lost due to injury, increased cell division in
the bordering epidermis cells reclaims the damaged area. While the rules governing this
regulatory, sign-mediated communication remain largely unknown, their existence is
undisputed. Such intercellular communication involves numerous, specific communica-
tion processes that are more or less independent of one another. This leads to an increased
potential for communication disturbance (ibid.).
Psoriasis is a disease that involves abnormal yet non-lethal cell growth. Here, the number
of dividing basal cells increases far beyond the rate at which cells normally detach from
the surface. Metabolic disturbance is one known cause, but even stress may be sufficient
to disrupt the communication between dermis and basal cells and to trigger the symptoms
of this communication disturbance. The common wart is also the result of such a benign
communication disturbance between dermis and basal cells (ibid.).
Similar types of communication disturbance can also lead to cancer. In basal cell carcino-
mas, the cancerous cell leaves the tissue it is normally associated with and migrates into
the underlying dermis. There, the basal cells no longer differentiate into their typical
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form, but divide unabatedly. Once inside the dermis they lead to an ever-larger malignant
growth. In this form of cancer, the cancerous cells rely heavily on the information flow
from the dermis and rarely form metastases in other regions of the body. In prickle cell
cancer, however, cells differentiate normally, albeit in areas outside the epidermis. These
cells are less dependent on information from the dermis and the rate of metastasis forma-
tion is much higher. Both forms of cancer are frequently triggered by UV radiation, with
the cells of each type showing a different behavior despite stemming from the same tis-
sue. This is evidence for disturbances in more than one communication process between
the dermis and basal cells. 
„All four diseases are clearly the result of communication disturbances between the cells“
(CHAIRNS, 1985).
5.3. Intracellular communication disturbance
A malignant growth is an aggregation of cancerous cells which stems from a single cell
that at some point lost control over its own growth. What causes a completely normal cell
within a cell association to disregard the rules that coordinate normal cell growth?
Recently, special enzyme proteins were discovered that accelerate or even trigger such
abnormal behavior. These enzymes are the products of specific genes. The conclusion
was that certain genes code for such explosive cell growth and therefore enlarge tumors;
they were termed oncogenes (BISHOP, 1982; WEINBERG, 1983, 1988; HUNTER,
1984). The transcription and expression of cancer-causing genes via the sign-mediated
communication process of protein synthesis yields precisely those enzymes that acceler-
ate the abnormal growth.
So-called retroviruses play an important role in the development of such cancer-causing
genes. As opposed to normal viruses, whose genetic material is contained in DNA, the
genetic text in retroviruses is based on RNA. It is surrounded by a proteinaceous enve-
lope. Normal viruses conscript the cell strategically, i.e., after viral infection the activities
of the cell no longer orient themselves according to the rules specific to the overall organ-
ism, but to those rules of behavior defined in the genetic text of the virus. In many areas,
the cell’s original genetic text remains effective, for example in the rules underlying pro-
tein synthesis, yet rather than maintaining the integrity of the overall organism, it serves
solely to support the reproductive strategy of the viruses (WATSON, 1992).
When cells reproduce by cell division, the DNA is first transcribed into mRNA and then
translated into the amino acid language. A virus inserts its information into this translation
process, coercing the cell to produce viral proteins. Some of these proteins multiply the
viral genome, other proteins attach themselves to the copies of the new virus particles, and
still others serve as messenger substances for viral genes. Using these messengers, viruses
induce normal cells to become tumors, i.e., to undergo unregulated cell proliferation.
Retroviruses can also unleash uncontrolled cell growth. They are the only viruses with an
RNA genome. Retroviral infection involves transcribing viral RNA into double-stranded
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DNA by means of a virus-specific enzyme (reverse transcriptase) and then inserting this
into the genome of the host cell. Up until the discovery of this rule, no one had a clue as
to how retroviruses reproduced. The hypothesis that RNA could also be transcribed into
DNA - contrary to traditionally held belief that genetic information flows exclusively
from DNA to RNA - enabled an understanding of reproduction in retroviruses through an
understanding of the rules underlying this reproduction (ibid.).
The genetic text of retroviruses usually contains a cancer gene. The transcription into
viral DNA and its insertion into the genome of the host cell will also involve the cancer
gene. The subsequent transcription of the cell’s DNA into mRNA by cellular enzymes
naturally also gives rise to RNA copies of the viral DNA. Some of these copies will later
form the viral genome of new virus particles. The remaining copies serve as mRNA,
whose text the cell translates into the amino acid sequence of proteins in the course of the
sign-mediated communication process of protein synthesis. These proteins are already
subject to the rules of viral RNA, i.e., they already serve as envelopes for the genetic text
of the retrovirus and thus in effect constitute new viral individuals. The enzyme of the
cancer gene, however, attaches itself to the plasma membrane of the cell from the inside,
where it alters certain proteins through so-called phosphorylation. Only at this point does
the enzyme, which is coded by the cancer gene, induce malignant growth in the cell.
Phosphorylation was long thought to be insignificant. Today we know that protein phos-
phorylation is responsible for cell growth. Its increase in the course of normal growth
derails the normal regulatory process.
All forms of cancer involve communication disturbance of the intracellular type in that a
group of cellular genes that code for growth and growth regulation becomes deformed or
damaged. This can be triggered by chemical substances, viruses, or retroviruses. During
the expression of such damaged genetic texts, i.e., in converting the genetic information
into mRNA and the amino acid sequences of proteins, the pragmatic effect of the text alter-
ations manifests itself as abnormal behavior and unhindered cell growth. In fact, the very
genes that code for regulated growth in every cell also harbor the potential to form cancer-
ous cells. The sign users are the same, yet the underlying rules can differ fundamentally.
Furthermore, viral strategies demonstrate that the overall organism’s DNA, which is fully
defined in each individual cell, is not a rigid genetic text; rather, the text components -
those sequences that do or do not code for proteins - are subject to a certain variability
which expresses itself in more or less clear variations of the semantic content and ulti-
mately of the pragmatic phenotype or activity. This text variability enables the full range
of text-processing procedures, from the insertion of viral DNA and the resultant con-
scription of the cell for intensified viral reproduction, to the vital adaptation of the organ-
ism as a whole to changing environmental conditions. Precisely this text variability
makes it easier for entire populations to optimize the reproduction of their members.
White hares in the northern hemisphere, for example, no doubt have a competitive advan-
tage over brown hares, which potential predators can spot much more easily in the snow.
In all likelihood, the reproductive success of a hare population whose genome contains a
gene that expresses white fur when winter sets in, will be higher.
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Genetic texts do not vary on their own, i.e., they are not autovariable. Rather, text alter-
ations - more commonly enlargements than distortions (e.g., through radiation damage) -
involve the regulated behavior of specific protein individuals or coordinated behavior by
a number of such individuals. While genes do code for proteins, no genetic text could be
expressed as a protein without enzyme proteins. Specific enzymes identify precisely
those sequences that mark the beginning and end of the particular gene that is to be
expressed. To a certain degree, the sign users (that use the genetic alphabet and even the
entire nucleic acid  language, enzyme proteins, and other types of proteins) are at the
same time the immediate goal of the sign-mediated communication processes undertaken
by these sign users. On the pragmatic level, of course, each enzyme protein is used for a
specific behavior sequence. The nucleic acid and amino acid languages enable protein
individuals to reproduce themselves. 
„* Notes:
1. Enzyme produces blunt ends.
2. The single strand is the 5´strand.
3. The single strand is the 3´strand.
4. The base pair N can be any purine or pyramidine pair.
5. The enzyme does not cut within the recognition sequence, but at whatever sequence lies
eight nucleotides 3´to the recognition site.
6. NorI has an eight-base recognition sequence and cuts mammalian DNA very infrequently.“
Fig. 20  „Some Restriction Enzymes and Their Cleavage Sequences“
(from: WATSON, 1992, p. 65)
Living nature, as a producing and self-reproducing entity, encompasses millions of differ-
ent biological species. These have developed an equally diverse range of communication
types and distinctly differ in the constellation of their genetic texts and in both their exter-
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nal appearance and overall habitus. All of them are subject to the two central rules of
reproduction and food uptake; in each individual, rule-governed interaction they under-
score the variation of languages in nature. Common to all of them, however, is the lan-
guage of protein individuals, especially the nucleic acid language: intraorganismic com-
munication - more so in the intracellular than in the intercellular realm - makes use of a
metalanguage that combines every conceivable language. Without its functionality, com-
munication between discrete organisms would be impossible because no individual
organism would be viable as a sign-using interorganismic species. Regardless of how dif-
ferent the individuals of a biological species are, the affect on intraorganismic communi-
cation disturbances is always negative. Communication disturbances that affect all the
members of a population will jeopardize the survival of the population as a whole.
5.4. Recombination of genetic texts through jumping genes and retroviruses
The investigation of so-called control sequences, i.e., genetic sequences of nucleotides
that regulate gene expression, revealed that certain sequence elements are apparently
variably inserted into and removed from genomes. These sequence elements were termed
transposable elements („jumping“ genes) or transposons (WATSON, 1992). Subsequent
research revealed that these sequence elements do not actually jump; rather, copies of
these sequences are produced, and these are inserted into or excised from other sites in the
genome by means of specific enzymes. A parent transposon is cleaved in a staggered
manner and copied to form daughter transposons which are then inserted into other sec-
tions of the genome by means of similar restriction enzymes. The nucleases that function
here as restriction enzymes and that cleave the genetic text such that the daughter trans-
poson can be inserted are coded by the protein-coding genes of the transposon itself. The
grammatic rule governing the insertion into the genetic text has been discovered:
In the affected chromosome, the sequences flanking the transposon are normally identi-
cal. The grammatic rules of complementary base pairs allow us to conclude that the host
chromosome is cleaved in a staggered manner. The transposon itself is coded by so-called
insertion sequences; they also include the gene that codes for the transposase, i.e., the
enzyme responsible for the position change of the daughter transposons (ibid.).
This enzyme is flanked on each side by inverted repeats (IR) which are 24 base pairs long.
The transposon itself consists of the identical insertion sequences, sandwitching a gene
that is either inserted or removed. „Jumping“ genes add an element of variability to the
genetic text because they can variably constitute the expression or repression of specific
genes (ibid.).
The enzyme’s staggered cleaving technique and the inverted repeats (IR), with the gene in
between, are precisely the identification feature that seems to orient the retroviral inser-
tion technique.
Let us recall the strategy of a retrovirus: once such an RNA tumor virus has infected a
particular cell of the organism, DNA copies of the RNA original is synthesized by the
reverse transcriptase contained within that cell. The viral DNA then migrates into the
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nucleus of the host cell, where it is inserted into the chromosome by specific enzymes.
During the production and insertion of viral DNA, certain terminal sequences are multi-
plied. They are distinguished by their 5’ and 3’ ends. This provides both ends of the viral
DNA sequence with identically long terminal repeats (LTR). They are several hundred
base pairs long. The base pairs of the viral DNA that directly adjoin the host DNA are
termed tandem duplicates. The transposons have the very same features (in this case
inverted repeats) (ibid.).
Fig. 21 „A model for transposon insertion. The host chromosome sequences flanking
the transposon are usually found to be identical, implying that a staggered cut is involved in the insertion
of the transposable element.“  (from: WATSON, 1983, p.141)
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Both ends of the transposons and of the retroviral DNA bear identical sequences; they
function as „recognition“ sequences (WATSON, 1992; I prefer the term identification
sequences) for those transposase enzymes that cleave the host chromosome and insert
either transposable control sequences or retroviral DNA. This precise process enables not
only control genes (for example growth-regulating genes in the chromosome) but also the
retroviral DNA to change their position in the chromsome or be variously inserted or
removed (as copies of the original).
We are dealing here with a rule that governs the constitution of variable genetic text
regions, a rule that was possibly learned or adopted by the retroviruses and subsequently
used to promote their own reproduction. Uncontrolled cell growth may thus reflect the
conscription of a host cell’s genetic text through retroviral DNA in the region of those
genes that code as growth regulation sequences; as a consequence, these become subject
to the rules of retroviral DNA reproduction (ibid.).
5.5. Electromagnetic fields as the communication medium of 
intercellular communication?
Up until now, we have referred only to chemical messenger substances and neurotrans-
mitters as the signs used in intraorganismic communication. The possibility that other
forms of sign-mediated communication and therefore other communication media exist
alongside the chemical ones was indicated by an experiment conducted back in 1975
(POPP, 1976, p. 58-62):
In the laboratory, a cell culture was split into two by a normal pane of glass. One side of
the divided culture was infected by a virus. In the course of the experiment, the second
half remained entirely unaffected, even after a lengthier period. In the subsequent experi-
mental setup, another cell culture was divided into two halves, this time with a plate of
quartz glass. One half was again infected with a virus.  After a certain period, the second
half, which was separated from the infected half by the quartz divider, also began to grow
uncontrollably.
The quartz glass is equally impenetrable for chemical substances and for viruses. How
then does the viral information pass through the quartz glass and subjugate the growth
regulation gene of the originally uninfected cell culture to the viral growth strategy? 
Some sort of communication medium that is absorbed by normal glass yet can penetrate
quartz glass must be involved. To the best of our knowledge, it could be UV radiation,
which in this case would have to come from the cell itself. Within the cell it might be
present in the form of infrared radiation, which would then be modulated into UV radia-
tion. The presence of such radiation has been confirmed; this goes hand in hand with the
recognition that every cell produces a weak electromagnetic field that is highly correlated
with the energetic status of that cell. This radiation clearly plays a role in communication,
specifically in regulating growth. The fact that the human body loses 10 million cells per
second lends credence to such a scenario. This cell loss must be correctly compensated
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for at the very site of the loss, i.e., in every part of the body. This requires that living cells in
the various tissues rapidly and precisely detect their dead or dying neighbors and that this
information be conveyed within the organism as a whole. The detection of a dying cell by an
adjoining cell must be more rapid than cell death itself. Otherwise those cells responsible
for compensating cell loss would be at constant risk of already being dead themselves. The
communication speed necessary to compensate cell death in a coordinated manner exceeds
the capacity of chemical messengers and must therefore lie in the electromagnetic realm.
The experiment shows that virus-infected cells can transmit the specific viral information
to the uninfected cells through the quartz glass by non-chemical means. Or should we
assume that the virally induced change in the genetic text (e.g., in the gene coding for
growth) alters the entire energy field of a cell so systematically that its altered emission
can also deform the energy field of the initially uninfected neighboring cell through the
quartz, transforming the growth gene into an oncogene (cancer gene)? In the first case the
viral information would assault the growth-regulating gene directly via an electromagnet-
ically modulated path, while in the second case the attack would be indirect (ibid.).
This question cannot be answered definitively based on currently available research
results. It is clear, however, that the uninfected cells, which were separated from the
infected ones by quartz glass, showed abnormal gene expression. It is also clear that cells
which heed the sign-mediated communication of the viruses can be classified as infected,
i.e., subordinated to the reproduction of viral information (ibid.).
Disturbances in the communication medium of electromagnetic fields and radiation
would be expected when carcinogenic chemicals distort normal communication process-
es, for example through partial absorption ( e.g., of polycyclic hydrocarbons). The same
holds true for radiation from outside the organism or when viruses so severely impair
infected cells that distorted signals to the adjoining cell induce the latter to react in the
same manner as the infected cell (ibid.).
Although this aspect of intracellular communication remains to be investigated in detail,
it is mentioned here as a potentially important element in demonstrating intercellular
communication and communication disturbances.
5.6. Self-defense strategies of organisms: The immune response
The organism as a whole is not defenseless against intraorganismic communication dis-
turbance. It has numerous defense strategies at its disposal, some of which are innate, oth-
ers which are acquired over the course of the organism’s life. In humans these include the
skin, which is impenetrable for both bacteria and viruses, as well as sebum and tears,
which flush out foreign particles (much like the resin of trees), or gastric juices, which
simply dissolve most foreign matter. Only after these innate protective functions are
breached by infectious bacteria or viruses does a highly specific defense strategy termed
the immune response kick in. It is the result of a complex behavioral coordination
between cells that identify and those that destroy invaders, a coordination which can be
mediated by cells that trigger alarm signals via chemical messenger substances.
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In all, three types of cells mount complementary efforts to organize the immune response
and to optimally coordinate behavior via very specific, sign-mediated communication
processes. The quality of this coordinated behavior determines the success or failure of
the overall immune response, i.e., whether the organism as a whole can defend itself
against foreign substances. In the long run, any self-defense strategy that is not permanent
means certain death by infection.
The cells responsible for organizing the immune response circulate throughout the body
in search of foreign substances. They are capable of identifying a virtually unlimited
number of such substances and can distinguish them from those occurring naturally in the
body. The so-called antibodies are the best known identification proteins. Millions of
these proteins (immunoglobins), which constitute themselves from a relatively limited
number of gene sections, are known to exist. Nevertheless, the virtually unlimited vari-
ability of these very restricted sequences gives rise to a wide range of antibodies. The
cleaving and rejoining of genetic sequences is responsible for the pragmatic variance of
the immune response as a sign-mediated communication process and guarantees its
effectiveness. Most of the diversity in antibodies stems from ever-new combinations and
recombinations of DNA sections (TONEGAWA, 1985).
The surface of certain immune cells bears T cell receptors, i.e., identification proteins,
that interact only with those cells that bear both endogenous and foreign identification
characters. This specific feature enables immune cells with T cell receptors to act against
virus infections in a very specific manner, because the surface of virally infected cells
bears both natural and foreign identification characteristics.
The most important cells of the immune system are lymphocytes, white blood corpuscles
formed from the stem cells of the bone marrow. In mammals, one class of lymphocytes,
the B cells, mature in the bone marrow, while the second class, the T cells, mature in the
thymus gland. Both cells are similar in appearance and size, yet play different roles in
coordinating the behavior of the immune response (ibid.).
B lymphocytes produce antibodies. During its maturation in the bone marrow, each B cell
is programed to produce antibodies that can identify a particular antigen (foreign protein),
even if this may have a variety of molecular configurations. As a rule, the descendents of
such B cells retain this identification competence in slightly modified variations. The
antibodies produced by the B cell remain attached to the outer surface of the cell mem-
brane as receptor molecules. The docking of an antigen onto such an antibody is the sig-
nal for the cell to produce precisely those antibodies specialized in recognizing the trig-
gering antigen. Because individual viruses or bacteria bear numerous identification
features, a variety of different antibodies must be produced (ibid.).
After successfully warding off an infection, such specialized B lymphocytes retain their
specialized defense competence; they remain in the body and form the so-called
„immunological memory“, i.e., in the event of re-infection by the same antigen they
ensure a rapid immune response (this conserves energy when one juxtaposes host life
span and potential number of infections). The cells with such identification competence
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have been termed „memory cells“. Since the rule behind this sign-mediated communica-
tion is known, the process can be strategically supported: vaccinations are designed to
introduce small amounts of antigens from certain diseases into the body (albeit antigens
whose virulence has largely been neutralized, yet which still retain the characteristics of
the natural strains). This preventive measure induces the production of the above-men-
tioned antibody memory cells, ensuring a more rapid immune response of the body in the
event of infection. The specialized B lymphocytes do more than merely form the
immunological memory. Some of them differentiate definitively and completely, i.e., they
no longer divide and do nothing but produce antibodies. At this stage they are termed
plasma cells; they live for only a few days and produce large amounts of immunoglobu-
lins, which they release to the body (ibid.).
The antibody molecules do not destroy the foreign invaders directly. Rather, by docking
onto an antigen they mark the target for numerous other cells and proteins that contribute
to the immune response. The macrophages, as feeding cells, devour and digest such for-
eign protein particles (ibid.). 
The distinguishing feature of antibodies is their structure. It consists of four polypeptide
chains, more specifically of two equal, low-weight chains with ca. 220 amino acids and
two equal, high-weight chains with a length of 330-440 amino acids. These are combined
to form a Y-shaped structure. Each polypeptide bears variable and invariable regions.
Antibodies that belong to a particular type all have the same invariable regions, while the
variable regions differ in each individual B cell reproductive clone. Each variable region
bears three short sections in which the amino acids are particularly variable. At the end of
both arms of the Y, these highly variable sections combine to form pouch-like depressions
that serve as bonding sites for antigens. Depending on the shape of the pouch-like depres-
sions, i.e., on which chemical groups line their walls, the antibody molecule is competent
to interact with the specific antigene regions that bind to precisely those sites (ibid.).
The interaction competence of an antibody with an antigen is therefore determined by the
amino acid sequence in the hypervariable regions. The overall functionality of an anti-
body is given by the specific composition of the invariable versus variable sections.
Together, light and heavy polypeptide chains can produce several million different anti-
gen-binding sites. As in the case of heavy chains, each light chain is coded by three dif-
ferent sections on the immunoglobulin DNA. 
We are dealing here with nucleotide sequences of various lengths that code for the invari-
able regions, the variable regions, and the region joining the two. Furthermore, those
genes that code for the variable regions of the heavy chains are provided with an addi-
tional sequence section. This yields a total of four coding sequence regions, the C(con-
stant), the V(variable), the J(joining), and the D(diversity) regions.
An immunoglobulin chain that is suitable for the immune response therefore consists of
an appropriately recombined DNA sequence. It is constituted in two steps. First, the V
and J regions are combined in the DNA of the light chain, while the V, D, and J regions
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are combined in the DNA of the heavy chain. In a subsequent step, the combined
sequence regions are transcribed onto an uninterrupted RNA molecule. It incorporates the
V and J regions of the light chain, the V, D, and J regions of the heavy chain, the C gene,
as well as the intron (the term applied to the non-coding sequences between the coding
ones: they serve like  intervals between words or sentences). At this stage, the intron and
a number of superfluous J elements are excised, and the mRNA is channeled out of the
nucleus and translated into a protein (ibid.).
The initial step, in which DNA (not RNA) recombination takes place first, is thought to
be limited solely to the sign-mediated communication process of the immune response. A
group of highly specialized enzyme proteins fulfils the task of combining the sequence
blocks of the V, D, and J regions, which lie some distance apart on the DNA, and to
remove the intervening DNA. Only very few such enzymes have actually been found,
although the corresponding DNA sequences that function as identification sequences for
these enzymes have been localized: a characteristic sequence arrangement is located
directly after every V gene of the light chain. It consists of (I) a group of 7 nucleotides
(heptamere) followed by (II) a spacer and (III) a group of nine nucleotides (nonamer). An
arrangement that is complementary to the above-mentioned sequence is positioned
directly in front of the J sequence. This sequence region can serve as an identification
sequence for enzymes that split the double helix, make it available for recombination, and
then rejoin it (ibid.).
Similar identification sequences for such recombination enzymes have been found on the
heavy chains.
On the other hand, the enzymes responsible for recombining the V, D, and J sequences are
somewhat imprecise in that additional base pairs are inserted from time to time, leading
to slightly different amino acid sequences from one immunoglobulin to the next.
Therefore, each immunoglobin bears somewhat different antigen binding sites. Beyond
this recombinatory constitution of sequences, recombination is characterized by numer-
ous spontaneous changes that follow no specific rules; this further significantly increases
the diversity of antibodies. Such spontaneous changes are essential to maintain the neces-
sary range of antibodies. In fact, they are so important that it is fair to assume that spon-
taneous changes are the rule rather than the exception (ibid.).
There are therefore two reasons for the diversity of antibodies: The first is rooted in
sequence combinations, which proceed according to strict grammatic rules. The second
involves spontaneous changes of individual nucleotide bases of a sequence which, as
research has shown, can significantly improve the fine tuning of the immune response.
Together, both increase the total number of potential antibody variations to over a billion
(ibid.).
The B cells and their antibodies, however, represent only one half of the class of cells that
contribute substantially to the immune response. The other half is formed by the so-called
T cells which, despite their similar appearance, consist of three types that display differ-
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ent behavior. The (a) killer cells kill their target cells directly by inflicting a lethal injury
or using toxins; the (b) helper cells identify antigens as such and stimulate various other
cells involved in the immune response; and the (c) suppressor cells weaken the activity of
these cells, for example after a successfully completed immune response (their role is
therefore antagonistic to that of the helper cells). The helper cells play an equally decisive
role in identifying antigens as do the suppressor cells, which are responsible for neutral-
izing the B and T cells after the successful immune response (as these would otherwise
attack the body’s own tissue) (ibid.).
„GENES FOR ANTIBODIES are broken up into small segments scattered widely throughout the genome. Two
kinds of light chain appear in mammalian antibody molecules. For the lamda light chain of the mouse there are
two V genes that encode most of the variable region and four C genes for the constant region. Upstream of each
C gene is a short segment of DNA designated J, for joining, which specifies the remainder of the variable region.
Either V gene can be combined with any pair of J and C genes. For the kappa light chain there are a few hundred
V segments, four J segments and a single C gene. The heavy-chain genes are similar, except that the DNA for
the variable region is further subdivided: in addition to the V and J segments there are about 20 D (for diversity)
segments. Each set of genes is on a diffrent chromosome. The T-cell-receptor genes are organized much as the
heavy-chain genes are.“
Fig. 22   4 coding sequence regions (from: TONEGAWA, 1985, p. 108)
The structure of the T cells consists of two chains of amino acids, the so-called alpha and
beta chains, along with a third chain, the gamma chain, which also plays a role in identi-
fying antigens.
The sequence combination of the T cells is quite similar to that of the immunoglobulins,
and the recombination techniques are governed by very similar or the same enzyme com-
plexes.
5.6.1. The identification of ‘self’ and ‘non-self’
While B cells interact with antigens on their own, the T cells only become active when the
antigen attaches to the surface of a cell which also bears features of the body’s own tissue.
Specific proteins, which are coded by a large number of genes termed the major histo-
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compatibility complex (MHC), are responsible for this. When the tissue of a donor is
transplanted to the recipient, the transplanted tissue is often rejected because the donor’s
MHC proteins trigger an immune response (ibid.). 
Each and every organism, with the exception of identical twins, possesses a different
group of MHC proteins. While antibodies and T cell receptors vary from cell to cell, the
MHC proteins differ only from one organism to the other.
„Recognition of a virally infected cell by an MHC class I-specific cytotoxic T cell.  Antigenic peptides derived
from viral proteins appear on the surface of the infected cell in a complex with a class I MHC molecule. The class
I molecule is made up of two polypeptides, the polymorphic α chain and β2 -microglobulin, an invariant protein.
The class I MHC-peptide complex is specifically recognized by a T-cell receptor (TCR), which is itself composed
of two protein chains, α and β. Another T cell-specific surface glycoprotein, CD8, binds to nonpolymorphic
regions on the class I MHC molecule. The carboxy-terminal portion of the TCR is associated with a group of
transmembrane proteins called the CD3 complex. The carboxy-terminal portion of CD8 is associated with an
intracellular protein tyrosine kinase, p56lck. Formation of the TCR-antigen-MHC-CD8 complex relays signals to
the interior of the cell and activates p56lck and proteins associated with CD3. In the case of cytotoxic T cells, the
cells respond to these signals by synthesizing and secreting enzymes that bore holes into the infected cell.“
Fig. 23  Identification process by MHC class I proteins
(from: WATSON, 1992, p. 306)
Two classes of MHC proteins have been discovered to date. T cells identify antigens
when an antigen occurs together with an MHC protein on the surface of a cell. This is the
only combination in which they are useful as an identification signal for T cells. Killer
cells (cytotoxic cells) react to a combination of antigen and class 1 MHC proteins; T cells,
on the other hand, react to a combination of antigens and class 2 MHC proteins. This
combination rule is a highly specific identification signal for immune cells. They do not
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react exclusively to foreign substances; if this were the case, then viruses would be able to
reproduce unhindered once they have infected a cell, i.e., once they are shielded by one of
the body’s own cells. 
Along with its own proteins, however, the surface of such an infected cell also bears sur-
face proteins characteristic of the virus. Precisely this combination is the signal that
induces killer cells, for example, to kill the entire infected cell along with its viruses
before it can propagate any further (ibid.).
„Recognition of processed antigen presented on a macrophage by an MHC class II-specific helper T cell.
Macrophages engulf an antigen and degrade it to small peptides. The peptides reappear on the cell surface in
complex with class II MHC proteins, which are composed of two polymorphic chains termed α and β. Class I-
specific T cells express CD4 instead of the CD8 protein present on class I-specific T cells. The class II MHC-
peptide complex is bound by the TCR and the CD4 protein present on helper T cells. Upon formation of the
complex, the helper T cell synthesizes and secretes lymphokines that cause antibody-producing B cells to divide
and differentiate into plasma cells, which secrete antibodies. Helper cell activation occurs through the CD3
complex and by turning on the p56lck protein tyrosine kinase.“ 
Fig. 24  Identification process by MHC class II proteins (from: WATSON, 1992, p. 307)
The class 2 MHC proteins on B lymphocytes and macrophages (killer cells) are the cue
for T helper cells to signal alarm, i.e., to trigger the immune response, using specific mes-
senger substances. Particularly in the case of virus infections, the specific interaction of
the T cells with infected cells determines which combination of antigen and ‘self’ tissue
surface triggers identification. This interaction determines success or failure of the
immune response. A successful immune response will be organized by numerous com-
municating, associated, and behaviorally coordinated cells. Their successful communica-
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tion is capable of repelling invaders that trigger intraorganismic communication distur-
bances, i.e., of repairing potential and actual communication disturbances by differentiat-
ing between foreign features and those of the body itself (ibid.).
5.6.2. The acquisition of interaction competence by thymus cells (T cells)
The T cells’ ability to interact with the body’s own tissue in a rule-governed manner is
vital, since virus-infected cells are not exogenous intruders but endogenous, strategically
conscripted cells. T cells can either attack immediately upon identifying a virally infect-
ed cell, with the goal of destroying the target, or they can send messenger substances to
those cells involved in the immune response (ibid.).
The body produces enormous numbers of T cells, in humans approximately 10 billion per
day. Such quantities are justified by the great diversity of potential invaders. Initially, this
mass of T cells remains inactive. Since they all have somewhat different receptors, no sin-
gle, clear-cut rule would be capable of orienting their behavior, i.e., they would identify
and attack most endogenous MHC proteins as alien (ibid.).
In the maturation phase of the T cells, which takes place in the thymus gland, the imma-
ture T cells are confronted with MHC proteins. This supply of different T cells is sorted
into types that fit well with MHC proteins and types with suboptimal or no fit. The latter
are destroyed. This initial selection process is followed by a second one for the remaining
T cells. Among their many tasks, MHC proteins regulate the cells’ uptake and release of
metabolic products. In the thymus, the preselected T cells are confronted with MHC pro-
teins that channel normal metabolic products out of the cell. Those T cells that react to
normal waste products with „alarm“ (i.e., by releasing messenger substances that induce
other cells to participate in the immune response), or that attack directly, are themselves
destroyed. After all, their future task as mature T cells is not only to identify the body’s
own MHC proteins as such, but to recognize virus-infected cells as targets based on their
MHC proteins (ibid.).
The identification features in this case are abnormal secretions of the virally infected cell;
this may involve only a single foreign protein fragment based on the fact that the infected
cell is producing viral components and is thus releasing modified metabolic products.
The interaction competence of the T cells is the result of rule conditioning during the mat-
uration phase:
(a) only those cells that are compatible with the body’s own MHC proteins can reproduce
and mature unhindered in the thymus. The immature T cells must react to MHC proteins
without foreign antigen. Once mature, they lose this ability and react only to the combi-
nation of antigen and endogenous MHC protein. 
(b) Only those mature T cells are released into the body’s circulatory system that do not
react to the normal excretory products of MHC proteins, but that sound alarm or immedi-
ately attack upon encountering abnormal characteristics in excretory products (ibid.)
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The rules behind this specific behavior are themselves subject to rule-governed interac-
tions of the intracellular type, i.e., during the expression of the genes coding for T cells:
immature T cells initially express the alpha gene only weakly, the beta and gamma gene
more strongly. Their proteins are subsequently produced in greater numbers. Immature T
cells bear receptors composed largely of gamma and beta chains (of amino acids) and that
react exclusively to MHC proteins. The selected T cells can react in a rule-governed man-
ner and are not destroyed, rather undergo further differentiation because they fit to MHC
proteins; they subsequently suppress the expression of the gamma gene and, instead,
express the alpha gene. The mature cells thus have alpha-beta receptors. This consider-
ably reduces but does not entirely eliminate the reactivity with MHC proteins since the
beta chain was, after all, present in the first selection process (ibid.).
T cells first react to the combination of antigen and the body’s MHC proteins in the alpha-
beta chain combination. This sheds light on why, in their first conditioning phase, T cells
react exclusively to MHC proteins, while in the second phase this exclusive reactivity is
lost and becomes differentiated into a combinational reactivity. Only the mature T cells
optimize the immune response capability of the overall organism. (Red blood cells under-
lie a similar differentiation rule in converting the form they have within the unborn organ-
ism to that they take on after birth; ibid.).
The above response to disturbances of or threats to intraorganismic communication - in
the form of the rule-governed interactions by cells responsible for the immune response -
can itself be subject to disturbance; this can lead to disorders that are no less dangerous
than those for which the immune response was developed in the first place. Thus, minor
irregularities in the selection of suitable T cells in the first conditioning phase can lead to
mature T cells that attack, destroy, or damage the body’s own tissue. Juvenile diabetes,
rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis and, above all, the ever-increasing incidence of
allergies, stem from abnormal interactions between the cells that organize the immune
response and the body’s own tissue. The immune cells behave abnormally because they
were already subject to abnormal conditions while gaining interaction competence. This
can be genetically based but, as in the case of most allergies, can also be induced by envi-
ronmental factors.
5.6.3. Viral camouflage strategies
The surface of virally infected cells typically bears specific protein molecules that are for-
eign and therefore termed antigens. They serve as identifcation features for antibodies
and as a signal for defensive action known as the immune response. 
Cells that have been conscripted by viruses in this manner develop strategies to camou-
flage themselves from cells that organize the immune response; these strategies fully con-
form with the aims of the infecting viruses:
(a) a tumor consisting of few cells can remain undetected until it has reached a size where
the identification mechanism of immune cells engages too late and the immune
response is no longer capable of repairing the communication disturbance. 
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(b) When attacked by immune cells, certain cancer cells are able to cast off their antigens
or to shift them to the inside. Such cancer cells lack identifiable external features, i.e.,
they are no longer recognizable as targets by the immune cells. 
(c) Aggregations of cancerous cells can inundate the body with antigens. In doing so, they
block so many immune cells that the cancer cells themselves can no longer be identi-
fied. This strategy has been termed „antigen blinding“ (ibid.).
These viral strategies, undertaken by cells subordinated to viral reproductive strategies,
point to the potential existence of tumor cells that do without antigens altogether and thus
principally circumvent detection by immune cells .
5.6.4. Communication disturbances involving damage to the genetic text 
and their repair by specific enzyme proteins
The rule-governed interactions between cells and cell associations, as well as those
between the components of a cell, guarantee a viable overall organism that is itself in a
position to communicate on the inter- and metaorganismic level. Inter- and intracellular,
sign-mediated communication processes are predetermined by the participating proteins
and therefore by the DNA coding these proteins. Thus, all the essential conditions gov-
erning successful intraorganismic communication are fixed in the form of the nucleic acid
language.
At the same time, the genetic text of a cell or cell association can be damaged by UV radi-
ation, radioactivity, or chemicals. Such damage may prevent the expression of a gene nec-
essary for a particular metabolic process, blocking its translation into a specific amino
acid chain that would then yield the required enzyme protein. Processes such as DNA
replication, the transcription of the DNA into RNA, and the subsequent translation into
the amino acid sequence can no longer be executed according to the rules.
On the other hand, the genetic text of the cells within an organism harbors specific genes
capable of repairing such damage. It does this by coding for enzymes that operate via two
different, sign-mediated communication processes. Although the modalities of the rules
governing these communication processes differ, their core rule remains the same: repair
damage to the genetic text. Two key communication processes are involved in damage
repair. The first is responsible for remedying minor damage and is permanently operative
(HOWARD & FLANDERS, 1981). The second kicks in when the first becomes over-
loaded, i.e., when major damage needs to be repaired. Both strategies utilize the gram-
matic rules of complementary base pairs.
5.6.4.1. Excision repair
Both strands of the double helix are typically held together by hydrogen bonds between
the DNA bases. UV radiation, for example, can prompt 2 pyramidines (thymine and cyto-
sine) on one of the chains to form a bond. This shifts the two pyramidines from their orig-
inal position within the overall structure, breaking the hydrogen bonds between the com-
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plementary bases on the other strand. The entire backbone of the DNA bends and the
directly adjoining base pairs also lose their complementary bonds. If an enzyme involved
in transcription were to come along at this time, it would have to interrupt the process at
this site. The inevitable result would be a communication disturbance because the protein
which was to be expressed could not be produced (ibid.).
Excision repair involves the removal of the damaged bases. Three enzymes are involved,
each of which is coded by a gene, whereby a fourth enzyme also plays a role. The enzyme
proteins uvrA, uvrB, and uvrC are responsible for excising the damaged sequence sec-
tion. DNA polymerase I docks at this gap and adds new nucleotides according to the law
of complementary base pairs. In a second step, the damaged sequence detaches entirely
and completes the whole damaged sequence section using new nucleotides, whereby the
original gap is shifted in the transcription direction by the length of the damaged
sequence. The final gap in the reconstituted sequence chain is sealed by the enzyme DNA
ligase. The original meaning of the damaged DNA is restored; it can now be read in the
normal manner, be transcribed, and be translated into protein-constituting amino acid
chains (ibid.).
5.6.4.2. Postreplication repair
During DNA replication both parent strands unravel to form individual DNA parent
strands, each of which normally gives dise to a new daughter strand. Two pyramidines
(thymine and cytosine) attached to one another in the parent strands can be corrected by
the above-described excision repair. Should such a pyramidine bond remain on a parent
strand after the replication, then no complementary daughter strand can be produced in
the immediate vicinity. The result is a so-called postreplicative gap. A delimited area of
single-stranded DNA, which also bears the pyramidine bond, lies opposite this gap.
A recA protein attaches at precisely this point and brings this single-stranded section next
to the DNA region on the other, undamaged daughter double strand that has been formed
in the meantime. There, both strands pair in a complementary manner. Thereafter, an
enzyme cleaves the parent strand of the intact double structure. The recA protein guides
the free end of the parent strand into the original gap, which thus becomes filled. The
upper double strand is repaired by the DNA polymerase, whereby the recA protein shifts
further to the right (in the reading direction), along with the crossing-over site of both
strands (ibid.).
The original pyramidine bond thus faces a correct base pair rather than the gap in the
complementary strand. As soon as the recA protein has fulfilled its function, the pyrami-
dine bond can be eliminated by excision repair. A second enzyme removes the cross-over
between the strands. The result is two intact double strands (ibid.).
Highly specific genes code for the enzyme proteins involved in this process. These genes
are not expressed as long as the DNA remains undamaged. A transcription repressor
blocks the operators of these genes engaged. In the event of more serious damage, the
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recA protein binds to the single-stranded DNA opposite the gap. This event activates a
protein-cleaving process which splits the repressor protein and allows all the previously
repressed genes to be read, yielding repair proteins. This concurrently gives rise to
numerous repressor proteins which, however, are immediately split by the recA protein
that was activated by the single-stranded DNA. Once the repair has been completed, no
additional recA protein is activated, and the repressor protein is no longer split. This
allows it to again suppress the expression of the repair enzymes (ibid.).
Specific, rule-governed interactions enable components of this damaged cell to repair
minor and major DNA damage, i.e., damage to the genetic text. Of particular interest in
this respect are interactions between the genetic text sections that code for enzyme pro-
teins, and between the enzyme proteins themselves, which not only regulate their own
production but carry out all the individual steps.
By means of highly specific, sign-mediated communication processes, this variety of spe-
cific protein individuals gives rise to strategies designed to be successfully repair intraor-
ganismic communication disturbances using a series of communication processes.
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PART
TWO

6. Explanatory deficits in Manfred Eigen’s
concept of language and communication.
From the logic of „molecular syntax“ to
molecular pragmatism.
Key biological processes could not be represented as sign-mediated communication
processes that require rule-governed linguistic sign use by real sign users without the
results of research in the fields of biochemistry and molecular biology. Superficially, the
philosophical perspective of a „language of nature“ differs only imperceptibly from the
scientific representation of such processes as rule-governed, sign-mediated interactions.
The terms „Genetic code“, „nucleic acid language“, recognition sequences“, „translation
process“, amino acid language“, „immune responses“, „intercellular communication“,
etc. owe their status as irreplacable core concepts in molecular biology not to an intro-
duction into biochemistry and molecular biology by linguists, communication experts, or
language philosophers. Rather, they were independently coined by molecular biologists
to explain observed phenomena and were clearly invoked due to the strong analogy to
processes of human communication.
Here, I attempt to show that the use of these key concepts in biochemistry and molecular
biology - when viewed under the premises envisioned by these fields - is problematic. To
exemplify this problem I refer to the terms „language“ and „communication“ as used by
Manfred Eigen. His research has had a substantial and lasting influence on biochemistry
and molecular biology as well as on evolutionary theory. Numerous researchers in these
disciplines use the language and communication concepts in the same or similar context
as Manfred Eigen.
6.1. Manfred Eigen’s use of the terms „language“ and „communication“
6.1.1. Molecular recognition processes and their significance for genetic manipulation
In the book he coauthored with Ruthild Winkler, „Das Spiel. Naturgesetze steuern den
Zufall“ (EIGEN/WINKLER. 1975)*, Eigen refers to a language concept which clealy
leans on that of information theory, particularly John v. Neumann’s idea regarding a self-
reproducing, intelligent automaton. For Eigen it is beyond doubt that life in the biological
sense originated according to the laws of physics and chemistry; it need only be investi-
gated with sufficient rigor under these aspects for its function and therefore its genesis to
be exactly defined. The goal of this research approach is to provide techniques with which
organisms can be created artificially. In Eigen’s mind, this artificial creation of life does
not involve an entirely „de novo“ creation, but rather a distinct improvement of genetic
manipulation techniques.
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* In the following text, page numbers in parentheses refer to this book.
The information concept is central to Eigen’s position: it best describes and explains the
storage of all the structural features of an organism in the chromosomes. According to
Eigen, genetic information is laid down in the form of a molecular text which, in the case
of humans, has the scope of a well-stocked private library (207). In the context of genetic
manipulation, this very aspect of a genetic text encompassing the entire genetic informa-
tion of an organism prompts Eigen to raise the problem of how to „track down and
exchange“ (ibid.) the detailed information that codes the substructures of an organism.
The identification of such substructures poses no problem for Eigen, since „the relative
arrangement of the individual genes, the gene map, as well as the syntax and semantics of
this molecular language are (...) largely known today“ (ibid.). The problem to be resolved
is one of „engineering“ (208), i.e., the techniques required to modify the genetic text.
Eigen compares this with the problems in organ transplantations, only that molecular
dimensions are involved and therefore the corresponding „micro-tools“ (ibid.) are
required. On the other hand, „gene transplantations“ need not be specially developed, but
merely discovered, since the entire instrumentarium has already been produced by nature.
This range of tools need only to be isolated from living organisms in order to be applied.
The naturally produced instrumentarium to manipulate the genetic text consists of restric-
tion enzymes, which cut the genetic text at specific sites. „The site consists of a palin-
drome-like sequence of six letters of the genetic text“ (208f.). Eigen specifically lays
down his conception of this identification process: „The restriction enzyme recognizes a
palindrome-like symmetry of the genetic text“ (210).
This capacity to identify specific text sequences must be strategically applied by
researchers who wish to carry out genetic manipulations. The restriction enzymes should
be able to carry out their identification and text cutting techniques at any site. 
„Since the genetic molecular language makes use of four different ‘letters’, one can envision
a multitude of cohesive recognition characters, depending on the length of the symmetrical
recognition zone“ (209). The exact nature of the recognition process by the restriction
enzymes is not yet known. We do know, however, that the enzymes recognize the palin-
drome-like sequences as cutting sites and that this is the general rule „by which genetic texts
are marked for the specific recognition by the executive function of the proteins“ (209).
6.1.2. Self-organization and the logic of „self-reproducing automatons“
For Eigen, the principle of self-organization lies behind the organization of biological
structures. He uses the human brain and its function to exemplify this principle. The brain
consists of nearly 10 billion nerve cells, each of which develops approximately 10 000 to
100 000 specific contact sites with adjoining cells. The goal is to find the basic rule gov-
erning this complexity - that principle of hierarchic organization which enables cells to
differentiate such a complex network.
Among the many explanatory models, Eigen sides with that of A. Turing: Turing postu-
lated a universal computing device (similar to the human brain) which, upon exact
instruction, „calculates the value of supplied functions“ (215) and is capable of independ-
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ently discovering general mathematical procedures, so-called algorithms. The computing
device would store these and use them as a basis for new operations, enabling it in princi-
ple to derive any calculatable function in a series of finite calculating steps. The device
therefore stores all the initially entered computational rules along with all the newly
derived ones and uses both in every algorithmic operation. The most significant advance
of A. Turing’s approach, in Eigen’s opinion, involves John v. Neumann’s concept of a
„self-reproducing automaton“. Eigen describes Neumann’s idea, which represents a
„mathematically exact“ refinement  of Turing’s idea, in the following manner:
„Every machine consumes free energy - it either uses electrical current or is powered by an
internal combustion engine; in short, it could not function without this metabolism. A spe-
cific operational task of the v. Neumann automaton is self-reproduction. The first model
from the year 1950 was entirely realistic in its conception: The machine runs back and
forth in a huge spare-parts warehouse and compiles the components necessary for its own
replication. Most importantly, it also reproduces its own construction plan or blueprint. Its
progeny should, after all, also be equipped with the self-reproduction capability. Herein
lies the possibility to perfect the v. Neumann automaton, an idea that has long been taken
up by theorists: selective alteration of the program enables continuous improvement and
an expanded range of application in the sense of Darwinian evolution“ (216f.).
Eigen refers the theoretical construction of the self-reproducing automaton to a reality in
which these automatons comply with Darwin’s theory of biological evolution. According
to Eigen, v. Neumann achieves this by referring to the individual components of the
automaton as cells and then assigning each cell a certain number of states which largely
consist of relationships to neighboring cells. This simulation of the nerve cell network in
the human brain would give rise to an optimal number of interconnections; these, in turn,
would enable the quantity of calculations that the Turing machine requires to solve its
problems. „In principle, the automaton is capable of carrying out any desired calculation“
(217). The cellular organization of the brain follows exactly this principle and is thus
comparable to a cell automaton. Brain function, and thus speaking (thinking), are brain
computations analagous to those of the self-reproducing automaton.
According to Eigen, an artificially constructed organism would require features resem-
bling those of the above automaton. With this concept, Eigen has, in fact, set his sights on
explaining the origin of life, or of organisms, through self-organization. This would
require:
a) a memory large enough to develop the algorithms;
b) a number of adaptive capabilities permitting continuous changes in and 
expansion of the program;
c) an intrinsic evaluation scheme within the machine.
Such an evaluation scheme is a prerequisite for the machine to be able to select the cor-
rect development from an array of theoretically possible  variants. „Nature, through the
development of receptors that register environmental signals and through the develop-
ment of nervous systems that can process and store such signals, has found a more eco-
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nomic way“ (225) than a machine whose construction is guided by the principle that
improved construction plans benefit not the present, but only future generations.
Nature’s more economic approach enables learning processes that impart significance
even to important changes within one and the same organism. The learning process of
such biological systems demonstrates how the reproduction, evaluation, and modification
of the elementary processes in the learning system function as selective processes. Eigen
does recognize the importance of „evaluation“ for his automaton model of life.
„The Turing automaton must therefore have an inherent, independently active evaluation
scheme that ‘motivates’ it to do certain things and refrain from doing others. It requires a
pleasure and a pain center; it would have to experience fear and delight. This, at least, is
how an ‘animate’ being learns“ (ibid.).
Eigen views the evaluation function as a mental phenomenon. It thus ranks as a fundamen-
tal, computable function; one need only to definitively pinpoint the corresponding centers
in the human brain to differentiate and reproduce the principles behind the operating
mechanisms and, in Eigen’s sense, to integrate them into a self-reproducing automaton.
From the  cognitive standpoint at least, no difference from humans would remain.
6.1.3. Levels of self-reproduction: Eigen’s implicit epistemology
The incredible variety that characterizes nature could not have been the result of a uni-
form principle of self-organization. Rather, various levels of self-organization must be
assumed. In Eigen’s opinion, Popper’s 3-World-Concept, which J. Eccles applied to the
organization of brain performance, is best suited for such a differentiation.
Accordingly, the world is divided into World 1 - the objects - to which our questions per-
tain. This encompasses the energy of the cosmos, the structure and actions of all organ-
isms and all human brains, but also includes the objects artifically created by humans
along with material substrates of human creativity (works of art), tools, machines, books,
etc. 
World 2 contains purely subjective knowledge, the experience of perception, thought,
emotions, remembrances, dreams, creative imagination, i.e., the imaginative faculty. This
world of the subjective is distinct from the world of objects and from World 3.
World 3 harbors knowledge in the objective sense - the cultural heritage recorded on
physical media and covering the fields of philosophy, theology, natural science, history,
literature, art and technology, yet also including the theoretical systems of scientific prob-
lems and critical arguments.
Thus, Eigen envisions a world whose materiality can be found in World 1 (including the
materiality of the human beings that devised this system). His perceptive experience of
this concept and the existence of the thinker as subjective „self-awareness“ corresponds
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to World 2. Finally, World 3 encompasses that which the thinker thinks, as an intellectual
substrate (insofar as it has been recorded in a book or other medium).
Eigen considers this interpretation model of the world to accurately reflect reality - a real-
ity from which the rules governing the self-organization at the various levels (Worlds
1,2,3) should be able to be extracted.
„Organisms are formed from disordered, unorganized matter. This requires the develop-
ment of a molecular language with which information can be ordered and transferred.
This, in turn, presupposes a genetic memory enabling a program as complex as that of the
human bauplan to develop in a stepwise manner“ (287).
These comprise processes of World 1. The quality of human thought and feeling would
derive from the function of neuronal stimulatory patterns of the brain, which are the mate-
rial expression of subjective feelings.
„The learning process in the central nervous system of (higher) animals takes place in an
analagous manner. A communication medium, an ‘inner language’ for transferring and
processing the environmental impressions received by the sensory organs, is necessary
here as well. These are encoded in the form of electrical stimulation patterns in the net-
work of nerve cells. The electroencephalogram is an externally inferable (weak) echo of
the uninterrupted, highly diverse communication between nerve cells“ (ibid.)
The brain, after all, is the very instance that carries out the evaluatory process that decides
on the efficiency of the information-processing system: it filters the „correct“ information
from a wealth of potentially important information.
„The memory localized in the network of switch contacts or synapses is responsible for a
selective evaluation of incoming information. The resulting continuous modification of
the memory structure, the engram, determines the makeup of the subjective experience
comprising World 2“ (287f.).
In Eigen’s opinion, subjective experience, or the totality of the relationship between sub-
ject and world, is based on the continuous change of existing rules by newly developed
ones; this parallels the automaton model of calculating devices that function algorithmi-
cally. (Here, Eigen provides an implicit transcendental foundation of the constitution of
subjective experience).
Finally, World 3 is reserved for the products of the human intellect, including the devel-
opment of a language which can be employed to proceed independently in the automa-
ton-theoretical sense.
„Among all organisms, man alone has developed a language built on logical principles; it
serves to transmit, exchange, and recombine the rather limited subjective experience and
thoughts conveyed by the sensory organs“ (288).
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This considerably expands the horizon of traditional evolutive processes: human lan-
guage liberates mankind from Darwinian constraints and enables him to partake of the
cumulative experience amassed during cultural development. In lower evolutionary lev-
els, on the other hand, new combinations always only benefit the following generation,
never those who gave rise to the new combination. This world of information storage in
books and other documents of the human intellect, this is World 3.
The central element in the competition between self-reproducing structures is the intrin-
sic evaluation scheme. The essentiality of this principle is not based on the principles of
self-organization alone; it is also coupled with the „conditions forced upon us“ (289) by
the real, living environment.
„The evaluation scheme of mental information, together with stimulus processing con-
trolled by a nerve center, is a product of evolution. It was initially based solely on the
selection of advantageous, genetically pre-programmed behavioral patterns. The develop-
ment of evaluation centers in which pain, fear, and pleasure are localized expands the lat-
itude for the directed response to environmental stimuli of all kinds. (...). Only in
humankind does the evaluation scheme of mental information attain individual independ-
ence“ (ibid.).
The self-organization levels of the 3 worlds also correspond to the evolutionary levels. It
is interesting to note that cognitive processes are the result of subjective brain processes,
while the relationship between subject and external world can be interpreted as an input-
output system from the standpoint of information theory. This is the opinion of Eigen.
6.1.4.  Structures of language
Eigen’s explanatory model for the self-organization of intercommunicating organisms
leans distinctly on the mathematical theory of communication - the information theory.
He repeatedly presents both molecular and human language as a reflection of one reality
and deduces the function of language from the material conditions of information-pro-
cessing systems.
„The existence of `language´ is equally important for the material self-organization of
organisms, for human communication, and for the evolution of ideas. A prerequisite for
the development of a language is an unambiguous symbol assignment. In the molecular
language it involves defined physico-chemical interactions; in communication between
humans it is based on phoneme allocation and its graphic fixation. The allocation of
meaning to the symbol combinations as well as their mutual relationships stem from an
evolutionary process based on functional evaluation. According to Chomsky, the inherent
structure of all languages exhibits common features which reflect a functional logic based
on the mode of operation of the central nervous system; this parallels the molecular
mechanisms which gave rise to the genetic language“ (291). 
Language thus becomes the product of language-producing organs. These organs are
structured according to the principles of self-organization and form a functional logic of
the network hierarchy of brain cells. Their logic, in turn, structures the language. The
allocation of meaning to the symbol combinations, i.e., the sense of a sentence, arises
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from evaluation criteria of a functional nature, that is, it develops from an agreement
reached in the course of intersubjective information exchange; depending on the symbol
arrangement, this agreement could have taken on a completely different form.
Language is a symbol arrangement formed according to physiological criteria, to which
meaning is then attributed. It clearly mirrors - and this is one of the key points in Eigen’s
conception of language - reality in its syntax, which obtains its structure from the organi-
zation of the nerve cell network. Eigen’s language model aims at a quantification and for-
malization, while the evaluation and allocation of meaning to expressions and contempo-
rary usage represent marginal conditions or are merely supplementary, not essential
constituents of language.
6.1.5. The information concept: the constitution of meaning through 
syntactic structures as the logic of material reality
For Eigen, the information concept is closely allied with the concept of form or gestalt.
Information is, so to speak, an abstraction of gestalt or its representation using the symbols
of a language. „Just as the essence of a gestalt combines concreteness and functionality,
information also has two complementary aspects: a quantitative, numerical one and a qual-
itative one examining the meaning and significance of the symbol arrangement“. (292)
Eigen shows special interest in the information concept, particularly as it pertains to the
quantitative aspect, i.e., what is the minimum amount of information required to enable
exact identification of the symbol arrangement. This measure of information is equivalent
to the amount of „yes-no-decisions“ necessary to identify all the symbols of a sequence“
(ibid.). In principle, every wholly unknown text can thus be deciphered by quantifying its
symbol arrangement. The text itself is irrelevant, e.g., in the event that speakers formulat-
ed it with different intentions or as an expression of various intents. Only the actual sym-
bol sequence is of import.
Nevertheless, Eigen recognizes a differentiation between an „absolute, quantifiable“ and
a „sense-providing, semantic information aspect“ (294). The latter is responsible for the
complexity of language. This complexity, however, is itself the result of the complexity of
the brain (Eigen, in accordance with Bar-Hillel): the semantic aspect is thus the result of
the syntax of the network hierarchy of brain cells.
Fig. 25 (a)    „Communication diagram“ 
(from: EIGEN/WINKLER. Fig. 56; 1975, p. 294)
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Therefore, according to Eigen, the „scheme of linguistic communication“ can be  charac-
terized by a flow diagram in which A represents a source of information of practically
unlimited productivity.
This message is compiled in B. There, the „incoming environmental information“ (294)
from the sensory organs - after „evaluation“ based on „programmed“ mechanisms - is
combined with the experience stored in memory. Finally, the information from A, which
is produced in B, is  sent through C in the form of physical signals.
This user of a linguistic sign is mirrored by a receiver, who receives and evaluates this
information in an analogous manner in the reversed sequence C’, B’, and A’. The key step
in this communication model, the one involving the transfer of information, is that
between C and C’. Actually, it only involves technical processes such as the coding of
information to enable mechanical processing. The information theory is primarily con-
cerned with this aspect along with the structural implications in the domain B and B’. The
information theory clearly distances itself from the problems surrounding A and A’ and
relegates this topic to psychologists and philosophers. For Eigen, aspects such as sensory
experience (= observation) and communicative experience (= comprehension) are
processes which take place in the centers B’ and A’ as opposed to in A itself.
The question regarding the discovery of those laws governing the central nervous system
of humans is, for Eigen, one of physics according to the the rules of nature. Eigen remains
convinced that the function of the central nervous system can, in principle, be quantified
by sufficiently thorough research. It is erroneous to conclude that full quantification of
brain capability is not possible since humans would simultaneously be the subject and
object of such research, and that this would involve an apriori of understanding principal-
ly hindering quantification (296).
Specific powers of consciousness are, rather, interrelationships between the complemen-
tary halves of the brain, which are joined together through 200 million nerve fibers and
which can transmit 4 Million Million electrical impulses per second. This quantity no
doubt suffices to explain all functions.
6.1.6. The allocation of symbols and meaning in the human language
The fixation of spoken language in symbols and letters also involves specific allocations.
„Symbol arrangement in speech is clearly defined in every case. The reason behind the
relatively large number of letters lies in the functional requirements of phonetically based
everyday languages“ (298). In this case the letters of the alphabet have arisen from the
abstraction of approx. 50 phonemes.
In standard computer languages it is more expedient to use only two symbols. „The
mechanically relayed interrelationship between transmitter (C) and receiver (C’) is based
on the unambiguity of symbol allocation“ (ibid.).
If the allocation of symbols to individual sounds in speech is clear, then Eigen considers
the allocation of meaning to the various symbol sequences to be equally unambiguous.
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This process, however, is far from complete, as evidenced in the language of poetry,
where new meaning is conferred through plays on phonemes. The combination of words
into sentences is an allocation problem as well, with a sheer incalculable number of sen-
tence combinations.
Eigen draws on Noam Chomsky’s language interpretation, in which „sentence structures,
if we disregard the specific peculiarities of the individual languages, exhibit parallels that
indicate a universal regularity evidently originating in the organization of the human
brain“ (301). Eigen (along with Chomsky) refers here to the structures of a universal syn-
tax, a general syntax configuration „as may have underlain the acquisition of speech in
evolution“ (ibid.). The intrinsic rules of Chomsky’s generative grammer - the production
and transformation rules - are of particular interest to Eigen. The fact that a consequent
formalization of speech reveals discrepancies vis-à-vis colloquial usage is only a margin-
al problem for Eigen. The reality of the informal language that we normally deal with,
however, is characterized by its open-endedness, whereas Eigen’s formalization postulate
presupposes a closed language system.
Eigen defines the relationship between language and reality such that language reflects a
formalizable reality. The reality of objects is subject to the same laws as the materiality of
our bodies and the self-organization of our brains. This brain is necessary to enable and
determine both consciousness and language. Overall reality reflects a universal syntax
which, in certain organisms, appears in the form of speech.
6.1.7. Molecular semantics
Eigen illustrates the relationship between the linguistic symbols and the designated object
(the semantic level of language) by comparing human language with the molecular lan-
guage of biological organisms. He takes a cue from a quote by C. F. v. Weizäcker („The
relationship between chromosome and the developing individual appears to be such that
the chromosome speaks and the individual listens“; 304). The conclusion: in the individ-
ual, the „communication channel“ from chromosome to organism is one-sided and can be
more accurately described as an issuing of commands. Intermolecular communication -
the „discourse“ (ibid.) between molecules - is restricted to the phenotypic level in the
form of an „‘object language’ oriented toward functional optimum criteria“ (ibid.).
On this level, Eigen detects analogies between this „phenotypic, molecular functional
language“ and „phonetically based spoken languages“ (ibid.).
The molecular language requires an equally „expressive alphabet“. Eigen refers here pri-
marily to the 20 amino acids and their various functions, a protein alphabet which is to be
compared with human language. The „words“ of the protein language, the amino acid
sequences, represent all the executive functions within organisms such as reaction media-
tion, control, and transport. „As in linguistic word combinations, several - approx. four to
eight - symbols combine to form a cooperative unit“ (ibid.). Eigen attaches importance to
the circumstance that these functionally operating symbols in protein languages are not
merely rowed linearly but are „arranged according to their respective chemical task in a
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specific spatial coordination“ (ibid.). Specific chain elements between the amino acids
are responsible for this spatial coordination. Enzymes themselves are word elements of
the amino acid language.
„Although the active center - the actual three-dimensional word correlate of the protein
language - comprises no more characters than the number of verbs in spoken language,
the protein molecule must unite a total of between one to five hundred chain elements
within itself in order to form such an active center. Each one of these molecules repre-
sents a particular task and one could describe the enzymes as the ‘verbs’ of the molecular
language“ (305).
The detailed and functional coordination of all organizational and production processes
within an organism is, according to Eigen, the result of the functionality of this language.
Heredity marks the limits of this functionality.
„All words of the molecular language are combined to a meaningful text, which can be
broken down into sentences. The transmission of this text from generation to generation
and the information flow between the legislative and the executive branch within the cell
cannot be accomplished with the protein alphabet, which is geared toward functional effi-
ciency“ (305).
Eigen equates the legislative branch with the nucleic acid language; it is structured
according to economical considerations, much as the alphabet of a computer „or some
other type of mechanical information transmission“. This alphabet uses a codeword con-
sisting of three nucleic acids for each letter of the amino acid. The allocation from code-
word to letter is unambiguous; this is not true in the other direction: numerous amino
acids have more than one codeword. Rather than using 2 characters as in the case of com-
puters or telex codes, this language uses 4 characters because its construction was based
not on logical criteria but on a natural process linked with the protein alphabet (ibid.). The
manifold structures of biological species, their diversity and differentiation, could only
have evolved through sequence combinations involving four letters; a simple pair of let-
ters would have been insufficient. This nevertheless weakened the „‘teleonomic’ demand
for a high level of economy in the transfer of genetic information and for a universal con-
cept of the encoding enzymatic machinery“ (305 ).
6.1.8. „The vector character of the speech flow from chromosome to organism“
In discussing the direction of this dialogue, Eigen refers to Arthur Kornberg and his tenet
„DNA-RNA-PROTEIN-everything else“ (306). According to the above 3-World-Concept
and Eigen’s 3-World-Language Model, the Kornberg equivalent can be stated as follows:
DNA is the storage site, the memory for genetic information. RNA transmits this infor-
mation, and the protein is the executive form of the information. „Everything else“, the
life process itself, is a subsequent development.
„Speech, communication, reading, and comprehension on this level merely means bind-
ing (= recognizing) the complementary molecular building blocks (=language symbols)
and linking them into a macromolecular ribbon (= text)“ (307). 
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Fig. 25 (b) „In the above diagram, William G. Moulton characterizes the communication system of
human language. Its relationship with the formal representation in Fig. 59 (i.e. Fig. 25 (a);
the A.) of this paper is indicated.“ (Figure and  text from: EIGEN/WINKLER. 1975, p. 300)
As a rule, the information transfer in the outlined language model of Moulton flows from
A to C  and in the present case also from the DNA to RNA: At the same time, reversals of
this direction have been recorded, for example in retroviral infections where RNA
sequences develop first and are subsequently copied into DNA sequences. Since DNA is
the more stable form, it has been speculated that RNA sequences are evolutionarily older. 
Accordingly, they would have contributed substantially, as a language, to the genesis of
the nucleic acid language; DNA would thus represent the more stable, reliable form of
fixing RNA creations and using them in reproduction (specifically, in hereditary trans-
mission). In Eigen’s words, „initially, in the phase of de-novo synthesis, a great many
phantasy products apparently develop. Under selection pressure, however, only the best
adapted sequence becomes chosen (...). The best adapted sequence is that which can be
reproduced the quickest and most accurately and also has the greatest stability“ (308).
In Eigen’s opinion, „a clear divergence of roles between geno- and phenotype“ took
place, especially in the differentiation of the translation mechanism from DNA to RNA.
Eigen answers the question regarding the subject of the translation - the subject of the lin-
guistic sign usage in the production of those phantasy products in the de-novo synthesis -
both holistically and materialistically: Molecular semantics provides language signs with
meaning according to physical laws.
„The representation of phenotypic reality in the genetic language (in an analogy to the
memory capacity of the mind we can refer to it as ‘genetic reflection’) is a consequence
of evolution in toto. We are dealing with the generation of information. This applies to
information in our brain as well: it can only arise in an evolutive manner, i.e., on the basis
of selection. In this case, however, the underlying elementary processes we are dealing
with involve time scales of milliseconds“ (310).
6.1.9. „Understanding“ as a reversal of information generation
Eigen then poses the question of whether information reveals itself to us as something
already in existence or whether it is an actual creation. In his opinion, information is both
creation and revelation. These features provide the process with its evolutive quality.
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„A message that is received is meant to be understood. It must therefore ‘reveal’ its mean-
ing, i.e., relate to existing experience or conventions and reproduce these. At the same
time it can also enrich our experience. The subsequent establishment of a connection, the
integration, the understanding becomes an act of creation“ (310).
Eigen’s distinction between the absolute aspect of information (i.e., the logical depiction
of reality through clear symbol allocation) and the semantic aspect (the symbol’s actual
meaning) could be eliminated „as soon as one could consider and express all the factors
in the probability distribution that are important for its meaning“ (ibid.). The reversal of
the information generation process would guarantee an adequate and comprehensive
understanding of information: all of the individual factors contributing to its develop-
ment, and their interrelationships, could be reconstructed. Understanding in this sense
would mean systematically narrowing down the probability distribution of semantic alter-
natives until only a single alternative remains. This would represent both the absolute and
the semantic aspect of the respective information.
This type of information gain - information as a message clearly understood to convey
information - has been quantitatively defined by Shannon and Rényi, who, in Eigen’s
words, „started out by considering the probability distribution before and after the arrival
of an additional piece of information and calculated the median information gain by com-
paring the modified individual probabilities“ (ibid.).
Understanding an information-containing expression would involve a process in which
all the possible alternative meanings of that information, with one exception, could be
„attributed a probability of realization equal to zero“. Narrowing a probability distribu-
tion down in this manner can be achieved physically only through irreversible processes.
„A sudden event causes an initially conceivable condition, characterized by a certain
probability, to become unstable; it collapses. A new situation, leading to the exclusion of
previously conceivable alternatives, arises“ (311).
Eigen’s communications model has its basis in formalizing criteria and would not be pos-
sible without the maxims of the depicting theory of language. Even the reflection on
thought (described in philosophy as transcendental reflection) is considered to be a
process of self-organization that is principally quantifiable and, through the construction
of learning machines, qualitatively modifiable as well.
Nature develops a brain based on mathematical and physical (obeying an inner logic) nat-
ural laws; this brain derives the lawfullness within itself from a universal syntax and func-
tions according to this syntax. Phoneme allocation enables a correct depiction of reality in
a formalized scientific language. The brain mirrors its own principles of organization in
this language. This is merely the endpoint of a biological evolution which began on the
lowest molecular level and thus, from the evolutionary point of view, was initially defined
by the nucleic acid language.
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„A selectively advantageous mutant arising from a reading error (i.e., from a statistical
fluctuation) in the genetic program can lead to the irrevocable collapse of a previously
stable population. The ‘new’ information owes its genesis to an irreversible event; it stems
from an „evaluation of meaning“ (this is , after all, what selection represents). One can
concur with Karl Popper in saying: Certain alternatives which were previously possible
become falsified. An analagous process must take place in the brain when an observation
is made or a message is read“ (311).
At this point, Eigen draws an analogy between molecular information and human com-
munication: both have a common process of information generation in which symbol
allocation is subject to a selection, i.e., evaluation, process where possible meanings are
irreversibly eliminated until only a single one remains. In his view, the understanding of
meaning on both the molecular and human level involves a reduction to zero of all possi-
bilities of realization, with the exception of one alternative. Molecular semantics and the
semantics of human languages (at least in the case of formalized scientific language) are
based on a selection process, a falsification process.
For Eigen, Popper’s falsification criterium in science theory, originally designed to
decide on the quality of quantifiable theories, is itself not amenable to theoretical discus-
sion and does not represent a falsifiable evaluation model; rather, it is an expression of a
reality in information-perception in which the brain lends expression to its own form of
organization along with the underlying logic.
6.1.10. Molecular genetics and generative grammer
Eigen also draws attention to the discrepancies arising from the „juxtaposition of molec-
ular and phonetic language“ and which reflect „the different nature of function“. This no
doubt indicates that Eigen does not entirely dismiss the pragmatic aspect of the linguistic
sign usage, although he attributes only marginal importance to the user of linguistic signs.
„Each language primarily reflects the characteristic features of the respective, underlying
communication machinery“ (313f.).
The term „communications machinery“ is used by most of the top researchers in the
fields of biochemistry and molecular biology; it can also be encountered in connection
with terms such as „protein synthesis machinery“ (DARNELL, 1985) or in slightly mod-
ified form as „evolutionary mechanism“, „communication mechanism between mole-
cules“ (PRIGOGINE, 1980, 1984), and „enzyme machinery“ (DELBRÜCK, 1987). This
demonstrates a broad consensus that v. Neumann’s automaton theory, or the mathemati-
cal theory of communication, can serve as an undisputed basis for the explanation of all
living phenomena.
Let us return to the differences between the molecular and phonetic language. The respec-
tive language structures differ much in the same way that the different functions in the
molecular and phonetic fields lead to a different „communication machinery“.
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„The expression form of genetics are sentences whose structure is determined by control
functions. Thus, in the operon segment of the bacterial genome, numerous functionally
interrelated structural genes are united by control units, so-called operators. The entire
genetic description of the bacterium, the genome, consists of such sentences, which are
interconnected within a single giant molecule. The chromosomes of more highly devel-
oped organisms have a highly regionated structure which is clearly visible even under the
electron microscope; the details of its ‘syntax’, however, remain largely unknown“ (314).
Here, Eigen clearly expresses what biochemists and molecular biologists interpret their
observations to be. He describes the biological structures that code the organism’s struc-
ture and developmental plan as a genetic message „fixed in sentences“. The form of the
genetic information corresponds with control functions.
The sentence construction of phonetic languages also exhibits general structural princi-
ples. As determined by Chomsky, the inherent structure of phonetically articulated sen-
tences relects structures of a universal grammer „which are intimately related to the ‘gen-
erative’ organ of language, the brain“ (314). New sentence combinations, formed to
promote understanding in the discourse between members of a social environment, are
the result of generative, syntactic operations of the brain. When human beings reflect on
their cognitive abilities, the brain forms syntactic sentence structures using these underly-
ing, universal syntactic rules. Accordingly, self-knowledge in humankind is a depiction of
brain functions through generative syntactic operations of the brain.
The analogy between molecular genetics and phonetic languages, coupled with the uni-
versal generative grammer common to both (as a manifestation of the logic inherent in
the material) leads Eigen to the conclusion that:
„At any rate one can say that the prerequisite for both great evolutionary processes of
nature - the origin of all forms of life and the evolution of the mind - was the existence of
a language. The molecular communication system of the cell is based on the reproductive
and instructive features of nucleic acids as well as on the catalytic efficiency of proteins“
(314f.).
At the same time, the similarities and dissimilarities of molecular genetic and phonetic
languages go beyond this. Memory capability, in particular, clearly demonstrates these
differences in forms of communication and language usage: While antibody formation in
the immune system takes place independently in each individual, memory involves regu-
lated interactions between antibody molecules and learned features. Memory takes place
on the molecular level.
„Each individual immune system therefore has its own language. The ‘vocabulary’ is
determined by the spectrum of antibody-producing cells. The correct usage of this lan-
guage emerges from a learning process and is subject to constant modification“ (328).
The organization of the immune memory is a regulated interaction process between all
protein individuals (enzymes) involved in the immune response. Even minute deviations
from these rules endanger the efficiency of the immune response and consequently the
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survival of the entire organism. It is the network of these interactions which enables an
immune response flexible enough to adapt to new requirements, to modify itself, and to
build upon and expand the stored memory of previous immune responses. The immune
response can thus always incorporate the stored experience and improve its efficiency.
Brain cells, as the epitome of the evolution of the central nervous system, form a similar
structural network to organize memory capability. As opposed to the indirect interaction
of protein individuals in the immune system, the cells of the central nervous system are
directly interconnected - via synapses as switch contacts - and interact by means of elec-
tric impulses and chemical substances. The interaction is more complex and is consider-
ably more rapid.
„Naturally, electric communication over greater distances can be effected at much greater
speeds than chemical communication involving material transport. Learning processes
which require hours or days in the immune network take place in fractions of a second in
the brain. At the same time, the fixation of that which is ‘experienced’ or ‘learned’ is
again a material process“ (329).
The junction between the nerve cells, the synapses, are extremely adaptable. „They devel-
op, vanish, and constantly change their contact features as a result of the communication“
(329).
In the central nervous system, memory and recollection, learning capacity, and imagina-
tion are fixed as specific stimulatory patterns and can therefore be rapidly recalled as
information or informational context; the process of reading and transcribing genetic
information involves entirely different mechanisms. Only the stable storage takes some-
what more time because complex information can only be recalled through a specific cir-
cuitry and this requires organizing a functional network of synapses and specific (infor-
mationally adequate) network structure.
„Neurons have the highest metabolism of all cells in the body; that is, they continuously
produce ribonuleic acids and proteins, yet not to store the information within these mole-
cules, but to employ them in developing a modifiable, functional network“ (331).
For Eigen, this description and interpretation of observed phenomena through  the infor-
mation theoretical model is self-referential. It is obvious to him that these conditions for
potential self-organization in the various networks - both molecular, molecular-cellular,
and intercellular types along with all their functions in the realm of genetics, in the
immune system and in the central nervous system - are the same as the conditions of their
scientific description.
Eigen can make no distinction between the language of the observation of events and the
language of the theory about the interpretation of these observations. The preconditions
for self-organization „mirror themselves in the uniform structure of the theoretical
approaches used in their description“ (331 ).
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6.2. Philosophical implications of Manfred Eigen’s 
language and communication concept
The comparison between the molecular and human language, as undertaken by Eigen, is
problematic because Eigen believes he is able to fully explain human language and lan-
guage in general by means of an implicit depictional theory. In his interpretation of lan-
guage and communication, the pragmatic aspect, i.e., the relationship between linguistic
signs and the user of these signs, is reduced to a marginal condition in the theory of lan-
guage, while the semantic aspect is reduced to rules of a universal syntax.
When viewed in this light, Eigen’s usage of the terms language and communication takes
on a purely metaphorical character that can only be avoided if these terms are understood
and used in their broader sense. Summarizing Eigen’s language concept reveals the fol-
lowing features:
6.2.1. Language as a quantifiable set of signs
The world behaves according to physically determinable natural laws. These can be
expressed using the language of mathematics. The formal, technical  language of mathe-
matics is alone capable of realistically describing these natural laws. Language in its fun-
damental sense is language as a formalized sign language. The „natural laws“ are expli-
cations of an implicit logical order in nature. Language depicts this logical order through
the logical structure of the linguistic sign system. The essential element of a language is
therefore its syntax. Only through the syntax does the logical structure of a language as a
depiction of the logical structure of nature come to light. Language as an image of law-
fully structured reality is principally quantifiable because it is mathematicizable.
Scientific research must concentrate on this aspect if it seeks to claim exactness.
The semantic aspect of language initially comprises an incidentally developed or com-
bined symbol sequence which only gained significance in the course of specific selection
processes. Here, substance in meaning corresponds to natural substance because the
selection processes have evaluative function.
We merely need to study and explain all the possible criteria in the genesis of natural sub-
stance in order to unmistakably understand the substance of meaning. In Eigen’s language
communication model, language as a communication medium between communicative
subjects remains an event of private and monologic character: language as an arbitrary
sequence of linguistic signs whose meaning is derived from selection processes does not
convey substance but merely structure. These structures can be expressed in binary codes
(yes/no decisions). The linguistic signs are variables whose syntax is subject to laws gov-
erning the linguistic sign-using organ or the macromolecules. The brain of humans, for
example, is endowed with these variables and combines them to reflect synapse network
logic. The variable sign syntax of the brain must be filled with experiences of a personal
nature and thus constitutes an individualized evaluation scheme.
124
In messages between communication partners, one side encodes the news he/she wishes
to convey in phonetic characters; the receiver must then decode and interpret the message
based on personal experience. Understanding messages shared between transmitter and
receiver is principally  possible since a uniform logical form - a universal syntax - lies
hidden behind every language. Messages are therefore apriori intersubjective in form and
structure, while the interpretation of content remains a purely private matter. The formal
structure of species-specific languages is intersubjectively identical; therefore, only sci-
entific formal languages, such as those used in mathematics and physics, can be properly
designated as languages capable of accurately representing conditions of reality.
6.2.2. Language as an algorithmic decision-making process
The function of that organ which syntactically combines the language symbols according to
its own structure most closely corresponds, in Eigen’ opinion, to cybernetics, i.e., the theo-
ry of information-processing systems (while abstracting the manner of its realization). The
functional units „central nervous system“, „brain“, and even „macromolecule“ consist of a
definable, limited number of elements and a limited number of interrelationships between
these elements; these make up the structure, the so-called systems structure, of these units.
Since we are dealing with living systems, active systems are present as well, i.e., there are
elements in systems which mutually exert or endure active influence. The relational struc-
tures can be of a chemical-particulate and energetic nature or purely informational. Some
of these systems will regulate themselves and react to particular environmental influences
with greater or lesser success. Those reacting more successfully optimize their probabili-
ty of reproduction. In the course of evolution, precisely those biological species which
have best adapted to altered environmental conditions have prevailed. Certain types of
systems create irreversible processes through self-organizational behavior, leading to the
preservation rather than the degeneration of successful structures; these structures contin-
ue to attract other evolutionarily successful structures, which enhances the complexity of
the system and in turn optimizes its adaptability.
These systems, along with their description by means of language, are depictions of a
reality structured by natural laws. Since both the logic of the describing and that of the
theory-forming language corresponds with the logic of the system, the relationship
between the elements of the system can be represented in an abstract, formal, and unam-
biguous manner. It is important to determine the relationship among the linguistic signs,
as their relationship reflects the relationship of order in the realm of nature.
The quality of the syntax is evident in the concept of information. Since messages based
on reality can be formally represented, they can be coded with 2 characters (0 and 1). This
unit of measure enables the information content of a particular message to be determined
with regard to the available number of available characters. This furnishes a calculatable,
average information content of a letter of an alphabet below which one cannot drop with-
out rendering letter identification impossible.
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A receiver decodes and privately interprets the received information (albeit according to
intersubjectively identical rules of an underlying logic common to all languages).
Information theory therefore also involves information processing, i.e., various transfor-
mations of particular messages into other sentence structures according to specific trans-
formation rules as determined by a machine.
Dynamic, self-regulating and information-processing cybernetic systems are considered
to be the realization of algorithms. An algorithm defines that method by which, in a finite
number of steps, a problem can be solved. Machines can calculate those functions for
which an algorithm exists. Since reality is structured by a logical order subject to natural
laws, the logical form of language (mirroring the logical form of reality) must be express-
ible in binary codes. Every message, every information, is calculatable and every problem
is solvable algorithmically. Principally, an optimally constructed machine would be
equipped with a more optimal syntax than humans.
6.2.3. Humankind as a learning machine
From the viewpoint of man as a machine, humans clearly represent an optimal model:
they fulfil all those preconditions for the algorithm development that a conventional
machine cannot deliver, i.e., criteria for information evaluation based on the real, social
environment. Humans, and all other biological systems, resemble a learning machine
capable of internally producing a syntactically correct image of the environment by inter-
acting with this environment, of correcting this image through repeated interactions, and
thus of changing the behavior toward the environment. Such learning systems are able to
continuously optimize their adaptability. The learning efficiency is mirrored in a history
of advantageous selections. This type of selection history is the history of the optimal
realization of algorithms.
Processes of human consciousness can be best represented cybernetically because the
brain - as the „learning machine“ in this model - understands itself best.
Reflection on reflection is a self-reproducing, dynamic, self-regulating behavior, a (tran-
scendental) reflection of the machine; language, the common logical form of reality and
reflection medium, is the precondition for its existence. 
Ultimately, processes of consciousness are learning machine functions based on the
input-output principle. Decoding the rules governing brain organization makes the decod-
ing of all conceivable conscious processes possible. This appoach transforms conscious-
ness into an observable, accurately and unambiguously describable and quantifiable
problem-solving behavior. The brain is structured in such a manner that it can transform
the syntax inherent on its molecular level up into the phonetic level: The constitution of a
formal language by the brain enables this „learning machine“ to recognize itself as a con-
stitution of reality and to reflect on itself.
Here, Popper’s theoretical viewpoint becomes relevant for Eigen. Accordingly, scientific
research must be viewed as being analogous to the adaptive behavior of organisms to
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their environment: one can therefore refer to the (biological) evolutionary character of
knowledge gain. The self-reproduction of the learning automaton is reflected in all levels
of biological reality. Popper’s 3-World concept enables Eigen to explain language in
every sense, from the nucleic acid language to that of human reason.
The differences between these two languages stem from the continuous development
process of biological structures, based on the model of a self-reproducing and self-regu-
lating automaton that functioned as a realization of algorithms. This enabled the steady
optimization of problem-solving strategies in organisms, eventually leading to the consti-
tution of a central nervous system, a precursor ultimately giving rise to the brain and its
enormous storage and information-processing capacity. Language enabled implementa-
tion of this evolutionary plan (from the amoeba to Einstein): this medium forms, trans-
forms, stores, expands, and combines information.
This explains why Eigen sees language as the prerequisite for the development of all
forms of life, as well as for the evolution of the mind. A uniform fundamental structure,
the logic of the universal language, lies behind all living phenomena as well as behind the
construction of the formal language which exactly reproduces this logic of reality (com-
prising both being and the discourse-on-being). Thus, the structure of information-form-
ing and -processing systems such as the brain, the central nervous system, or the immune
system mirrors „in its uniform basic structure, the theoretical approaches applied in its
description“ (331).
6.3. Deficits in the depicting theory of language
Even formal systems are not closed, as Eigen purports, nor are they principally fully
determinable. Furthermore, language is the result of communicative interactions in dia-
logue situations rather than the result of constitutive achievements of the individual per-
sons. Communicating with one another, sending messages, understanding expressions is
not a private coding and decoding process, but rather an interpretation process arising
from a mutual adherence to rules by communicating partners who agree on the rules.
The ability to abide by these rules is innate, the skill in complying with particular rules is
acquired through interactions and relies on norms of interaction to utilize words in sen-
tences. Information cannot principally be quantified as message content: statements made
by social individuals in situational contexts are not closed and thus are principally not
fully  formalizable. The attempt to construct a purely representational language is
doomed to failure because formal artificial languages do not exclusively contain terms
that are unambiguous. This pertains to terms that cannot be confirmed through observa-
tion. Specifically, scientific statements are not attributable to immediate sensory
experience, i.e., the language game used to describe observations does not mirror the
brain activity during the perception of reality.
A world-depicting standard language must remain a mere postulate because it cannot log-
ically substantiate itself. Too many theoretical concepts, too many scientific criteria that
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are principally not formalizable (e.g., „progress in the cognition process“, „practicabili-
ty“, etc.), point to the limits of formalizability. The very identity between artificial lan-
guage and its form renders it incapable of reporting on itself, something that presents no
problem when using informal speech. Language is an intersubjective phenomenon in
which several individuals can share, alter, reproduce as well as renew the rules of lan-
guage usage. The basis and aims of this usage are defined by the real social environment
of interacting life forms. The user  of a linguistic sign cannot be comprehended according
to the speaker-outside world model. Rather, this requires reflection on the interactive cir-
cumstances to which the user has always been bound, circumstances which provide an
underlying awareness enabling him/her to understand statements made by members of
the real environment. The user of formal artificial languages - before appreciating the
purpose of the usage - has also developed this prior awareness in the course of interactive
processes with members of the real social environment.
Speech is a form of action, and I can understand this activity if I understand the rules gov-
erning the activity. This means I can also understand an act that runs counter to the rules.
Everyday language usage reflects everyday social interactions of the constituent individ-
uals. The prerequisite for fully understanding statements is the integration of the under-
stander in customs of social interaction and not merely a knowledge of formal syntactic-
semantic rules. A prior condition for all formalizations in scientific artificial languages is
a factual, historically evolved, communicative experience. This very precondition
becomes an object of empirically testable hypothesis formation in Eigen’s language
model. At this point, however, Eigen’s model becomes paradoxical because he seeks to
theoretically grasp language with tools that are themselves linguistically predetermined.
Even Chomsky’s attempt to reconstruct universal systems of rules within an empirical
theory of language (rules that have developed over the course of evolution, are genetical-
ly transmitted, and then „awakened“ through social interaction) is founded on a „genera-
tive grammer“ which itself is based on the mathematical analysis of formal systems
(CHOMSKY, 1964 a, 1964 b). He attributes the rules governing sentence construction to
the level of syntax, semantics, and phonology. To him, these rules are rules of a formal
system. Chomsky himself, however, concludes that formal systems are principally inca-
pable of doing justice to the complexity of sentence structure: sentences do not appear to
be produced linearly, which should be the case in formal systems. According to this
model, the generating system of rules must exclude real communicative acts and interac-
tions and, with it, precisely the apriori of practical language usage. 
Eigen’s language model, which is rooted in information theory, clearly reveals that Eigen
equates the form of theory language with the form of language used to describe reality
(experience). This implies the equation of formalized scientific languages with the lan-
guage used to describe observations. Previous attempts to specify all the rules governing
the translation of every term in theory-language into terms of observational languages
have been unsuccessful. Not all concepts of theory language can be transposed into con-
cepts of the observational language.
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A similar situation is encountered in the attempt to absolutize mathematics as that pure
formal language whose every ramification might become fully transparent. This led
Gödel to formulate the „Unvollständigkeitssatz“ („incompleteness theorem“) in his work
„Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der principia mathematica und verwandter Systeme“
(GÖDEL, 1931). 
Gödel investigated a formal system by applying arithmetic and related deduction method-
ologies. His aim was to convert the metatheoretical statements into arithmetic statements
by means of a specific allocation procedure. More precisely, he strived to convert the
statements formulated in a metalanguage into the object language S by using the object
language S. This led Gödel to two conclusions:
a) Under the assumption that system S is consistent, then it will contain one 
formally indecidable theorem, i.e., one  theorem is inevitably present 
that can be neither proved nor disproved within the system.
b)  Under the assumption that system S is consistent, then this consistency 
of S cannot be proved within S.
The question of decidability and computability is closely allied with the algorithm con-
cept, whereby Eigen seems to postulate that algorithms are not only concepts of theoreti-
cal language, but also depict (decision-) behavior in the realm of biology and therefore
are amenable to empirical analysis. Indeed, he is convinced that everything can be repre-
sented in the form of algorithms and can thus, in principle (after sufficiently thorough
analysis), be decided. Yet Eigen never puts this to the test, i.e., he never states the condi-
tions under which a branch of mathematics would be indedecidable. Namely, a field of
formalized artificial language is indecidable when no algorithm can be provided to help
decide - for a particular formula of a formalized artificial language and involving a finite
number of steps - whether this formula is universally valid or not.
Today, several branches of mathematics are considered indecidable. Herein lies the con-
sequence of this indecidability theorem for the automaton theory of A. Turing and J. v.
Neumann: a machine can principally compute only those functions for which an algo-
rithm can be provided. Functions lacking an algorithm are not computable.
Every cybernetic, self-controlling machine is the realization of a formal system. Eigen
assumes that the evolution of self-reproducing and self-organizing organisms represents
the realization of the syntax of a universal language underlying the order of the world.
This universal syntax, as a representation of mathematically expressible reality, is also the
formal basis for the evolution of these organisms. For every one of these machines, as in
the case of every organism, there must be an indecidable formula.
It is precisely by means of a non-formal language that this formula can be shown to be
true or false; this non-formal language is the very tool that enables the language itself to
be discussed. The machine is unable to do this because no algorithm is available with
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which a cybernetic machine can get to the bottom of  its underlying formal system.
Systems theory is principally unable to fulfil the demands that Eigen places on it.
The fact that the paradoxes arising within an object language cannot be solved with that
language led to a differentiation between object language and metalanguage. None-
theless, paradoxes can also appear within metalanguage; these can only be solved by
splitting into metalanguage, meta-meta language and soforth in an infinite number of
steps. This unavoidable gradation of metalanguages necessitated resorting to colloquial
speech, developed in the context of social experience, as the ultimate metalanguage. It
provides the last instance for deciding on the paradoxes emerging from object- and meta-
languages. Neither the syntax nor the semantics of a system can be constituted within that
particular system without resorting to the ultimate metalanguage.
The ambition to provide logic and mathematics with apriori validity is no longer tenable:
an unambiguous linguistic fundament of science, one beyond further inquiry and sup-
porting itself through direct evidence, cannot be secured. Language proves to be a perpet-
ually open system with regard to its logical structures and cannot guarantee definiteness
from within itself. This is the very conclusion that Eigen disputes with his language
model.To briefly summarize this chapter:
(a) There can be no formal system which is entirely reflectable in all its aspects while at
the same time being its own metasystem.
(b) Concrete acts and interactions are principally unlimited in  their possibilities. There
will always be lines of argumentation that lie outside of and have no connection with
an existing system. Principally, every system can be transcended argumentatively.
Newly emerging language games and rules may develop as novel structures which are
foreign to previous systems and not merely a further step in a series in prevailing ele-
ments. These very discontinuities enable totally new  language applications.
(c) The ultimate metalanguage, colloquial language, provides indispensible evidence
about the communication practice of subjects in the real environment; the operator  of
formalizations is himself an integral part of this. Reverting to this everyday  type of
communication reveals information about the subjects practising this usage. In 
this sense, pragmatism becomes the  theoretical basis both for formal operating and
for a non-reductionistic language theory.
Thus, Manfred Eigen (representing molecular biology and biochemistry) fails in his
attempt to use the language and communication concept to explain observed biological
phenomena and processes. Eigen is correct in recognizing that language and communica-
tion were and continue to be indispensible for the origin of life, the development of bio-
logical species diversity, as well as for the specifically human capacity for thought,
speech, and action; at the same time, he is unable to provide an adequate foundation of
these two terms. This casts doubt on the entire explanatory model for living nature as
provided by the biological disciplines.
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The inevitable question is: how can the use of the terms language and communication be
expanded so that both concepts provide not only a sufficient explanation, but also an
understanding of living nature?
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7. Pragmatics of language (Sprachpragmatik) as a basis 
for a semiotically expanded language and communication
concept in behavioral, socio-, and molecular biology
The insurmountable explanatory deficits in the depicting theory of  language, as deter-
mined above in Manfred Eigen’s usage of the terms „language“ and „communication“,
require an expansion of the explanatory horizon he forwarded. The inability of cybernet-
ic systems theory or information theory to establish and justify the application of either
concept to explain central processes and structures of living nature is apparent; further
usage in the sense of Manfred Eigen would make this approach liable to criticism as an
anthropomorphism or would reduce it to mere metaphorical character. In my opinion, the
expanded explanatory horizon for the application of „language“ and „communication“ to
explain and understand 
living nature could take on the following form:
7.1.  Language as a medium of understanding (Verständigung). The apriori 
of the pragmatic situation of understanding (Verständigungssituation)
Organisms that communicate with each other by means of linguistic signs  can corre-
spond by coordinating their behavior. They represent real life-forms (Lebensformen) in a
real, animate world. Language is necessary as an intercommunication medium for the
overall organism, not only externally to develop optimal action criteria, but also internal-
ly to explore optimal reaction criteria.
The disruption of either external or internal communication can seriously endanger the
survival of the organism as a whole, even if the pathways are completely different. The
ability of organisms to adapt to changing environmental conditions is not the only result
of successful internal and external communication. The creativity, nonlinearity, and pro-
ductive scope of new genetic texts, which serve as the construction and development
plans for organisms, indicate the avenues that language and communication open up.
Indeed, their realization is difficult to explain without the assumption of sign-mediated
communication processes.
Both, self-organization in autocatalytic processes and the creativity of human intellect
require language and commmunication as the realization medium. From this perspective,
language and communication serve as a precondition for the possibility of life (versus
non-living matter), the evolution of biological species, and for the cultural evolution of
human reason; Manfred Eigen is entirely correct in this respect.
Since  users of linguistic signs can combine a finite number of characters with a finite
number of rules to carry out an infinite number of sign-mediated communication process-
es, language and communication become the structural and organizational medium for
biological species. Sign-mediated communication processes allow leaps in the evolution
of  biological species to be understood because such leaps are ultimately creations of
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genetic text combinations; these have not developed from random, undirected changes in
the genetic text, but rather were initiated by  protein individuals (enzymes) which are
highly competent in the combination and recombination of genetic text sequences. They
are so highly competent  that gene manipulators rely almost exclusively on this compe-
tence.
Reflection on the pragmatic intercommunication situation also helps us understand the
leaps in scientific knowledge, whose critical phases are discontinuous and nonlinear
(KUHN, 1970). While Manfred Eigen points out the similarities in such discontinuous
and nonlinear processes, he is unable to explain this similarity on the basis of his lan-
guage model.
Language enables constatative and regulative linguistic action (Sprachhandlungen)  -or
linguistic behavior (Sprachverhalten) in nonhuman biological individuals- much more so
than mere generative linguistic action (or -behavior). They help organize the everyday
social environment in which organisms are immersed throughout their individual lifes-
pans. Nonetheless, linguistic-sign-utilizing individuals are equally capable of conducting
generative linguistic action or -behavior; here, new activities or new behavior, new rules,
are constituted which themselves normatively orient further activities or behavior
sequences.
Sign-using individuals are principally able to create entirely new activities, new behavior,
completely new texts, completely new genetic texts in different realms (macro-level:
domain involving phenomena of sensory perception; micro-level: domain of molecular
interactions). These creations do not logically evolve from existing networks according to
pre-existing rules; rather, they constitute something new, something foreign to that
already in existence. This is precisely what Eigen’s language model cannot explain,
because Eigen neglects the constitutive capability of the pragmatic situation. He thus
eliminates the preconditions for his own theory development.
7.2. No generative grammar without generative pragmatics
Generative grammar states that every sentence of a language (initially the underlying
structure and then, with the help of transformation rules, the overlying structure) can be
created. Accordingly, a linguistic-psychological theory of human language would be an
empirical science whose object of study would be the preconditions for its existence. This
would further raise the prospect for providing a linguistic foundation of logic - the ques-
tion involving the difference between analytic and synthetic judgements would then lend
itself to a linguistic solution. However, logic can hardly be founded by an explanatory,
empirically testable theory (which itself presupposes logic).
The attempt to understand the subconscious adherence to grammatical rules when
expressing and interpreting remarks as an extension of naturally governed behavior is
doomed to failure: how linguistically competent individuals adhere to rules of grammer
cannot be equated with how water crystallizes into ice or melts again to liquid form.
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Following rules of grammar in speech (or writing) can itself become the topic of speech
and can be intentionally altered, distorted, or even violated. This very creativity  to
change rules forms the much valued artistic quality of linguistic endeavor and enables
poetic and speculative language usage along with novel types of rationality, thought pat-
terns and life-forms . The difference between rules of grammar and natural laws is
unbridgeable. Humankind cannot determine the degree of its adherence versus nonadher-
ence to natural laws; we can, however, define this relationship with regard to grammatical
rules at will. Even the rule-changing creativity in the realm of DNA indicates that natu-
ral laws cannot explain rule changes, i.e., innovation at the level of genetic text
sequences. This pertains to those changes stemming from the activity of protein individu-
als competent in text modification, not to deformations of genetic text sequences arising
randomly from external influences (for example radioactive radiation, chemically
induced mutations, etc.).
Sign-mediated communication is a regulated interactive event between interactive indi-
viduals. The rules of sign usage are therefore a component of social norms, of normative
activity or behavior, for which the interactive event is constitutive. This interactive event
should not be reduced in a behavioristic manner, since the interpreter himself/herself is a
member of the social community that intersubjectively made interpretation experienca-
ble. Interaction events are principally grasped subjectively before they can become the
topic of objective description or explanation.
In humans particularly, the discussion about norm consciousness is not reducable to inter-
nalized or innate rule adherence. The constitution of this norm consciousness is the con-
sequence of a social interactive event in a real environment. Equally, Eigen’s postulate of
an evaluation function that selects the universal grammar from all possible alternatives,
shifts transformation grammar in the direction of a theory of (finitely deciding) automa-
tons and thereby relates to a possible algebra of linguistic computer programs. The aim of
such a theory may well be the successful computer simulation of human language behav-
ior, as was planned by A. Turing and J. v. Neumann and which an entire generation of
researchers from numerous scientific disciplines has since set their hopes on. In this case
one must  systematically avoid confusing the simulation of human speech with speech
itself. Even if machines could simulate how humans abide by rules, they themselves do
not actually follow such rules, but „merely function in accordance with certain formal
procedures“ (SEARLE. 1984). The machine simulates certain formal characteristics of
mental processes.
By loosely employing the term information (or: information processing) for such entirely
divergent phenomena as the adherence of humans to rules on the one hand and the simu-
lation of human rule adherence on the other, Eigen glosses over the confusion between
human rule adherence and „as if“ human rule adherence by machines.
The purely mechanical „as-if“ simulation could be transcended if a successful communication
took place between computer and human subject, for example in the form of a non-formaliz-
able self-reflection. This would, however, principally exclude Gödel’s indecidability theorem.
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7.3. From (privatistically conceived) generative grammar to 
the apriori of pragmatic speech situations
The Eigen language model interprets language as a monologic conveyance of informa-
tion. According to Eigen, the fact that the speaker has a command of linguistic sign uti-
lization (rules of language usage) is not due to co-constitution through a learning process
involving social interaction in which socially integrated individuals master the meaning
of linguistic signs in real-life communication situations. Rather, this is determined exclu-
sively by its apriori identity with the logic behind the „system“ central nervous system or
brain. Thus, the social interaction process would merely stimulates this innate capability;
in reality this shared rule-understanding is an instinct-analogous process.
The theoretical perception of the information exchange process purely as  message trans-
mission neglects the constitutive contribution of those involved in the interaction process;
communication is reduced to the genetically acquired language competence of the
respective communication partner. Accordingly, each of these participants carries all the
linguistic prerequisites apriori within him/herself, specifically within the language-form-
ing organ. Both speaker and listener are viewed as entirely separate individuals. Although
both are equipped with the same program, i.e., they abide by the same natural laws and
can therefore establish a quasi-intersubjectivity about the validity of identical meanings,
they remain entirely privatistic in their conception. Thus, the precondition for the consti-
tution of meaning is not the apriori involving the understanding among individuals that
share and communicate in a common life world (Lebenswelt). 
Rather, the ultimate factor lies in the phonetic process between C and C’ (Fig. 24), where
information is conveyed between a speaker and a listener who use their individually given
language competence and the apriori identical language to put their individual thoughts
into words and to code them or, vice-versa, to decode and understand the contained infor-
mation.
When members in the real environment communicate with each other about something
(e.g., the coordination of behavior), Eigen argues that the meaning of this „something“ is
ultimately constituted through syntactic rules. My aim here is to demonstrate how and
why the meaning of this „something“ is constituted in pragmatic speech situations.
In a theory of language based on pragmatism, the sentences and texts of idealized speak-
ers in syntactic/semantic theories are replaced by the remarks of speakers in idealized
speech situations. The theory of speech competence must be supplemented by a pragma-
tism of the speech situations (theory of communicative competence); this can clarify the
preconditions under which language is used to achieve understanding about something,
i.e., under which conditions the contexts of actions or behavior constitute meanings of
linguistic expressions.
Only the pragmatic, inherent structure of such communication situations can reveal,
under scrutiny, why a speaker shows what he/she means with what he/she says (VOS-
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SENKUHL, 1982). These meanings are in no way formalizable, and every operator of a
formalization has presupposed and applied these pragmatic conditions long before actual-
ly knowing what formalization is. The underlying pragmatic structure provides a means
of principally understanding even grammatically irregular sentences in speech situations;
a purely grammatical analysis of such an anomaly may very well be confronted with
insolvable paradoxes. The pragmatic level also provides hermeneutic access to an under-
standing of the rule-changing creativity process, which enables the sign user to design
and express entirely new sentences, to conduct new actions, to develop new behavior - all
in no way logically derivable from pre-existing states. Grammatical competence can
never be fully separated from the communicative competence constituted in speech situa-
tions: assuming one without the other cannot adequately explain a sign-mediated com-
munication (APEL (ed.), 1976 a; HABERMAS, 1989; SEARLE, 1976; ).
Eigen’s reliance on Chomsky’s generative grammar in no way eliminates the deficits of
his language model.
7.4. The constitution of meaning and understanding through real 
processes of understanding (Verständigungsprozesse)
Analysis of Eigen’s language model shows that his language and communication concept
is insufficient to comprehend and reconstruct human language usage and requires amend-
ment through pragmatic points of view. Indeed, these pragmatic viewpoints of language
usage largely determine our understanding of the adherence/non-adherence to grammati-
cal and semantic rules. This is particulary evident in the attempt to analyse unconvention-
al language usage (WUNDERLICH/MAAS, 1972; WUNDERLICH, 1976).
The pragmatic situation of understanding is characterized by a complementarity that is
indispensible for the constitution of meaning or, in Eigen’s words, for the evaluation
scheme and the allocation of meaning to symbol combinations. Sign-mediated communi-
cation can only extract meaning from signs within a setting involving a reciprocal confir-
mation between language usage and daily life; for the sign-using subject, this transparent
framework enables meaningful expression and permits successful intercommunication
about a chosen topic. The pragmatic sign-usage situation is ultimately constitutive for the
meaning of language application and speech behavior. Wittgenstein termed this situation
„language game“ and K.O. Apel very aptly differentiated this term as „a ‘life-form’, a
functioning unit of language usage, living expression, behavioral custom, and worldly
openness“ (APEL, 1976 a, p. 321).
Meaning can only be grasped in the framework of (real or fictitious) participation in such
language game. Language game even exists, or so we as humans can assume, in those cases
where conspecific individuals exhibit species-specific behavior that takes on sign character
whose particular meaning can be understood by the language game participants of that
species. This remains valid even when we consider the differences between human and non-
human, sign-mediated communication. An example is that specifically human quality in
which the rules governing the sign-mediated communication are concurrently maintained
as rules in the reflective consciousness and can often even be formulated as explicit rules.
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The meaning constitutes itself through the specificity of the actual intercommunicative
situation (whose purpose may be sociality or the coordination of activity or behavior); no
one can seriously dispute such behavioral coordination in non-human biological individ-
uals. The pragmatic approach also explains how the same linguistic signs can take on dif-
ferent meaning in the various language games. Shifts in linguistic sign meaning are an
integral and important component in specific language game situations.
In the process of communicative interactions, norms - which serve to orient our activity
and govern behavior - can be nullified or modified. The pragmatic language usage of indi-
viduals involved in species-specific, sign-mediated communication processes (language
game, etc.) enables the change, expansion, and transformation of proven and conventional
sign meanings. This gives rise to the possibility, even the probability, of an evolutive self-
organization of organisms, one that involves a discontinuous differentiation of ever more
complexly structured organisms, initially via intra-organismic communication processes.
This self-organization cannot in fact be explained or even understood (as Eigen postu-
lates) as an algorithmic process; rather, it is a rule governed, sign-mediated (and conse-
quently linguistic) communication process between a) the protein individuals of a biolog-
ical organism, b) conspecific individuals, c) conspecifics and external environment.
Evolutive self-organization is an evolutive possibility when intra-, inter-, and meta-
organismic communication function in an equally complementary fashion and when they
can claim linguistically-mediated, rule-changing creativity.
An explanation of how to constitute irreversible processes - in particular with respect to a
competent expansion or advantageous alteration of the genetic text through enzyme pro-
teins - would hardly be possible: without assuming this complementarity, how could one
understand the acquisition of a social interaction competence, much less the genetic fixa-
tion of specific, crucial experiences (WILSON. 1985)?
Sign-mediated communication in non-human languages is also clearly oriented
toward pragmatic conditions; it constitutes meaning and significance here as well.
Examples include the bee language as well as inter- and intracellular communica-
tion (FRISCH, 1971, WITZANY, 1993 b).
7.4.1 The Apriori of understanding situations for constituting 
meaning in the bee language
As demonstrated in our treatment of two sign-mediated communication processes in the
language of northern hemisphere honey bees, in certain situations the behavioral context
determines the meaning of the linguistic signs used. The bees’ ability to interact socially
is no doubt genetically fixed. However, the constitution of the specific performance, i.e.,
of the actual communication process, is contingent on the actual situational demand:
a) In the sign-mediated communication process underlying the foundation of a new
colony, only scouts participate in the search for a new home. They are the oldest bees in
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the swarm and have already gathered food for the parent hive; they are fully experienced
with the features of the local terrain. Why do only these experienced scouts swarm out,
and not the inexperienced ones as well? Does the flight of the queen cause certain genet-
ic text sequences in the scouts to be expressed, i.e., those that code for and initiate such a
behavior? Or does the rule governing the participation of only experienced scouts under-
lie some other species-specific, intersubjective communication?
The criteria that a prospective hive must fulfil are so differentiated that one can reasonably
assume a genetically determined inspection and evaluation behavior. On the other hand,
these evaluation criteria clearly do not exist from the onset: they must have been constitut-
ed by experience, followed by subsequent genetic fixation. Pragmatic situations formed
the evaluation pattern for the combination or creation of genetic sequences that then coded
these experiences as text sequences. Naturally, there is no reason to doubt that enzyme pro-
teins competent in text processing carried out this fixation, i.e., have structured and, above
all, inserted the respective sequence at the appropriate site in the genome.
No haphazard change or deformation of genetic text sequences can shape the highly dif-
ferentiated selection criteria for the winter hives of northern hemisphere honey bees: they
are simply too rigorous. The failure of the hive selection process to closely match the
required hive features can kill off the entire swarm in one winter. The argument that this
involves the natural selection of many chance mutations would imply the extinction of all
northern hemisphere bee populations before they ever had the opportunity to develop suf-
ficiently differentiated selection criteria for suitable winter hives.
As demonstrated earlier, the process by which a potential winter home is scrutinized is
itself incredibly complex and exact. The bees pace the entire length and breadth of the new
site: no millimeter is left out. This explains why a single bee covers a distance of nearly 50
m in the course of this inspection, even though the cavity itself is relatively small.
This performance by the bee fulfils a reliable evaluatory function and is part of the over-
all sign-mediated communication process; in this case it represents an individual contri-
bution. Such specific hive inspection behavior must have been constituted as experience
and subsequently become genetically fixed. Enzyme proteins in the cell must have coded
the specificity of this experience and inserted it into the correct site in the genome.
Otherwise the tree hollow would be unable to trigger the expression of the particular
genetic sequence that induces the individual bee - at the very time of its arrival there - to
reproduce the genetically fixed experiences of past bee generations.
Even this transformation of the scouts’ experience into the text-combining activities of
enzyme proteins is insufficient to explain why such genetic text fixation provides the next
bee generation with suitable hive-selection criteria. After all, the scouts have a different
status than the queen, who gives birth to all bees. While she does move into the new hol-
low with the swarm, and a genetic fixation of how she experiences this hollow is conceiv-
able, how can she genetically transmit the inspection procedure when she herself  did not
participate in the inspection? What plausible path exists between the experience of the
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scouts and the genetic text of the queen? Can one assume a generative linguistic behavior
in which experience is initially conveyed interindividually and only later - genetically
combined - incorporated into the genetic make-up? One scenario: the scouts impart their
experiences to the queen in the form of sign-mediated communication; she represents
these internally as stimulation patterns, thereby providing the text-competent enzyme
proteins with coding criteria that are inserted into the genome in correct relation to exist-
ing text sequences. And what might the criteria that govern the transformation into the
genetic text be, i.e., which experiences are genetically fixed and which ones are not?
Pragmatic interactions or communication situations which the overall organism experi-
ences in real life apparently determine how the enzyme proteins of that organism consti-
tute new or altered genetic text sequences.
The sign-mediated communication process underlying the founding of a new bee colony
also points to numerous other pragmatic situations that must be or, if they are genetically
fixed, must have been vital for the evaluatory function. The consultation between scouts
about the potentially most suitable new home - in this case the tail waggle dance - raises
the question: what induces bees that have identified a potential site as being less satisfac-
tory to dance less vigorously, and bees that have identified a site as being highly suitable
to dance more vigorously and to „symbolically code“ (TODT, 1986, p. 207) the direction
and distance of their discovery? What induces the less lively dancers, those who are less
convinced of their discovery, to take up the invitation of the more vigorously dancing
bees to inspect the site they consider to be particularly suited, especially when this
involves repeating the same complex and time-consuming inspection procedure? What
subsequently enables these bees to decide in favor of the recommended, inspected, and
perhaps more highly evaluated site and to themselves promote this site with an appropri-
ately intense dance? Furthermore, this new decision may itself be temporary, and another,
even better home may trigger a renewed inspection process, etc. At any rate, the final
decision is a consensus decision by all scouts, all of whom have by then inspected the
most highly advocated home. If no consensus can be reached, no decision is taken and the
swarm freezes to death at the site of their deliberations during the first cold spell.
Provided that the decision-making process represents sign-mediated communication,
then it cannot be of the algorithmic type; rather, it must be a truly communicative process
between conspecifics in a commonly shared life world (Lebenswelt). They represent sub-
jects for one another because they use the same linguistic signs in the same sign-mediat-
ed communication process to achieve understanding, form associations, and coordinate
behavior. The fact that language is involved, i.e., language and not merely a formal pro-
cedure, opens the potential for generative and therefore entirely new linguistic behavior.
Otherwise, northern hemisphere bees would never have been able to differentiate the nec-
essary sign-mediated communication processes (processes outside the repertoire of
southern hemisphere bees). Whereas southern hemisphere bees use behavior to constitute
signs with direct indicatory or invitational character, northern hemisphere bees employ
movements to constitute and utilize a symbolic sign character for these movements;
understanding these signs permits more differentiated messages to be deciphered (mes-
sages that even humans can understand, provided that they can determine the rules under-
lying the use of these movement signs).
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D. Todt, a sociobiologist whose research was instrumental in initiating an interdiscipli-
nary dialog with semiotics in Germany, expressly underlines the use of symbols by bees
of the northern hemisphere.
The specific sign-mediated communication process involved in searching for a home is
terminated only when consensus has been reached. The process is completed when a new
home (one selected exclusively by scouts) is inhabited and developed.
b) This marks the onset of the second sign-mediated communication process described
above - food gathering. Again, the tail waggle dance is used to convey  information. The
rules underlying the movement sequences as well as the indication of direction and dis-
tance remain the same as in the preceding example. The sequence of signs is also the
same. Their meaning, however, is different because they take on new meaning within the
pragmatic context of a new communication process. The waggle dance may well be a
rule-governed, genetically fixed behavior that is expressed as the need arises: nonethe-
less, the actual situation in which the signs are used within a population of communicat-
ing conspecifics lends meaning to the signs themselves and determines their sequence in
a dance.
In addition, the target group addressed by these expressions is not the same as in the pre-
ceding case. All foragers, not just the scouts alone, are called upon to search for food
sites. One situation-specific feature is responsible for the fact that foragers (and not just
scouts) are being addressed, even though the mode of expression and the utilized linguis-
tic signs are the same as in the previous example in which scouts were prompted to swarm
out: only when the dancers carry flower pollen - which is not the case when the task
involves searching for a new hive - is the call valid for foragers as well. In the absence of
pollen, the foragers do not react to the messages or invitations. Understanding
(Verständigung) between bees is not limited to dance movements alone. These move-
ments are combined with (the very important) vibratory movements
(KIRCHNER/TOWNE, 1994) of the wings and abdomen along with the rule governed
use of olfactory signs. This marks the limits of our comprehension of the bee language.
Human beings can never hope to progress much beyond a passable understanding of the
rules governing the bees’ use of linguistic signs: beyond a certain complexity of sign
combinations, mastering the specific modes of use would require becoming involved in
the bees’ communication process as interactional subjects. This inherently transcends
human capabilities and points to the limits in the compatibility of transpecific forms of
communication, for example in metaorganismic communication.
c) One final pragmatic criterium for the signifying function of the utilized linguistic signs
deserves mention: the occurrence of various bee dialects. The same  sign (or the same
sign sequence) can exhibit slightly different rules of usage in bee colonies that are geo-
graphically widely separated yet belong to the same species. In the case of the Austrian
and Italian bees described earlier, the form in which the same symbolic (behavioral) sign
is expressed can translate into site deviations of several hundred meters, The pragmatic
context, in this case the bee colony’s actual life-world (Lebenswelt), determines the
semantic rules according to which this sign is interpreted.
141
7.4.2. No intra- and intercellular sign-mediated communication process without real
sign users. The importance of cellular communities of communication.
The genetic code which is fixed in DNA and read, copied, and translated in gene expres-
sion gains importance as a genetic text only if real sign-users are available to read, copy
and translate it into the amino acid language. This gene expression, along with all of the
related subprocesses is neither mechanistic nor mysterious and vitalistic. Rather, it is the
result of complex, regulated interactions and highly specific behavior coordination
between numerous types of enzyme proteins (WATSON, 1992).
These enzymes clear the text for reading, implement the copying into the three types of
RNA, search the text for superfluous text passages, cut these out, to a certain extent repair
damaged sections using rougher and finer techniques (excision- and postreplication
repair), and complete the entire process of normal gene expression (HOWARD-FLAN-
DERS, 1981). All enzymatic protein individuals are themselves coded as genetic
sequences, yet enzyme proteins themselves always clear genes for reading and thus
ensure the reproduction of all necessary enzyme proteins. This allows numerous genera-
tions of specific enzyme protein types to exist within the life-span of an organism, begin-
ning at the onset of life.
The technique employed in the reproduction of the enzyme types is the same in all organ-
isms in which genetic texts must be read, copied, and translated into the amino acid lan-
guage. Every cell of the entire organism stores the complete genetic construction plan in
the form of the genome, although only those text passages required for the function of the
particular cell association are expressed. This also means that the specificity of the cell
association is decisive for evaluating those passages (within the total genetic text) that are
to be read, copied, and translated. Every organ, i.e., every specific cell association in
which specifically associated cells must carry out a function for the complete organism
(in a complex coordination with other organs), requires regulated interactions in order to
fulfil the demands placed on it by the organism (e.g., raised pulse rate after physical exer-
cise).
Today we appreciate how complex the execution of this sign-mediated communication is
in specific communication situations and within specific requirement profiles
(WITZANY, 1993 a). The communication between cells  of a cell association (organ) is
irrevocably limited to this context, i.e., the irreversibility is genetically fixed and virtual-
ly guarantees abidance by the rules that govern the reproduction of cell-association-spe-
cific progeny: we can be certain that liver cells reproduce only new liver cells.
At the same time, the specific position within a cell association determines the expression
of those genes which code for the (punctual) reproduction of a cell in precisely this specif-
ic position. The actual position of a cell in the real environment is the evaluation criterium
for the gene-expressing enzyme to express exactly that segment of the total genetic text
which enables the reproduction of a cell in that and no other position (GEHRING, 1985).
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Highly specific cell communication between cells of a cell association further enables the
production of proteins required for the various functions (e.g., metabolism function) with-
in the complete organism. The required proteins are not infrequently produced by very dif-
ferent cell associations via very cell-association-specific communication processes
(WITZANY, 1993 b). The rules of these sign-mediated communication processes, both of
the intra- and intercellular type, are followed, occasionally even newly constituted, by real
users of linguistic signs. They (the rules) are not only structured by the syntax of the genet-
ic text, but also by the real life-world (Lebenswelt) of the complete organism; this itself
constitutes situational contexts and contexts of experience, or finds itself within such con-
texts, and is primarily responsible for imposing special tasks/demands on cell associations. 
Specific task-accomplishing strategies can be (but need not be) genetically fixed as experi-
ences. This indicates that text-generating enzyme proteins use specific stimulatory patterns
of the organism, which are the result of situational contexts in a real life-world (Lebens-
welt), as a basis for their text generating activity. Such stimulatory patterns may be neu-
ronal or may function in combination with chemical messenger substances as text-generat-
ing stimulatory patterns. Interestingly, evidence for this was provided not by socio- or
molecular biologists, but by biochemists (BONNER, 1983 a; WYLES/KUNKEL/WIL-
SON, 1984; WILSON, 1985).
Protein synthesis probably takes place in all organisms in the same manner. Otherwise
one would not be able to arbitrarily combine the mRNA, tRNA and ribosomes of com-
pletely different species of organisms in a cell-free environment. The nucleic acid lan-
guage is governed by a common syntactic law, yet the real life-world (Lebenswelt) of
protein individuals, of the cell components and cell associations, as well as of those
organisms whose life is maintained by these cell associations, determine the use of this
language; they initiate the generative, sign-mediated communication processes (i.e., not
random mutations due to radiation or mutagenic agants) in which this language is
changed, transcended in its meaning, newly combined, or its complexity increased or
reduced. Real life-world and the interacting, rule-abiding individuals that constitute them
are indirect (via organismic body) co-constitutive for the sentence structure of the genet-
ic texts (WITZANY, 1993 b, 1997).
Without a molecular pragmatism, neither the logic of the molecular syntax nor the
molecular semantics that Eigen deduces from it could  be understood; furthermore, their
explanation would remain reductionistic. Understanding the language of nature (nucleic
acid language) requires a molecular semiotics (WITZANY, 1993 a) that analyses and
interprets the molecular interaction processes as sign processes (semioses). This would
reverse the omission of the actual sign users in the intra- and intercellular communication
processes and would incorporate their co-constitutive role in the structure of the genetic
text and its expression.
This level of insight must be attained before one can legitimately refer to a language
of nature: then we are no longer dealing with an explanatory model operating with
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metaphorical terms, but have an approach that enables us to understand and sub-
stantiate the conditions that establish the possibility of living organisms.
As long as molecular biology considers language to be an apriori for the evolution of
organisms and, ultimately, also of human intellect, it has grasped language only syntacti-
cally/ semantically.
From the standpoint of language philosophy, we can legitimately refer to a language of
nature in the evolution of organisms and in the evolution of human reason only after
incorporating the pragmatic dimension of sign utilization and thus including both the
real life-world (Lebenswelt) of the sign user and an understanding of its life-form.
A further example of how linguistic signs are constituted with meaning through the
pragmatic usage context is provided by chemical messenger substances whose structure
is the same but whose meaning differs in different communication processes. Thus, the
same chemical messenger can assume an entirely different messenger function as a hor-
mone than as a neurotransmitter in the communication between nerve cells.
The constitution of immunological memory is yet another example of how the interaction
competence of the B-lymphocytes is co-constituted through pragmatic interaction:
After successfully warding off an infection, the B-lymphocytes which helped organize
the defense remain present in the body as an immune memory. In the event of a renewed
infection the immune response can proceed much more rapidly and more effectively. The
immune response itself, however, is not genetically fixed, merely the structure of those
proteins that organize the immune response. The immune response is the result of a com-
plex identification and interaction process (TONEGAWA. 1985). On the other hand, the
constitution of the immunoglobulins, in their incredible diversity, is the result of the vari-
able combination of respective DNA sequences. 
Here as well, sequence segments are not changed and combined automatically or ran-
domly, but rather through enzyme proteins with combinatory competence. Using relative-
ly few, variable sequence regions and following only a few rules, they produce a sheer
endless number of easily distinguished identification proteins, which help organize a suc-
cessful immune response. Highly complex interaction forms and mutually  complementa-
ry communication types (intra-,inter-, and meta-organismic communication), not random
sequence mutations, have led to the development of such an immune response compe-
tence. If the organization and structuring of such relatively simple biological processes is
controlled by highly complex enzyme sign processes, then how much more plausible is
the assumption that such sign processes are involved in actual evolutionary processes, in
which much more complex symbol processes are required?
Enzyme proteins in particular, which combine and recombine genetic texts, provide evi-
dence for an evolutionarily acquired competence in text  processing. More specifically,
recombination enzymes identify particular recognition sequences as such and use this
ability to carry out combinatory operations on the genetic text; in this manner they cut out
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semantically significant text sequences from the text assemblage and insert them some-
where else in the assemblage. The sequence combination itself is  governed by syntactic
rules; the exact nature of their combination is under  the influence of pragmatic condi-
tions. The real life world (Lebenswelt) of the affected cells and molecular structures of a
complete organism form the evaluation function which constitutes the actual text combi-
nation as a meaning function.
The metaphor involving the „language of nature“, as applied by molecular  biologists,
should not be rejected out of hand. Nevertheless, to justify referring to a language of
nature in the sense a philosophy of language requires an expansion of the reductionistic
language concept of molecular biology. This would enable an understanding of living
nature based not on metaphors but on a reconstruction of historical intercommunication
situations and forms. The discussion about the language of nature opens new interpreta-
tion possibilities for observations in the realm of living nature - avenues that would prin-
cipally be closed to reductionistic research methods.
145

PART
THREE

8. Types and forms of communication in living nature
The previous chapters served to round off the systematic part of this work and to examine
potential areas of application opened by this approach.
The following outlook, which begins with evidence that living nature can be understood
as a linguistically and communicatively structured and organized entity, bears program-
matic features: the subsequent sections should be viewed as a blueprint and lay no claim
to exhaustively treating the perspectives they introduce in a form and content.
At the same time, a new philosophy of biology based on pragmatics of language may
well be emerging in the fields of research and education. It draws its justification from
viewing living nature as being structured and organized in a linguistic and communicative
manner; it founds its theses and methods on language philosophy and focuses its research
on establishing a „theory of communicative nature“. I will outline the basic principles
of such a theory in this chapter.
The preceding sections aimed at opening the door to understanding nature by demon-
strating its linguistic, communicative structure and organization; such an approach would
clearly allow traditional avenues of explaining nature to be newly oriented.
On one hand, this understanding of living nature is based on the language-like structure
of the genetic code and on the sign-mediated communication processes leading from the
genetic code to a living organism (whose form and function is in large part defined in that
code).
On the other hand, understanding living nature means examining the different forms of
rule-governed, sign-mediated interactions between discrete organisms. Depending on the
biological species and the communication medium, the interactions involve various forms
of sign-mediated communication, whereby the sign user constitutes and adapts them to its
inherent physiological features.
Most rule-governed interactions between organisms involve behavioral traits that take on
a symbolic character. To a lesser extent, symbolic linguistic signs may be used, i.e., a sign
stands for a defined circumstance without in itself actually representing that circum-
stance.
Few fields of research attempt to understand living nature by deciphering all the gram-
matic, semantic, and pragmatic rules underlying linguistic sign use in a biological
species. Zoosemiotics has tackled this problem with admirable success (FRISCH, 1965;
GRIFFIN, 1985; HULTSCH & TODT, 1986; KROODSMA 1982; LINDAUER, 1981;
MATTHES, 1978; PLOOG, 1974; SEBEOK, 1968, 1977; TEMBROCK, 1971; TODT,
1974, 1986). Based on the understanding of nature that this field achieves, semiotic
research might well be expanded to include all other kingdoms of organisms, e.g., in the
form of plant semiotics, fungal semiotics, protoctist semiotics, and a prokaryont semi-
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otics. This would cover the communication processes between discrete organisms. On the
other hand, communication processes at the level of genetic text sequences fall within the
realm of molecular semiotics, as discussed earlier. This branch of research will no doubt
contribute significantly to deciphering protein structures and their relationship to protein
function.
The rule-governed interactions between organisms, along with those in the intraorganis-
mic realm (intra- and intercellular communication), have a series of common features
above and beyond their distinct differences:
(a) the communication is sign mediated. 
Several other formal-pragmatic features that I have attempted to formulate in this book
can be found in all known forms of communication in every kingdom of organisms:
(b) species-specific communication also always serves to coordinate behavior 
in some manner. 
(c) No association is possible without species-specific communication.
Many additional common features can no doubt be discovered and described: I restrict
myself to these three characteristics because they represent key elements in the way
mankind defines itself.
From an evolutionary standpoint, the commonality of such features in all forms of com-
munication in living nature is understandable: all organisms stem from other organisms
that are considered to be their ancestors. With the exception of the first life form, life was
never again created from non-living material (creatio toto ex nihilo), i.e., each organism
can look back on a species, family, and phylum history.
From the onset, biological sciences have devoted intensive effort to reconstructing such
phylogenetic trees, and there is solid evidence for assuming that all living organisms are
related to one another to some degree, be it direct or indirect.
Upon closer examination, evolutionary history is inextricably entwined with the phyloge-
ny of phyla, families, and species. This history of biological organisms, along with the
generations that reproduce them, is clearly characterized by an underlying, habitat-specif-
ic interactional logic and interactional dynamics; the designation as a social or associa-
tional history appears to be justified. The actual „histories“ clearly differ from one another,
but share the fact that they involve organisms that communicate with one another.
The development and radiation of biological species would not have been possible without
the nucleic acid language: it defined every step of this development and radiation in the
form of genetic text sequences. It is the universal language underlying all life, and is virtu-
ally infinitely combinable in the extracellular environment. This universal language of life
does more than merely fix newly acquired physiological and/or habitual developments,
preserving them for the reproduction of future generations. Its role goes beyond merely
sustaining the constitutive and regulatory functions within an organism. Ultimately, this
language of living nature enables the constitution of entirely new text sequences and text
details, and thus the constitution of completely new biological species.
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This is the essence of the terms „biological self organization“ or „ongoing creation“ - the
capacity and capability of an organism to adapt to changing environmental conditions by
newly constituting genetic texts in the nucleic acid language, as well as the ability to
ensure its intraorganismic communication and to irreversibly fix those genotypic and
phenotypic changes that increase the reproductive potential of its lineage.
This, after all, characterizes every type of language use from the intracellular communi-
cation of the simplest unicells to human reflection:
in language use, i.e., in sign-mediated communication, the rules governing sign use can
principally be altered, expanded, and overstepped, thereby constituting new rules and
new forms of communication; these need not be fully reconstructable or explainable
based on predecessors and earlier forms, but exhibit truly novel qualities in key areas that
are simply undetectable in predecessors, ancestors, or earlier representatives.
As was demonstrated by numerous examples in the section on intraorganismic communi-
cation, this rule-changing creativity is not based on accidental changes in the genetic
texts, but rather on the manipulation, specification, expansion, and alteration of genetic
text sequences by enzyme proteins that are competent in text processing.
The full range of new perspectives revealed by the language-philosophical approach to liv-
ing nature can help establish a „theory of communicative nature“. Such a theory, whose
details remain to be formulated, is the research goal of a philosophy of biology based on
linguistical pragmatics. Its task is to interpret the research of various biological subdisci-
plines in this light, without any concessions to traditional, reductionistic research methods.
Its scientific purview would encompass all living organisms, including the interrelation-
ships between these organisms. At present, the following key elements of this theory can
be postulated:
1. Language of  nature: language-philosophical aspects of the nucleic acid language,
with special emphasis on molecular-semiotic aspects.
2. Languages in nature: language-philosophical aspects of sign-mediated communica-
tion processes between conspecifics in every kingdom.
3. Types of communication in nature: the study of all intra-, inter-, and metaorganismic
communication types in every phylum.
4. Forms of communication in nature: Determination of all communication forms that
are phylum specific with regard to their communication type: the various  kingdoms
as communication forms and their semicompatible relationship with one another.
5. Evolutionary theory based on a philosophy of language: reformulation of the classical
maxims of evolutionary theory from the perspective of living nature as a linguistically
and communicatively structured and organized living nature.
In the following section I plan to outline a new classification scheme in which all organ-
isms can be interpreted precisely from the vantagepoint of living nature that is structured
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and organized in a linguistic and communicative manner. At the same time, an effort will
be made to point out unbridgeable differences: clearly, bees use language symbols differ-
ently than whales or, indeed, humans.
8.1. One language of nature - many forms of communication 
As demonstrated earlier in this book, the nucleic acid language is vital for all forms of
life. Even the most minute disturbances, the slightest reading, translating, or copying
errors, can mean death or doom the organism to a suboptimal life. No organism in past or
present times, not even the history of life itself, is possible or even conceivable without
this universal language of nature.
The differentiation of this language was a prerequisite for the differentiation of every bio-
logical species known to have existed in the past or that still exists today. Moreover, this
language largely governs the way organisms behave toward their environment: it can irre-
versibly fix the behavioral repertoire of preceding generations. Most importantly, it regu-
lates the functions within the organism, i.e., on the intra-and intercellular level, as well as
coordinates the behavior of the individual organs.
In vitro experiments have shown that the potential combinations of this language of
nature - under adherence to its grammatic rules - are virtually limitless. Thus, the genetic
text sequences of a mouse and a human being are compatible in the extracellular environ-
ment. If the text sequence for a growth hormone from the human genome is inserted into
the proper site in the genome of a mouse (text-processing enzyme proteins are responsi-
ble for the correct insertion), then the mouse in fact does grow significantly larger than
the original genetic makeup would have allowed.
This language of nature also enables organisms to store the experience they gain in the
form of genetic text sequences (WILSON, 1985). This requires a coding process in which
experiences - as the perception of sensory input - take on structural character; these char-
acters, together with others (for example chemical messenger substances), can then be
identified and coded as structural characters by enzyme proteins that are competent in
processing texts. One central question involves the evaluation criteria used by such
enzyme proteins, i.e., we are currently still unable to distinguish the validity criteria
according to which one type of experience becomes genetically coded and fixed, while
another is stored neuronally but not further processed. This successful coding capacity is,
in turn, itself genetically fixed.
The language of nature defines the time and place of protein synthesis, i.e., of the enzyme
protein production that phenotypically expresses this language. Although no genotypically
fixed information could be expressed without enzyme proteins, the form and function of
these enzyme proteins are themselves genetically fixed. The prerequisite for such a self-
reflective, self-correcting, and self-expanding language of nature is the existence of protein
associations whose individuals are capable of metabolic functions. We define an organism,
in its most simple form, by its ability to take up, utilize, and break down exploited sub-
stances. The language of nature defines such organisms; the minimum requirement for
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their full development, i.e., for the expression of all the information stored in this language,
is a functioning metabolism of the new organism. Thus, the organism represents the medi-
um in which these genetic text-processing functions can take operate in the real world.
The language of nature and its capabilities are therefore inseparably linked with the
communication forms of actual protein individuals. One is not viable without the other.
When we refer to life, we must assume a complementarity between a single „language of
nature“ and nature’s numerous communication forms; the latter can be viewed as the
categorization of every conceivable phenotype in nature.
The constitution of new genetic text sequences is only peripherally related to enlarge-
ments and changes in existing text sequences, i.e., to the coding of the formative experi-
ences of living organisms in their environment. Rather, enzyme proteins competent in
combining texts produce new text creations that function as blueprints for entirely new
life forms - independent of such experiences. The ability to constitute new text sequences
is an important factor for optimizing living nature’s productivity: each new organism aris-
ing in this manner constitutes - on the phenotypic level - a new form of species-specific
communication. They enrich the diversity within the respective habitat and force existing
populations to interact with the newly derived forms. This experience between old and
new would never have taken place without the novel element. These new experiences, in
turn, can initiate new codings (e.g., changes or expansions) in the genome of individuals
of an existing population, codings that would never have been possible without the inter-
action with new life forms.
Thus, the appearance of new life forms (via text creations by text-processing enzyme pro-
teins on the genotypic level) is a cofactor in the specification and accompanying expan-
sion of the gene pool of existing populations. Such complementary effects no doubt con-
tribute to creating new, organism-bound enzyme proteins that are more proficient in text
processing than their predecessors, who themselves were sufficiently competent to organ-
ize the organism’s reactions to its erstwhile environment. (Consider, for example, the re-
orientation of certain digestive processes through man’s introduction of dairy farming).
The origin of new biological species or even kingdoms represents a novelty not only for
the particular organisms involved, but also for all the other life forms that must interact
directly or indirectly with the novel organisms.
The relationship between the single, universal language of nature and the kingdom-specif-
ic communication forms of the organisms themselves is manifold: their relationship, i.e.,
the relationship between the genotypic and phenotypic level, is a complementary one.
8.2. Semicompatible forms of communication in nature. 
The classification of communication types and communication forms
Alongside this universal language of nature, which is instrumental in constituting all
forms of life, there exist languages in nature: sign-mediated communication processes
between individual organisms designed to coordinate behavior and promote the forma-
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tion of associations. These types of communication can vary considerably from biologi-
cal species to biological species; as demonstrated earlier in the case of bees, regional
populations can develop habitat-specific communication types (dialects) even within one
and the same species. The dialects within a regional population of a species provide lee-
way for an even greater differentiation. Every classification of communication types in
nature must therefore focus on fundamental differences between biological kingdoms,
differences that are reflected in the respective  phylogenetic histories as well. Modern
biological systematics, i.e., taxonomy, offers a useful approach: its differentiation of 5
kingdoms enables a principle distinction into kingdom-specific categories of communica-
tion forms. This will be treated at a later stage.
According to my thesis, every life form worthy of the definition (from single-celled organ-
isms to human beings) is enmeshed throughout its life in three types of communication:
1. Each organism is subject to an intraorganismic communication that is  indispensable
for the internal organization of numerous vital functions, reactions, etc. Several such
examples were presented in more detail in earlier chapters. This includes both intra-
cellular and intercellular communication (the latter being especially well-developed in
animals). Naturally, this also encompasses the expression of the genetic text, i.e., con-
verting the genotype into the phenotype. Intraorganismic communication is ultimately
responsible for the external form and function of the organism.
2. Every organism participates in interorganismic communcation, i.e., communication
between members of the same species; this also plays a role in coordinating behavior
and forming associations, without which a biological species would be unable to sur-
vive. This category also encompasses all rule-governed interactions between con-
specifics: their species-specific constitution endows them with an identical or at least
similar repertoire of signs and rules, or enables the organisms to acquire this repertoire
through learning processes. The most complex forms of interaction have developed in
the communication between members of the same species, whereby this type of com-
munication is once again most pronounced in the animal kingdom.
3. Every organism participates in metaorganismic communication processes in that it
interacts with other species throughout its life. In most cases this type of communica-
tion is either symbiotic (vital to both interacting partners) or parasitic (beneficial to one
species, detrimental to the other). Viewed superficially from a human perspective, the
most conspicuous interaction processes are the violent ones between different species,
i.e., those in which one organism serves as prey for another. Even in such cases, howev-
er, the „victims“ are not defenseless; rather, they have developed a range of species-spe-
cific defense strategies that are genetically fixed and thus hereditary. Countless exam-
ples of symbiotic and parasitic metaorganismic communication types exist. A select
few biological species have developed other types of metaorganismic communication
beyond symbiosis and/or parasitism (more highly evolved mammals and humans).
In this chapter I will interrelate these three types of communication with the various
forms of communication; this yields a multi-level differentiation of sign-mediated com-
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munication processes in living nature and reveals their relationship to the observed phe-
notypes. Such a summary is critical because kingdom-specific communication forms are
manifested in the morphological structure and in the interactions of members of living
environments. This is the reason why I refer to forms of communication in nature rather
than to language levels.
8.2.1. The arrangement of all known organisms into phylogenetically related groups
As mentioned earlier, nature’s forms of communication differ from one another in the
evolutionary sense as well, whereby each form discussed below need not differ from the
preceding one in all features, but in characteristic ones. From the evolutionary standpoint,
therefore, each new kingdom manifests itself as a fundamentally new communication
form (of the language of nature) that can be distinguished from the preceding kingdom
with regard to all three communication types.
The following presentation is based on modern biological systematics and avoids the old
classification systems (zoology, botany, microbiology, etc.) along with their terminologi-
cal inconsistencies; equal weight is given to all the important structural and organization-
al features distinguished by these fields of research. The most recent systematics is based
on a model of R.H. Whittaker; it has since met with broad interdisciplinary acceptance
and been published in updated forms by Lynn Margulis and Karlene V. Schwartz (MAR-
GULIS & SCHWARTZ, 1988).
Accordingly, 5 kingdoms of organisms are currently distinguished on the basis of life
cycles (phylogeny, reproduction, feeding, social interaction, etc.). The basic unit distin-
guished here is the species. Approximately 3 million species are thought to exist today,
although the number may be as high as 20 million (the discrepancy is based on well-
founded assumptions about unknown insect species). On the other hand, a far greater
number of species has already become extinct during the course of geological history.
Closely related species are united into genera, with closely related genera being grouped
into families, families into orders, orders into classes, classes into phyla, and phyla into
kingdoms. In all cases, the arrangement into these categories is based on group features
reflecting natural phylogenetic affinities. Thus, man belongs to the species Homo sapiens,
to the genus Homo, the hominid family, the order of the primates, the class of the mam-
mals, the phylum of the vertebrates, and the animal kingdom.
The five kingdoms can be clearly and definitively distinguished from one another:
Single-celled organisms lacking a nucleus (prokaryotes) (I) differ much more from the
next evolutionary step, i.e., unicells with true nucleus and their relatives (eukaryotes),
than animals do from plants. Organisms with a true nucleus can be divided into eukaryot-
ic microorganisms and their relatives (protoctists)  (II) as well as into the phenotypically
larger eukaryotic organisms (animals) (III), fungi (IV), and plants (V). „These last
three familiar kingdoms represent the three great ecological strategies for larger organ-
isms: production (plants), absorption (fungi), and consumption (animals)“ (MARGULIS
& SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. X). 
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From the perspective of the philosophy of language and the philosophy of nature, this tra-
ditional division (which is entirely useful in the framework of biological research)
remains unsatisfactory when it comes to mankind’s self-understanding (Selbstverständ-
nis). Based on the communicative and linguistic competence of humans, it is most help-
ful to differentiate between the communication form of the animal kingdom and the com-
munication form of humans. While we can relatively effortlessly trace our physiological
descendance from primate predecessors (compare also BUCHER, 1992), their cultural
development shows that we have differentiated an evolutionary step lacking in any of the
5 kingdoms. The classification of communication forms therefore needs to be expanded
to include the human element, so that in representing the communication forms of living
nature I will refer to six such fundamental forms.
Clearly, each kingdom and its specific communication form developed at different times
in Earth history from the evolutionary perspective, and a „before“ and „after“ can be dis-
tinguished; it therefore appears reasonable to begin with accepted divisions of time in
order to be able to chronologically arrange the appearance of the respective kingdoms.
8.2.2. Dating the origin of the 6 communication forms in nature
Geologists are continually improving the chronology of Earth’s history. Rock layers are
compared with one another, with the upper ones being considered to be younger than the
underlying beds. The evaluation of decay processes of natural radioactive isotopes also
enables relatively precise dating.
The age of the Earth has been estimated at 5 billion years. The oldest known fossils, bac-
terium-like structures, have been dated at approximately 3.5 billion years (ibid.). These
earliest forms of life were prokaryotes. They ruled the planet for nearly 2.5 billion years,
i.e., for more than half of Earth’s history. This was followed about 1.2 billion years ago by
the appearance of protoctists, whose constitution introduced a fundamentally new dimen-
sion of biological possibilities: the evolutionary jump to cells with a true nucleus provid-
ed the basis for all future evolutionary steps.
The first typical animals appeared on the scene about 700 million years ago, followed 400
million years ago by the fungi. Plants represent the most recent evolutionary step, form-
ing an independent kingdom ca. 380 million years ago. The sediments of the so-called
Phanerozoic mark the point in time in which a detailed chronological differentiation is
possible. This aeon began approx. 580 million years ago and is, in contrast to all earlier
time periods, incomparably rich in fossils.
Since the communication form of humans differs distinctly from all others, dating its ori-
gin is justified in the present context. To the extent that one can interpret archeological
finds as human fossils, the age of the genus Homo has been estimated at ca. 1.5 million
years or more. Our species, Homo sapiens, is considered to be nearly 120 000 years old,
with the definitive differentiation of the brain to its present state having occurred some 
35 000 years ago (WASHBURN, 1978; BUCHER, 1992).
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Fig. 26 „A geologic chronology of Earth history“
(from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 16/17)
8.2.3. Expanding modern biological systematics 
in the dimension of  a philosophy of language
Throughout its life cycle, every member of a particular kingdom is - from the language-
philosophical perspective - the phenotypic expression of a genotype and its realization
through enzyme proteins competent in text processing. Due to the closer natural phyloge-
netic affinities of organisms within a kingdom, the communication types within that king-
dom will be more similar than between kingdoms. This is why I also refer to each king-
dom as a communication form. The following descriptions of characteristic features
therefore always encompass the underlying sign-mediated intraorganismic communica-
tion (coded in the nucleic acid language) that was necessary to shape such features.
Thus, the description of typical metabolic processes would always fall within the realm of
intraorganismic communication, while the various forms of behavioral coordination with
conspecifics would fall within the realm of interorganismic communication. Accordingly,
forms of interaction between organisms belonging to different species would be classified
as metaorganismic communication.
8.2.3.1. The Prokaryotes
This kingdom consists entirely of microorganisms that are invisible to the naked eye, in
particular the highly diverse group comprising the bacteria. All in all, more than 10 000
species are known. From the evolutionary standpoint, the prokaryotes represent the earli-
est forms of life. The fact that they escaped extinction at a time when all other forms of
living nature were unfolding is no doubt due to the wide range of indispensable function-
al roles they play in the lives of other organisms (MARGULIS & SCHWARTZ, 1988, p.
33f.).
a) Intraorganismic communication
All vital functions within a prokaryote are organized by an enormous number of chemical
transformations; these, in turn, are oriented and directed by intraorganismic communica-
tion. The specific implementation in a particular prokaryote is genetically defined. The
DNA is contained within the so-called nucleoids, which lack a surrounding membrane.
They also lack the chromosomes that characterize all eukaryotic organisms, having
instead simple genophores („gene carriers“). The DNA is not surrounded by protein.
These simple organisms have apparently been unable to produce those enzyme proteins
that can process the genetic text in a manner that would lead to the subsequent formation
of a nucleus. The advantage of these life forms is their minute size, which opens up habi-
tats that are inaccessible to larger organisms (ibid.).
The forms of metabolic function differentiated by bacteria by far exceed those developed
by eukaryotic organisms. For example, bacteria produce or consume a range of gases;
such metabolic processes contribute substantially to the formation of Earth’s atmosphere.
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Bacteria use a range of techniques to obtain their nourishment, among them photosynthe-
sis and chemosynthesis. In both cases, food and metabolic energy is derived from inor-
ganic sources (ibid.).
Bacteria are also capable of feeding on organic compounds from either living or non-liv-
ing biomass. As opposed to plants, photosynthetically competent bacteria can utilize
hydrogen sulfide instead of water. 
Bacteria are among the hardiest organisms on the planet: by forming spores (which con-
tain at least one copy of each bacterium gene) they can even survive spells of complete
dessication. They reproduce chiefly by cell division (DNA replication), i.e., the division
of a parent cell into two daughter cells (ibid.).
b) Interorganismic communication
Bacteria join together to form colonies. For many years, such bacteria colonies were mis-
taken for algae, which can take on a very similar appearance. This form of prokaryotic
association is generally the product of increased cell division in the vicinity of a food
source. Some such associations assume a specific structure, for example Bacillus
colonies. They undergo coordinated movements and rotations as a unit. Little is known
about how they coordinate such behavior, but there is no doubt that such a coordination
takes place. Reproductive strategies in which the genetic material of two prokaryotes are
combined - in unequal proportions - also exist, for example via a virus that can exchange
genes between bacteria (ibid.).
(compare also KAISER/LOSICK, 1993, LOSICK/KAISER 1997)
c) Metaorganismic communication
As a rule, bacteria live in water or some other liquid medium. Their rule-governed inter-
actions with other species have given rise to some highly differentiated forms which can
be subsumed under one of two fundamental strategies. On the one hand they can be sym-
biotic, i.e., live in or with a host organism, with the latter being dependent on bacterial
activity (for example for digestion). On the other hand they can be parasitic and cause dis-
ease in plants, animals, and humans.“Bacteria converse with one another and with plants
and animals by emitting and reacting to chemical signals. The need to `talk´ may help
explain why the microbes synthesize a vast array of compounds.“ (LOSICK/KAISER,
1997, p. 52) Sign-mediated, rule governed interaction leeds to differentiation of species
specific properties which enriches their communicative fitness. „Beyond conversing with
their own kind, bacterial cells sometimes conduct elaborate chemical conversations with
higher organisms.“(ibid., p. 55)
The so-called archaebacteria (some scientists term it an own kingdom; WOESE, 1981)
found optimal living conditions at the dawn of Earth’s history, specifically in hot, con-
centrated sulfuric acid. These life forms die upon contact with oxygen. Since the advent
of animals and plants, certain bacteria have specialized in releasing the remains of dead
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organisms into the seawater in the form of nitrogen and phosphorus. These substances
are, in turn, essential for the survival of other organisms (algae). Without the organic com-
pounds produced by bacteria, the food chains or food webs responsible for differentiating
innumerable forms of life could not exist. Bacteria are therefore integral parts of every
community of living organisms.
Fig. 27  Phylae of Prokaryotes (from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 24)
This kingdom, as a communication form in nature, comes closest to the universal lan-
guage of nature from the perspective of its global distribution: bacteria can be encoun-
tered everywhere in nature. If bacteria were to become extinct as a kingdom, all remain-
ing forms of life would be doomed. Most organisms would never be able to form proteins
without the help of certain bacteria that can bind nitrogen - a prerequisite for photosyn-
thesis.
The metaorganismic communication of bacteria in the earliest phases of Earth’s history
was, in fact, restricted to interactions between prokaryotes, as no other organisms were
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present at the time. Only with the advent of protoctists were prokaryotes able to commu-
nicate in a true metaorganismic manner.
8.2.3.2. The Protoctists
The protoctists represent a kingdom that has taken the fundamental evolutionary hur-
dle from cells without, to cells with true nucleus (MARGULIS & SCHWARTZ, 1988, p.
75f.). All subsequent kingdoms in the evolution of life consist of eukaryotic cells (i.e.,
have a true nucleus).
Protoctists are neither prokaryotes nor animals, plants, or fungi. They encompass eukary-
otic microorganisms and related forms. This includes all nucleated algae, flagellated
water molds, slime molds (unrelated to fungi), and protozoans. Nearly 200 000 species of
protoctists are known today (ibid.).
Fig. 28  Typical prokaryotic cell on the left; on the right a eucaryotic cell
(from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 9)
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a) Intraorganismic communication
The fundamental expansion of the genetic text that led to the constitution of nucleated
cells ultimately gave rise to chromosomes consisting of DNA and proteins consisting of
RNA. Cell division took place after prior nuclear division. Most protoctists are capable of
cell respiration, with eukaryotic cells principally requiring oxygen to survive.To the best
of our knowledge, various forms of anucleate single-celled organisms attained a type of
association around which - under a certain set of environmental conditions - a type of
membrane developed; it was subsequently genetically fixed as an autogenous product of
this „associational conglomerate“ of eukaryotic cells. Such an association hypothesis is
plausible in the framework of a „theory of communicative nature“ (compare also DUVE,
1996 and MARGULIS, 1998).
Fig. 29  The protoctists are the first eucaryotic organisms. They are the  starting
point for the evolution of the latter organismic kingdoms animals, fungi, plants.
(from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 76)
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Cell respiration in protoctists takes place in organelles termed mitochondria. The cell
organization and, more generally, the life cycles of protoctists are very variable.
Nevertheless, this variability is far lower than in prokaryotes. On the other hand, the
metabolic diversity within this kingdom exceeds that of animals, fungi, and plants. Some
species release free oxygen, others ingest solid or dissolved organic substances, while
still others release such material into their surroundings. Certain species of protoctists
become photosynthetically active under light conditions, yet absorb particulate or dis-
solved organic substances in the dark. One of the few features common to all protoctists
is their eukaryotic ancestry. One must always bear in mind that these many functions
would not be possible without intraorganismic communication. However, while intraor-
ganismic communication in prokaryotes was restricted to intracellular communication, in
all other kingdoms it takes place on the intercellular level as well. The protoctists, how-
ever, are unicellular microorganisms in which the borders between intercellular commu-
nication (as a sector of intraorganismic communication) and interorganismic communica-
tion are sometimes blurred.  I would like to briefly present one example of
interorganismic communication in protoctists.
Fig. 30  Life cycle of the cellular slime mold, in which the amebas assemble themselves round a centre.
Therefore the slime mold  is termed by the scientists  „the god of amebas“, because it is obviously
a coordination of behavior, but nobody knows how it functions and which signaling processes are
involved. (from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 133)
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b) Interorganismic communication
Certain protoctist phyla contain families encompasses both unicellular and colonial
forms. They can develop complex forms of interaction.
For example, the life cycle of a plasmodial slime mold may involve differentiation into a
stalk and a sporangium involving a large number of amebas. The ameba cells do not
divide to form this slime mold structure. Rather, they coordinate their behavior such that
some combine to form the stalk while others combine to form the sporangium. The plas-
modial slime mold (no relation to fungi) therefore superficially resembles a uniform
organism, while in reality it represents the structural aggregation of individual amebas,
i.e., rule-governed ameba behavior.
c) Metaorganismic communication
In any event, protoctists live exclusively in a liquid medium. Some inhabit the marine
environment, others prefer freshwater, while still others are found in the bodily fluids of
higher organisms.
Virtually all plants, animals, and fungi live in close association with protoctists, either
symbiotically or as parasites. Protictists may also feed on bacteria. The abundant supply
of bacterial food in the early days of Earth’s history enabled this kingdom to colonize the
entire planet.
8.2.3.3. The Animals
The first evolutionary differentiation of a new kingdom after the protoctist innovation was
that of the animal kingdom (MARGULIS & SCHWARTZ, p. 167 f.). It took nearly
another 300 million years before the kingdom Fungi developed, and even longer for the
first plants to appear.
The animal kingdom is so interesting because it contains the greatest structural diversity.
The range of sizes and the many organizational types here are also quite impressive. A
microscope is required to recognize the smallest animals, while the largest - the blue
whales - belong to the same phylum and the same class (mammals) as humans and can
reach a weight of ca. 130 tons as adults.
Most animal species are worm-like aquatic organisms, and the majority has already
become extinct. Animals are the only organisms to have successfully invaded the skys.
The creativity in constituting new genetic text sequences has given rise to numerous types
of flying animals. The Arthropoda („joint-legged animals“) are the largest phyla of all,
containing nearly 10 million species (insects). Perhaps the most well-known and familiar
representatives of the animal kingdom are members of the chordate phylum, which
includes all mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and fishes. This phylum encompasses
approx. 45 000 species, all of which stem from aquatic life forms. The presence of embry-
onic gill slits in all representatives (including humans) underscores this ancestry (ibid.).
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Fig. 31  The Animal kingdom (from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 168)
a) Intraorganismic communication
Intraorganismic communication in the animal kingdom has differentiated life forms that
successfully developed many forms of interaction; at the same time, this type of commu-
nication is itself specialized for optimizing only a few fundamental reproductive strate-
gies, metabolic pathways, etc. All animals are multicellular organisms that develop
through fusion of an egg cell and a sperm cell. This fusion leads to a so-called zygote,
which grows and differentiates via mitotic cell division.
The mitoses initially lead - in a manner defined by genetic text sequences that are similar
in all animals - to a ball of cells and then to a hollow sphere; the latter character cannot be
found in any other kingdom and is considered to be exclusive to animals. In the course of
further differentiation, this hollow sphere gives rise to a hollow, tube-like digestive system.
b) Interorganismic communication
The animals we most commonly perceive are those belonging to the phylum Chordata,
i.e., mammals, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and fishes. This phylum has also developed the
most complex types of interorganismic communication. These range from sign-mediated
communication in the tactile realm, to electrical, chemical (insects), and ultimately pho-
netic and visual communication.
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Signs can be used in two ways, either as a vehicle for mere signal transmission or, in
many species, in the form of symbolic sign use. The sign character of specific behaviors
within behavioral sequences is particularly diverse. This is the result of an intensive,
rule-governed social structure which, thanks to the increased movement dynamics and
responsiveness that the central nervous system or brain allows, can react very flexibly to
the demands placed on it. Such an intensive interactivity is lacking in virtually all other
kingdoms and has a corresponding, strong impact on the text-generating processes in the
intraorganismic realm (WILSON, 1985); this complementary, dynamic interrelationship
has no doubt given rise to a strong complement of text-generating enzyme proteins hav-
ing text-generating competence (ibid.).
Fig. 32  Prostoma rubrum, a typical representative of the animal kingdom
(from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 191)
Not only has interorganismic communication taken on its most complex form in the ani-
mal kingdom (although the more advanced animal groups first appeared after the evolu-
tionary origins of fungi and plants), but it has also led to life forms whose communicato-
ry competence and performance transcend that of the animal kingdom. This life form -
mankind - has differentiated an independent, highly complex cultural evolution as the
basis for its further development.
Interorganismic communication in higher animals may also manifest itself as assistance
between conspecifics (mutual brood relief in bird species), primitive forms of ritual behav-
ior (burial rites in elphants), or active support for ailing members (cetaceans, primates, ele-
phants); a behavioristic interpretation is  insufficient to fully explain these phenomena. 
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In such cases, pure biological evolution has clearly been transcended in the direction of
cultural evolution. These can, in part, be genetically coded as behavior patterns and are
thus inheritable, although the behavior patterns stem primarily from interorganismic
communication and can, in part, also be reproduced through social interactions.
c) Metaorganismic communication
Animals may feed on other animals or plants as well as on dissolved or particulate organ-
ic matter. Highly developed parasitic forms of interaction can occur as well, for example
between parasitic worms and more highly developed animals. Symbiotic interactions are
particularly well developed here and play a decisive role in living nature (i.e., insect-plant
interactions).
Due to its high complexity and dynamics, metaorganismic communication in the animal
kingdom provides a dense sensory environment for all other kingdoms. Animals thus
exert strong stimulatory potentials both for themselves and for members of other king-
doms. In this manner, they may prompt the evolutionary specialization of intra-, inter-,
and metaorganismic communication in countless life forms.
8.2.3.4. The Fungi
The fungi developed from protoctists approximately 400 million years ago (MARGULIS
& SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 151f.). These eurkaryotes form spores and lack flagella in any
stage of their life cycle. The total number of species has been estimated at 100 000. Most
are terrestrial, although some have been found in aquatic habitats as well. As inconspicu-
ous as the Kingdom Fungi may seem at first glance, terrestrial plants probably could not
have developed without them (ibid.).
a) Intraorganismic communication
Fungal spores germinate and grow to form so-called hyphae, which are subdivided by
cross walls (septa). Genetic text-processing has given rise to structures unknown in either
the animal and plant kingdoms. A larger mass of hyphae form a network termed a myceli-
um.
Fungi do not undergo embryological development. The spores develop directly into
hyphae or, in certain cases, into single growing cells. Rather than ingesting particulate
matter, fungi absorb dissolved substances. The fungal hyphae release enzymes into their
surroundings: these break suitable food items down into their molecular components
(ibid.).
b) Interorganismic communication
The dynamic repertoire of fungi is relatively restricted, so that interorganismic communi-
cation is limited to a few interactions in key phases of the life cycle. Fungi differ only little
from their ancestors, the protoctists, with regard to forms of association, colony formation,
and other coordinated reproductive and dispersal strategies. On the other hand, the degree
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of association and the underlying behavioral coordination is considerably more complex,
with the mycelia capable of reaching a length of several meters. Fungi reproduce sexually
by conjugation, whereby the hyphae of different mating types contact each other and sub-
sequently fuse. This fusion initially only involves the cytoplasm, with the nuclei remaining
separate. The two nuclei in the hypha, one from each parent, can remain separate over
longer periods of time, but are present as a pair (ibid.). Fungi can also reproduce asexual-
ly: they produce spores that can be dispersed over great distances by the wind.
Fig. 33 The organismic kingdom of the Fungi 
(from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 152)
In the Kingdom Fungi, interorganismic communication between conspecifics is largely
restricted to behavior coordination and association via chemical substances that serve as
linguistic signs.
c) Metaorganismic communication
The metaorganismic communication of fungi is restricted to parasitic or symbiotic inter-
actions. Fungi produce a series of complex organic substances as a defense strategy; these
can be very aggressive and even lethal to other organisms. Many fungi are also pathogens,
especially in plants (ibid.).
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Fig. 34 The asexual reproduction of Rhizopus sp. (from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 157)
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Symbiotic interactions within this kingdom are useful or even vital to a wide range of
organisms. Many plants, for example, are known to cooperate symbiotically with fungi in
their root systems, where the fungi help process the nutrients. Forest trees that rely on
dissolved nutrients would be unable to survive without fungi. 
Fungi serve mankind in a number of technical-industrial processes, i.e., in producing
antibiotics and cheese, baking bread, and in brewing beer. Fossil finds showing fungi inti-
mately associated with plant tissue support the hypothesis that a plant-fungus cooperation
enabled aquatic plants to invade terrestrial habitats (ibid.).
8.2.3.5. The Plants
From an evolutionary standpoint, plants form the youngest kingdom within biological
systematics (MARGULIS & SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 257f.). They appear shortly after the
fungi in the form of rootless, leafless organisms resembling seaweeds. Their ancestry is
comparatively undisputed: they stem from green algae (same complement of photosyn-
thetic pigments, same type of reproduction). As is the case in animals, plants always
develop from embryos, i.e., multicellular structures enveloped by maternal tissue. All
plants go through a sexual phase that is surprisingly similar and comparable in all phyla
of the kingdom. 
Fig. 35  The organismic kingdom of the plants (from: MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 258)
170
Plants considerably enrich the overall diversity of living nature; their physical presence
constitutes an entirely new range of habitats (thus providing the foundation for higher
animal life, for example). They encompass ca. 500 000 species, although some estimates
are much higher (ibid.).
a) Intraorganismic communication
All plants are eukaryotic and possess so-called chloroplasts, i.e., photosynthetic struc-
tures that contain green pigments. Photosynthetically competent plants are the most
important organisms involved in transforming solar energy and inorganic carbon into
organic nutrients. Most plants belong to the so-called angiosperms or flowering plants,
rather than to the gymnosperms (which produce naked seeds). Vascular plants and moss-
es have taken quite different routes in differentiating intracellular communication.
An innovative evolutionary step - the appearance of angiospermous flowering cells - gave
rise to plants that bear fruit. This was the prerequisite for an environment that could sup-
port mammals.
b) Interorganismic communication
Plants form colonies and typically grow in aggregations that include different species,
genera, etc. At first glance, or compared with the animal kingdom, their interorganismic
communication appears to be quite undynamic and largely restricted to the exchange of
chemical substances. This tends to obscure the diversity and complexity of the sign-medi-
ated communication processes that take place here. Plant biotopes are characterized by a
permanently coordinated production process in which the waste products themselves are
fully recycled. On the interorganismic level, plants have a symbiotic and parasitic rela-
tionship with one another (ibid.).
c) Metaorganismic communication
As far as nutrient cycles are concerned, plants live in tight symbiosis with representatives
of all other kingdoms, i.e., with bacteria, protoctists, fungi, and animals (especially
insects). This kingdom relies heavily on the diversity of such symbioses. Through its
range of biotope-structuring, interorganismic associations, the plant kingdom provides an
optimal environment for larger animals. Plants also produce an astounding variety of
complex chemical compounds that are not directly required for feeding or reproduction,
but that serve to defend the plant against animals, fungi, or even other plant competitors.
By releasing such substances into the soil, plants prevent their competition from growing
in the immediate vicinity (ibid.).
8.2.3.6. The Human beings
While human beings do not represent a kingdom of their own, they do have a unique form
of communication. In our attempts to understand living nature, we approach our own
species and non-human nature in a different manner. Any attempt to comprehend our-
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selves as living beings is an expression of our own  self-understanding (Selbstverständ-
nis). It is by understanding ourselves that we understand humanity.
This understanding is based on and imparted by our expressions, actions, interactions,
thoughts, etc.; in certain cases we are able to specify the laws underlying this understand-
ing, that is we are in a position to comprehend this understanding as a form of action
(transcendental-reflexively) and not merely as a form of behavior (empirically).
Mammals originated approximately 200 million years ago, and one of their orders
encompasses the primates (100 million years ago). The primates themselves differentiat-
ed into two suborders, the prosimians and the true apes. The latter also gave rise to the
anthropoids (hominoids). The hominoids, in turn, gave rise to the pongid and hominid
families. According to current knowledge, the species Homo sapiens is ca. 120 000 years
old and is the direct ancestor of modern humans, whose present brain size was differenti-
ated about 35 000 - 40 000 years ago.
It is absolutely justified to place humans into the animal kingdom; after all, the DNA of
chimpanzees and humans differs by a mere 1.2% (GHIGLIERI, 1985).
a) Intraorganismic communication
Our intraorganismic communication is closely related with that of primates. Nonetheless,
the intraorganismic communication of humans split us off from the hominoid phyloge-
netic tree, and our brain differentiation enabled the organization of our many skills and
abilities. This pertains to our linguistic development, our ability to communicate, and our
use of reason in linguistic expressions, all of which so clearly differentiate us from the
primates. Today, we understand ourselves to be very highly evolved living beings. 
The genetic text processing involved in the respective intraorganismic communication is
equally highly evolved:
„Quality control: No technical production system, regardless how perfect, even approach-
es the low error rate achieved in the DNA reproduction process in living organisms. This
degree of precision is vital for humans as well: even a single mistake in the transmission
of hereditary information can have lethal consequences, as for example in sickle cell ane-
mia or cancer. In the course of developing from a fertilized egg to an adult human being,
the three billion letter pairs of the human genome are reproduced nearly a quadrillion
times. These orders of magnitude underscore the monumental scale of the task involved
in correct transmission. An error rate as low as one in a million would still mean ca. 3000
mistakes per transmission: normal development would be impossible. Three enzymatical-
ly controlled processes are responsible for suppressing errors during the reproduction of
the genetic text. Polymerases are responsible for selecting the correct letters, i.e., the
nucleotide building blocks for the new DNA strands, while exonucleases are responsible
for rejecting damaged letters. After these two steps, the error rate is reduced to one in ten
million. The third and decisive step - correcting mistakes in the overall manuscript - is far
more complex. Several proteins work hand in hand in this process. They recognize and
excise sites in which the letters of one strand do not fit with those of the complementary
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strand. The missing piece is completed by polymerases. After this final quality control
step, the error rate is reduced to a mere one in ten billion“ (from: SPEKTRUM DER WIS-
SENSCHAFT, 1988, vol. 9, p. 119).
This description of how the efficiency of intraorganismic communication is optimized in
reproducing the genetic text clearly demonstrates that the text-processing competence of
cooperating enzyme proteins has reached its evolutionary epitome in humans. („Hamilton
draws our attention to the circumstance that the highest degree of cooperation does in fact
take place in colonies of genetically identical cells such as those that form the human
body“; SMITH, 1978)
b) Interorganismic communication
Interorganismic communication between humans differs considerably from that between
animals. Numerous independent scientific disciplines have shed more light on interorgan-
ismic communication than on all other types of human communication. Not only the phi-
losophy of language, but also linguistics and (human) semiotics has provided comprehen-
sive information about human language use and its rule-governed, sign-mediated
interactions.
The specific human capacity for language and communication enabled mankind’s devel-
opment along a culturally derived pathway. „Despite many imaginative studies, the origin
of man’s language ability remains a mystery. Fossil remains also fail to provide any clues,
although language was probably the decisive factor in accelerating human evolution“
(WASHBURN, 1978).
Brainpower enabled mankind to develop what we refer to as language (reason, con-
sciousness, abstract thought) and to evolve a normative (moral) value system (which is no
doubt in part also culturally determined) through coordinated action and associational
activity. This value system is not inherited biologically, but rather reproduced or passed
on from the older to the younger generation of a social and cultural community through
spoken and written tradition as well as by role model.
In the case of eating habits, for example, this gave rise to culturally quite diverse cus-
toms. Some cultural communities are exclusively vegetarian, while others eat great quan-
tities of meat; in short, what some consider to be a delicacy is strictly rejected by others
(e.g., pork).
Approximately 5000 different languages are currently recognized. They represent
evolved cutural traditions and tailored lifestyles that humans - as social creatures - have
differentiated. Each of these cultural communities has a unique approach to maintainin its
cultural traditions. Our social life pits religous, ritual, and mythological moral values and
norms against the universalized, modern values of the techno-scientific, „enlightened“
society.  What makes us unique is our level of interorganismic communication; precisely
our ability to reflect upon this clearly reveals that language and communication serve not
173
only to perceive and regulate the structure and organization of social life, but especially
also to change, expand, and transform it.
Interorganismic communication in humans encompasses everything we needs in order to
formulate mankind’s understanding of itself.
c) Metaorganismic communication
When communicating with individuals of other species, humans operate within the
framework of a culturally predetermined set of values. They use technical means to sub-
jugate non-human nature, utilizing „natural resources“ to achieve predefined short-,
medium-, and long-term objectives. We are the only creatures to direct our exploitative
interest to members of virtually every kingdom of organisms (prokaryotes/bacteria:
sewage treatment plants, pharmaceutics, etc.; protoctists: medicaments; animals: meat
productiom; fungi: antibiotic cultures, bread baking, cheese production, beer brewing;
plants: plant cultures).
Since mankind’s development is strongly oriented according to cultural values and norms,
human reason should be applied to consider the consequences of our actions, for example
on the future generations of all biological species. The rampant increase in potential tech-
nical threats endangers the very existence of living nature and calls for actively exercising
our ability to reason. Massive and potentially irreversible impacts on the complementary
interactions and functions between and within the various kingdoms endanger both the cul-
tural and biological reproductive ability of the human species as a whole.
No other threat in Earth’s history has ever endangered the overall biosphere as much as
our technological and scientific activities. Mankind must therefore solve the crisis it has
riggered by (a) altering its cultural values and norms and (b) altering those activities and
agendas based on antiquated concepts. Should such a coordinated response lag too far
behind the problem-solving imperative, then the adage that „humans are the crown jewel
of evolution“ may well be reversed to read „humans are the bane of evolution“.
8.2.4. The interrelationship of communication forms. The adaptation of Nicolai 
Hartmann’s theory of levels in the philosophy of language sense
The formulation of 6 communication forms is an approach that allows all organisms to be
arranged into natural phylogenetic groups - expanded by the human element - and allows
these biological groups to be characterized with regard to the 3 types of communication
inherent in all life forms. 
The following outline presentation of biological systematics (as expanded in the lan-
guage-philosophical sense) is per definition programmatic in character and does not pur-
port to exhaustively categorize the actual, real commmunication processes in the respec-
tive phyla, orders, classes, families, genera, and species in the various kingdoms. Such a
presentation should be entrusted to the individual scientific disciplines and their highly
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specialized methodologies, for example biolinguistics and the biosemiotic disciplines
envisioned above; these disciplines would then constructively integrate their contribu-
tions into a „theory of communicative nature“.
The representation of the six communication forms of nature, along with its reference to
the evolutionary aspect, drew attention to the fact that, at the dawn of life, a relatively
simple form of communication sufficed to give rise to a wealth of microscopic life forms;
the differentiation of all subsequent organisms produced increasingly complex communi-
cation forms, all having a complementary relationship with one another.
From an evolutionary standpoint, the history of living nature is therefore a development
from simple to complex forms of communication, from simple to complex organisms, yet
without destroying or replacing those simpler forms. The evolution of new biological
species is an extremely complex event not only for the new organisms themselves, but
also for the extant species forced to adjust or adapt to the presence of the new forms, i.e.,
to develop and optimize rules of communication.
Ever since Aristotle’s time, natural philosophy has striven to categorize observable differ-
ences. The result was a string of concepts that might be termed theories of levels. One of
the latest versions is that forwarded by Nicolai Hartmann and brought up to the scientific
standards of the late 1950s (HARTMANN, 1964).
He distinguishes 4 levels of being, the material, the vital, the psychic, and the mental, and
determined the characteristic features of each of these levels. This concept is part of a philo-
sophical ontology. I do not wish to go into this ontology and its associated problems in more
detail here and will not structure my conception of the communication forms in nature
around an ontological theorem. Nonetheless, Hartmann’s blueprint characterized the interre-
lationships between his levels through so-called theory of levels („Schichtenlehre“). In my
opinion, Hartmann’s  „laws“ offer - on a provisional basis - an absolutely useful orientation
in determining the relationship of the communication forms to one another. I would like to
begin by briefly summarizing Hartmann’s Schichtengesetze and examine whether they are
suitable - within the framework of a philosophy of biology that is oriented according to lin-
guistic pragmatics - to determine the interrelationships of the communication forms:
1) Law of autonomy: According to Hartmann, each layer of being is autonomously struc-
tured and the genesis of this autonomy cannot be fully derived from the next lower level.
The spiritual realm is therefore autonomous from the psychic realm, the psychic realm
from the vital, and the vital from the inorganic realm. In Hartmann’s opinion, this does
not necessarily mean that the mental realm lacks psychic elements, the psychological
realm vital elements, and the vital realm inorganic elements; rather, it emphasizes that
each of these layers features inherent laws that can be found here and only here.
Hartmann recognizes two subordinate laws in the framework of this law of autonomy:
1a) Law of novelty: In each higher layer, features appear which are lacking in the next
lower layer. These features represent a novelty - something new compared with the  lower
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layer. Such new elements are neither a logical consequence in the development from the
lower to higher layer nor can they be fully derived from the former.
1b) The law of modified, recurrent features: The laws of the lower layer reappear in the
higher layer (never vice versa; semicompatibility), but in a modified manner. Specifically,
the laws of the lower are structurally and functionally integrated into the higher. For
example, the laws of the inorganic layer re-occur in the vital layer, but under the organi-
zational principles of the vital layer, i.e., in a constellation unknown at the inorganic layer.
2. Law of dominance: The laws specific to a layer do not merely govern that layer. Within
the overall organism, every higher layer acts on all layers below it, without dismantling or
negating them. Humans, for example, possess a vegetative nervous system whose func-
tion is largely independent of mental activity. This mental activity, however, can influence
the psychic state and, by destabilizing it, have an effect on the vegetative nervous system
(similar to auto-suggestive techniques).
3. Law of dependence: Each higher layer is neither poised above, nor determined by the
lower ones, although a certain dependence does exist. The mental layer functions on the
basis of the psychic, this on the vital, and the vital in turn on inorganic substances. In the
case of comatose patients, the vital layer and the vital organization of the inorganic mat-
ter comprising the body continues to function, but the psychic and mental is eliminated.
4. Law of distance: Due to the new, defining quality of a layer of being, Hartmann recog-
nizes a „metaphysical discontinuity“ rather than actual transitions between the layers.
While advocates of approaches based on the continuity theory have always postulated
such transitions, no actual transitions have been found or convincingly reconstructed in
the field of paleontology. According to Hartmann, nature progresses in discrete steps.
Independent of Hartmann’s ontological theory  of levels (Schichtenlehre), my thesis is
that these laws of layers are applicable as structural features of the six forms of commu-
nication. Here, they do not define ontological laws, but fundamental, formal-pragmatic
rules governing the interrelationship of the communication forms; these rules are consti-
tuted by communicating individuals that produce these communication forms using the 3
communication types. Using sign-mediated communication, nature evolves from simple
to complex, complementary life forms; in doing so, it produces such fundamental formal-
pragmatic rules. The linguistic and communicative structure and organization of nature
are the very factors that enabled the differentiation of ever more complex kingdoms
whose interrelationships reveal such underlying rules.
Hartmann’s theory of layers (Schichtenlehre), in its adaptation to a philosophy of lan-
guage, is not only useful in determining the interrelationships between the communica-
tion forms in nature. It can also serve to describe cultural evolution and human self-
understanding - a point that I believe deserves mention here. Thus, clear analogies to
progress in scientific knowledge, e.g., to „the structure of scientific revolutions“ can be
discerned (KUHN, 1970).
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At this point I wish to briefly outline the semicompatible relationship between the com-
munication forms in nature. This draws attention to the fact that a linguistically and com-
municatively structured and organized living nature had to develop fundamental formal-
pragmatic rules for its own differentiation; this is the only strategy capable of preventing
more highly evolved features from being dismantled while at the same time enabling the
abilities acquired in one kingdom to be effective in more highly developed kingdoms as
well. 
Ilya Prigogine adamantly pointed out how decisive this irreversibility in the differentia-
tion of biological processes is (PRIGOGINE, 1980; PRIGOGINE & STENGERS, 1984).
On the other hand, the insight that this irreversibility is the consequence of producing and
adhering to such fundamental formal-pragmatic rules is an inherently language-philo-
sophical hypothesis.
8.3. Delimiting the communication forms from one another
In the following, I categorize - in outline form - living nature from the perspective of the
6 fundamental forms of communication; the goal is to more closely define the interrela-
tionships between these bauplan types, which modern taxonomy recognizes as the
expression of genetically fixed units termed kingdoms.
Each individual of every biological species can be viewed as the expression of a geneti-
cally defined bauplan. As demonstrated in earlier chapters, this expression is the result of
complex intra- and intercellular communication processes. Six fundamental types of such
intraorganismic communication processes have evolved in the history of living nature;
according to my thesis, their relationship with one another is semicompatible.
Even though all forms of life are more or less closely related to one another from the evolu-
tionary standpoint, the individual kingdoms are differentiated by unmistakable features with
no common denominator. Each kingdom has given rise to truly new forms (including
humans as an independent communication form) that do not gradually build upon and cannot
be defined exclusively by existing forms. Thus, the advent of prokaryotes, whose defining
feature is the nucleic acid language, does not represent a gradual development of randomly
strung together amino acids and protein components. Equally, the origin of eukaryotes was
an original and truly novel event in living nature: it reflects a type of intra- and intercellular
communication lying beyond the capabilities of prokaryotes. The development of the animal,
fungal, plant kingdoms and, ultimately, of humans, also represents something truly new in
living nature, something that other kingdoms lack in this shape and form.
At the same time, each newly developed kingdom contains organization forms and struc-
tures of the kingdom (I) from which it arose. Furthermore, all kingdoms are subject to
determinants anchored in laws of nature governing the prebiotic level. In certain respects,
all kingdoms are also (II) dependent upon interactions with others: thus, plants for
example provide an optimal habitat for many other organisms, while at the same time
being highly dependent upon protoctists, bacteria, fungi, and animals (above all insects).
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This „recycling“ of the organizational and structural features of „lower“ kingdoms is not
what defines a particular kingdom. Rather, their novel element (III) dominates their form
and function. The organizational and structural features of each less complex kingdom
can be found in the more advanced kingdoms it gave rise to, (IV) never vice versa: the
kingdom-specific structural and organizational features are precisely those that are not
found in the lower one. This defines the semicompatibility of the communication forms:
each more highly developed or autonomous form of communication can incorporate fea-
tures of the lower ones, but the lower never dominates features of the higher one.
Ultimately, human beings are the only creatures capable of using all non-human commu-
nication forms in a technically compatible manner - a feat no member of any other king-
dom can duplicate. The result, despite the great variety of communication forms, is an
unbridgeable (V) gap between the various kingdoms and the human race. Transitional
forms in the true sense are also missing.
All organisms can be clearly arranged into one kingdom or the other. Even in the step
from our closest predecessors to modern humans, all conceivable transitional forms have
become extinct, leaving no mixed or ancestral forms. The result: a human race which dif-
fers distinctly from animals. Ultimately, the most common denominator of all life forms
is the nucleic acid language. The variations described below merely document the incred-
ibly varied forms of „expression“ that this language gave rise to. The differentiation
itself, however, called for concrete communication processes between real, interacting
individuals.
8.3.1. Precommunicative interaction level
Interactions between inorganic compounds are generally described by physical and
chemical „natural laws“. These so-called laws govern the inherent properties of bonds
and building blocks at the subatomic, atomic, and molecular level and define such prop-
erties in the form of conservation theorems of physics, for example the law of conserva-
tion of energy, of momentum, or of angular momentum.
This level of rules governing the interaction of inorganic matter (to name only the most
important ones) includes the law of gravity, the second law of thermodynamics (entropy
increases constantly), the general and special theory of relativity, electrodynamics, and
optics. In a broader sense, this level encompasses every law that helps describe those
physical-chemical processes whose rule-governed interactions do not involve the molec-
ular genetic code (as the organizational form of biological self-reproduction).
Natural laws are explanatory models with statistical character, i.e., with the character of
probability. They themselves are not what moves the world, but are merely rules that
humans attempt to extract from their observation of events, specifically in an interpreta-
tional process.
Even today, the quantum theory ranks as the most important natural law ever advanced by
science. Interestingly, the physicist R. Ebert pointed out an analogy between the quantum
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theory and language comprehension. This was summarized as follows by Hermann
Krings: „The assumption of a complementarity in the properties of quanta, the non-objec-
tification of elementary particles, the restriction of precise conclusions to probabilities
(rather than determinability), and the meaning of information indicate that our under-
standing of elementary natural phenomena shows analogies to comprehension in the
realm of language“ (In: KRINGS, 1982, p. 388).
The precommunicative interaction level was formed by a wealth of subatomic, atomic,
and molecular structures and dynamic processes; these constituted specific molecular
compounds that the earliest life forms were able to use to structure their own bodies as
well as to develop their survival and reproductive strategies.
In my opinion, the border between the animate and inanimate, between the random
arrangement of nucleic acids or amino acids and the functions of a self-reproducing pro-
tein individual, lies in the difference between non-communicative and communicative
organization. The inorganic level produced macromolecules and all the nucleic acids,
amino acids, and polypeptides necessary to constitute living organisms, but did not itself
give rise to the first life forms.
There is no seamless transition between the pre-grammatic (and thus fundamentally
pre-semantic) laws governing the combination of molecular structures on the one
hand, and pragmatically interacting, self-organizing protein individuals (much less liv-
ing cells) on the other hand.
While the self-organization of these protein individuals is, in fact, subject to such pre-
grammatic and pre-semantic laws, the proteins transpose the laws into a grammatic and
semantic dimension that would be principally inaccessible if protein individuals did not
exist. Real organisms are a prerequisite for the language of nature to actually become lan-
guage.
Scientists from various disciplines, for example evolutionary theory, biochemistry, and
molecular biology, are busy probing the divide between the animate and inanimate; their
approach involves a definitional convergence in the way we interpret what still belongs to
the prebiotic and what already belongs to the biotic realm.
One such definitional approach was the proposal to already designate the formation of
polypeptides or the molecular structures of amino acids and nucleic acids as life (EIGEN
et al., 1981, p. 78 f.). In this case, the artificial polypeptides as well as amino acids and
nucleic acids that have been produced in experiments would have served as proof that life
can be created artificially. However, such „building blocks of life“ clearly lack the typical
features of even the simplest life forms.
As envisioned in my concept, the successful (i.e., reproducible) use of a simple form of
nucleic acid language distinguishes life from non-living matter.
This language is a prerequisite for sign-mediated communication processes in the molec-
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ular realm - processes which are passed on (in the form of rule-governed interactions)
when a cell divides into two and can enable the ongoing reproduction of the first individ-
ual in the descendents. The behavioral coordination and association between the simplest
organisms - based on sign-mediated communication processes - only superficially resem-
bles other interaction forms such as the inorganic differentiation of crystals („mineral
associations“; SCHOPF, 1978); in fact, these two processes are fundamentally different.
8.3.2. Communicative levels of interaction 
8.3.2.1. The Prokaryotes (bacteria)
1. Law of autonomy: The simplest and oldest life forms from the evolutionary standpoint,
the prokaryotes, have structural, organizational, and coordinational features that are miss-
ing in the precommunicative level.
1a) Law of novelty: Prokaryotes possess a genetic text in which the bauplan as well as the
execution of the bauplan and the functions of the unicellular organism are anchored. The
structure of the nucleic acid language alphabet underlies the same rules that also govern
the constitution of all other organisms. Bacteria carry out metabolic activities and repro-
duce. The energy fueling this metabolism stems from their ability to carry out chemo- or
photosynthesis. Further characters include a cell membrane, a cell wall, and a DNA
nucleoid.
“A living cell has two decisive abilities: it can metabolize and it can reproduce. From the
short-term perspective it survives by rearranging the atoms and substances it takes up,
giving rise to molecules that it needs for its vital functions. In the long-term, it survives by
reproducing itself and giving rise to descendants with biochemical capabilities identical
to its own“ (DICKERSON, 1978). 
All these features, packaged in this organizational form, are missing at the precommu-
nicative interaction level. This organizational form was introduced into prokaryote com-
munication by the nucleic acid language (which is nonexistent as a language at the pre-
communicative level).
1b) Law of modified, recurrent features: All rules of the inorganic level are also valid in
the realm of prokaryotes. They are integrated into this level, with all prokaryote commu-
nication processes relying on the laws of the precommunicative level. The production of
the various protein species is subject to the chemical and, above all, the physical laws
governing molecular bonds. Every communication process follows the path of the least
energy consumption and the least resistance („golden compromise“). Thus, the way in
which various protein structures are produced in no way contradicts the electrical forces
underlying the structure of molecules and their interrelationships.
2. Law of dominance: The communication types of prokaryotes do more than merely reg-
ulate biological processes. The use of sign-mediated communication processes funda-
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mentally alters the structure of biological versus inorganic processes. The former are
therefore newly combined (in accordance with the laws of the precommunicative interac-
tion level) through the organizational form of the simplest unicells; they are integrated in
an organizational process that would never have been possible without such laws.
3. Law of dependence: While the communication form of prokaryotes fundamentally
transcends the bounds of the precommunicative interaction level (through the introduc-
tion of the nucleic acid language alone), the prokaryotes could not have arisen and devel-
oped without the precommunicative interaction level. The full range of molecular struc-
tures and the various types of bonds between them provide the basis for the origin and
subsequent optimal growth of prokaryotes.
4. Law of distance: There is an unbridgeable gap between the precommunicative inter-
action level and the prokaryotic communication form, i.e., that between the animate and
the inanimate. Viruses, which are generally not classified as living organisms (MAR-
GULIS & SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 14 f.) and which can even crystallize if their habitat
dries out, reproduce exclusively in host organisms. They employ different strategies for
their reproduction, all of which function on the basis of the nucleic acid language. Based
on this fact, viruses are probably later differentiations of (very simple) predecessors of
bacteria: if viruses need a host organism, how could they have reproduced themselves - as
a transitional form from the non-living to the living - at a time when host organisms most
certainly were not present?
8.3.2.2. The Protoctists
1. Law of autonomy: In the field of biological research, the evolutionary step from the
prokaryotes to the eukaryotes is considered to be the most significant advance in living
nature. This transition from anucleate to nucleate cells does, in fact, represent a differen-
tiation and development that provided the basis for the evolution of all more complex
organisms.
1a) Law of novelty: The first eukaryotic forms, the protoctists, are characterized by cellu-
lar respiration and a more complex inter- and metaorganismic communication than the
prokaryotes would ever  have been capable of. While the metabolic diversity and thus the
intraorganismic communication in prokaryotes is more varied, protoctist specializations
go far beyond prokaryote capabilities. New protoctist features include the development of
a true cell nucleus and the differentiation of microtubuli, which serve as the cell’s energy-
exploiting and storage structures.
1b) Law of modified, recurrent freatures: The first eukaryotes no doubt developed from
the prokaryotes and possess numerous features that can also be found in the latter (nucle-
ic acid language, cell membrane, behavioral coordination, formation of associations). On
the other hand, eukaryotes possess true chromosomes, a true nucleus with its own mem-
brane sheath, and more complex forms of behavioral coordination and association (see
plasmodial slime mould example, MARGULIS/SCHWARTZ, 1988, p. 133)).
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2. Law of dominance: The radiation of eukaryotic microorganisms and their relatives, the
protoctists, replaces neither the structural and organizational features adopted from the
prokaryotes, nor the prokaryotes themselves. Within the eukaryotic level of organization,
however, the typical eukaryotic interorganismic communication dominates, and the
prokaryotic features are clearly overridden.
3. Law of dependence: The life histories of eukaryotic and prokaryotic microorganisms
are not mutually exclusive, even though the differentiations of protoctists far exceed those
of the prokaryotes as far as the complexity of their abilities is concerned: the global suc-
cess of protoctists would not have been possible without the ubiquitous presence of
prokaryotes. These served and continue to serve as food for protoctists: the latter could
never have survived without the former.
4. Law of distance: No transitions exist between prokaryotes and protoctists. Unicellular
organisms can be divided into those having and those lacking a true nucleus, those with or
without cell respiration, and those with true chromosomes or with genophores, which dif-
fer distinctly from chromosomes. The communication form of protoctists is a truly novel
entity, an independent kingdom.
8.3.2.3. The Animals
1. Law of autonomy: From an evolutionary standpoint, the animal kingdom most closely
followed upon the protoctists; it clearly arose from the protoctists. This kingdom is char-
acterized by a broad spectrum of organizational types and by a number of very large life
forms. Both intra- and especially interorganismic communication have reached their most
complex level of differentiation here.
1a) Law of novelty: All animals are multicellular organisms that have developed by the
fusion of an egg and a sperm cell. Only animals possess a hollow, tubular digestive sys-
tem. Intercellular communication in animals is by far the most complex in all kingdoms;
it finds no equal elsewhere. This communication enabled the development of species-spe-
cific cell associations, i.e., organs. These, in turn, have differentiated an interorgan com-
munication unique to this kingdom, one guaranteeing that even rather large individuals
function optimally. A prerequisite for developing such specific animal organs was the cre-
ation of the three tissue layers typical for this kingdom. Another innovation in the animal
kingdom involves nerve cells and brain tissue: this initiated entirely new and much more
rapid communication processes that were a precondition for highly efficient, coordinated
movement in larger organisms. 
The differentiation of highly complex behaviors in behavioral sequences, which can take
on sign character within species-specific life-worlds (Lebenswelten), is the rule in the
animal kingdom. The range spans from the use of simple signals to the constitution of
signs with symbol function. Even the ability to transcend purely parasitic and symbiotic,
metaorganismic communication - up to and including early forms of ritual behavior - is
the norm in the realm of more highly evolved animal species.
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None of these characters can be encountered in the preceding developmental levels. The
animal kingdom is a discrete, new evolutionary stage.
1b) Law of modified, recurrent freatures: Animals also possess a nucleic acid language
and a eukaryotic lineage; they also coordinate their behavior with conspecifics in a com-
monly shared environment and form associations.
2. Law of dominance: All prokaryotic and protoctist communication processes, which are
also present in animals, are subordinated to the communicative features that distinguish
the animal kingdom from others, i.e., that characterize its novelty.
3. Law of dependence: The animal kingdom and its key communicative features would
never have arisen without the prior developments at the prokaryote and protoctist levels.
Furthermore, the animal kingdom could not survive today without the existence of lower
kingdoms of organisms. For example, the digestive process in animals cannot function
without bacteria. Despite a communicatory ability that by far exceeds that of lower king-
doms, animals still depend on symbiotic, metaorganismic communication with prokary-
otes and protoctists.
4. Law of distance: No transition forms exist between protoctists and the animal king-
dom. A differentiation between the two is principally possible since animals possess com-
municative features missing from in the protoctists (e.g., brain lobes).
8.3.2.4. The Fungi
1. Law of autonomy: Fungi appeared after animals and before plants. They are character-
ized by communicative features missing in all other kingdoms. Fungi absorb dissolved
food.
1a) Law of novelty: Although fungi also stem from protoctists, their communicative dif-
ferentiations in the realm of feeding and reproduction differ fundamentally from those of
all other kingdoms. The mycelial life form is truly a novel feature that protoctists were
never able to develop either geno- or phenotypically.
1b) Law of modified, recurrent features: Certain communicative features in the fungi are
also present in the protoctist kingdom, especially in the realm of food uptake. 
2. Law of dominance: The feeding mechanisms that fungi share with the protoctists are
subject to the intraorganismic communication specific to fungi; this includes mycelium
formation as an intraorganismically coordinated form of association and also includes the
interorganismic fungal communication involved in reproduction via the fusion of hyphae.
3. Law of dependence: As was the case in animals, fungi could never have arisen without
earlier protoctist development. While fungi differ fundamentally from both protoctists
and animals, the prokaryotes and protoctists provided the communicative cornerstone
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upon which the fungi were able to develop by creating new genetic texts. As opposed to the
animals and plants, symbioses between fungi and prokaryotes and protoctists are less vital.
4. Law of distance: There are no true transitional forms between protoctists and fungi.
Certain candidates in the literature are merely the result of poorly differentiated descrip-
tive processes by individual biologists. For example, a number of scientific disciplines
continue to designate certain species of protoctists as fungi, even though they completely
lack a key character of the fungal kingdom, namely the multicellular, eukaryotic commu-
nication form.
8.3.2.5. The Plants
Law of autonomy: The most recent kingdom is that of the plants. It stems from protoc-
tists, specifically from the green algae. It was the strong radiation of plants that provided
the trophic basis for the differentiation of higher forms of animal life.
1a) Law of novelty: As opposed to all other kingdoms, plants possess chloroplasts with
which they produce organic building blocks and food from sunlight and inorganic carbon.
Their great diversity of forms characterizes Earth’s landmasses and fundamentally distin-
guishes this kingdom from all others. Plants play a decisive role in structuring specific
habitats. Plants also form unique and highly complex metaorganismic communication
links with fungi and animals (especially insects).
1b) Law of modified, recurrent features: More than most other organisms, plants adhere
strictly to precommunicative interaction rules in developing their diversity of shapes and
forms („golden compromise“). Plants have cell walls and DNA as do prokaryotes, and
nuclei as do protoctists. Nevertheless, they differ fundamentally from these predecessors:
they are multicellular and all of them pass through a developmental stage that involves an
embryo.
2. Law of dominance: The communication processes and communication form inherent
to plants build upon the communicative features of earlier kingdoms. Typical plant fea-
tures (a cell wall consisting of cellulose) enable the differentiation of communication
types that distinctively orient and restructure all the adopted ancestral forms to fit typical
plant communication forms, expanding them by a dimension specific to plants.
3. Law of dependence: By their nature, plants provide an optimal habitat for other organ-
isms; at  the same time, they are highly dependent on the functional ability and function-
al diversity of lower kingdoms as well as of the fungi and animals (insects). This depend-
ence is rooted above all in the realm of metaorganismic communication.
4. Law of distance: Although plants clearly arose from protoctist green algae, the plant
kingdom is fundamentally different from all remaining kingdoms. Close transitional
stages no doubt existed between protoctist algae and the first plants. Nonetheless, plants
form embryos in the course of their development and are multicellular, features that are
beyond the capabilities of protoctists.
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8.3.3. The human communication level
1. Law of autonomy: While humans have descended from the animal kingdom, we have
grounds to believe that both our past and current development has taken us in a direction
that clearly sets us apart from ancestral forms.
1a) Law of novelty: Humans have developed forms of interaction unknown in the animal
kingdom. We use the probably most complex of all languages along with conceptual
thought and foresighted actions even over lengthier time spans. In short, we are dealing
with a culturally determined genesis of norms that biological considerations often fail
to explain. Humans are set apart in the choice of means with which they pursue their
goals, and they also reflect and confer on the process. For example, we can choose
between actions designed to communicate and those that merely serve a strategic pur-
pose. Humans can converse with one another and discuss that very conversation, i.e., they
can effortlessly switch back and forth between a formalized artificial language and their
ultimate metalanguage, colloquial speech (Umgangssprache).
In their cultural differentiation of religions, humans have developed a broad spectrum of
norms to govern their actions. Ultimately, humans can be described as beings that are
anchored in their instincts but have the gift of reason. Art and craftsmanship are typical
human abilities. As opposed to all other organisms, mankind makes every other form of
non-human communication technically compatible. A range of communicative traits that
cannot be derived from animal behavior appears in humans. The use of reason (a typically
human trait), along with the different types of rationality that have been developed by the
various cultural groups, cannot be found in any other kingdom and represent a true novelty.
1b) Law of modified, recurrent features : Humans continue to follow their (reduced)
instincts, and those behavioral habits that have not been consciously planned and execut-
ed can relatively easily be traced to our close relatives in the animal kingdom.
Psychological reactions such as aggression, fear, grief, pleasure, and numerous social
behavior patterns can be found in slightly modified form in primates. Early forms of
human social structures, such as those exhibited by hunter-gatherers, have been exten-
sively documented in chimpanzees (GHIGLIERI, 1985; SMITH, 1978).
2. Law of dominance: Every type of behavior that we have inherited from primates has
been integrated into behavioral contexts embedded in the cultural norms of culturally
defined communities. Cultural norms are norms that have no biological/genetic basis.
Rather, mankind imposes them on itself: it formulates them linguistically, generates
them, and then adheres to them. The novel element in humans - their typical competence
in language and communication - largely determines the structure of social interactions.
3. Law of dependence: Humans would never have developed without the development of
primates. In unfolding our unique human quality, we are constantly confronted with relict
primate instincts. Despite having developed the highest form of linguistic and commu-
nicative competence of all living beings, we rely much more heavily on the existence and
complementary functions of other kingdoms than vice versa. Our survival without living,
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non-human nature would be doubtful; converesely, the only effect that our extinction
would have on nature is that 1000 species less would become extinct every year due to
human activity.
4. Law of distance: There are no true transitional forms between primates and humans.
Even the interpretation of archeological finds and their comparative analysis has failed to
reveal a „missing link“. Definitional shifts have been introduced in order to circumvent
this inconsistency in continuity theory, specifically regarding the timepoint at which a
find can be interpreted as being typical for the genus Homo: again, this merely involves
definition changes. In fact, there is an unbridgeable difference between the communica-
tion form of primates and that of humans.
8.4. Using the semicompatibility of nature’s communication forms to systematically
define kingdom-specific, sign-mediated communication processes
Arranging phylogenetically related groups of organisms into kingdoms represents a form
of scientific systematization. Equally, systematizing the relationships among nature’s
communication forms also represents an orienting, programmatic endeavor, one that is
necessary for detailed investigation of nature as a linguistically and communicatively
structured entity .
The explication of the semicompatible communication forms of nature will serve to high-
light the most important steps taken in the evolution of life as far as the creation of
genetic texts is concerned (genotypic or molecular semiotics level); it will be equally in
highlighting new kingdoms. In fact, each organism differs from all others through its
characteristic individuality. Even organisms with the same genetic complement (so-called
clones) are not identical to one another. For example, the layout of the finest vein net-
works in animals is determined by pragmatic, physiological rules rather than the genetic
text. 
Inasmuch as all organisms are members of a shared social environment and have an inter-
linked social history based on their phylogeny, reproduction, and species-specific interac-
tions, they share rules pertaining to the three communication types. These rules define
and govern behavior. This enviro-centric perspective and this focus on the life forms of
biological species (especially as it pertains to members of one and the same biological
species) leads to a systematization within the communication forms of nature. 
Communication forms represent systematizations of evolutionarily variously expressed
genetic potentials, none of which can be reduced to any other form, each being charac-
terized by key, new structural and organizational features that are absent in the other
kingdoms.
The repertoire of signs and the rules of sign usage are only compatible (with regard to the
three communication types that accompany organisms throughout their lives) insofar as
the organisms belong to one and the same biological species. The compatibility of com-
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munication types of a biological species can even be used as a measure of phylogenetic
affinity on the species level. Honeybees served as our example: Karl v. Frisch’s compara-
tive investigation into the rules governing sign use in Austrian and Italian honeybees
revealed habitat-specific and life-form-specific deviations. In this case the rules could
(abetted by breeding and acclimatization) be regarded as being compatible, while sign
use in bees from the southern hemisphere (signs with analog, indicative character) versus
the northern hemisphere (movements as signs with symbol character) appears to be much
less compatible.
Comparing biological species that belong to different kingdoms (based on phylogenetic
group, origins, evolutionary history, etc.), inevitably reveals the semicompatibility of the
6 communication forms of nature.
Thus, many biological species exhibit similar group-dynamic behavior types, for example
closing ranks when threatened. Even if sign-mediated communication coordinates this
specific behavior in all these species, the result (closing ranks) is often achieved with an
entirely different repertoire of signs and a different set of rules governing sign use. Under
certain circumstances, humans may also move closer together when threatened. This
reaction in humans that are under attack (as a defensive strategy) may resemble the reac-
tion of elephants, for example. On the other hand, criticism leveled at a cognitive
approach may cause the research team that developed and applied the criticized method
to form a tight argumentative front (argumentative defense strategy), which would cer-
tainly never occur in elephants.
Humans, applying their language and communication skills, are therefore in a position to
observe and describe the comunication forms of all biological species; in some cases we
can even decipher the sign repertoires of a species and identify - as rules - the rules gov-
erning sign use.
In observing every facet of living nature, mankind can determine the fundamental, uni-
versal-pragmatic rules underlying all forms of communication. We are able to apply
these rules, modify them, and employ these modified versions. Furthermore, we are able
to develop, construct, and apply artefacts that artificially achieve the desired effect or a
result much in the same way as a natural communication form would.
Our ability to apply this observational talent in order to produce aesthetic reason merely
adds another feature to our definition of typical human traits, traits that were nonexistent
prior to the origin of mankind.
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Fig. 36  Types and forms of communication in living nature
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9. The origin of novel entities in living nature:
Evolution as generative linguistic behavior
The chapters on intraorganismic communication demonstrated that no organism could
differentiate without intra- and intercellular communication, whether it be the differentia-
tion from DNA (genotype) to the final form (phenotype), the temporal sequence of the
individual developmental stages, or the physiological organization of all bodily functions
and movements in the course of this differentiation.
The chapter on communication disturbances showed how sensitively intraorganismic
communication reacts to even the slightest deviations from the rules; at the same time,
this type of communication can correct communication disturbances or even prevent
them from occurring (immune response). 
The basis for this type of communication, which allows a wide range of phenotypes to be
differentiated from a wide range of genotypes, is the language of nature, i.e., the nucleic
acid language. It finds use in all organisms and involves a uniform repertoire of signs.
The communication types, i.e., intra-, inter-, and metaorganismic communication, are the
same in every organism. No organism can extract itself entirely from these communica-
tion types over its full lifespan, although these communication types differ considerably
from communication form to communication form.
The bee language example underlined that - beyond this universal language of nature
(genotypic level) - numerous other languages exist in nature (phenotypic level). It also
demonstrated that phenotypes communicate species-specifically, whereby the commu-
nicative aspect is more accessible to the human observer on the phenotypic level: Karl v.
Frisch was awarded the Nobel prize in 1973 for detailing the bee language.
The fruitful interdisciplinary cooperation between sociobiology and semiotics (at the
present time chiefly zoosemiotics) is evidence that the sign-mediated communication
processes that individuals use to coordinate their behavior and to enter into associations
are present in every biological species. We can also assume that humans are by no means
unique in having a language and being able to communicate, even though our language
and its application differs quite distinctly from the sign-mediated communication of our
closest biological relatives.
In all these cases we are justified in using the terms language, languages, and communi-
cation, even though - species specifically - the languages and their usage differ dramati-
cally from one another grammatically, semantically, and pragmatically. While Manfred
Eigen no doubt suspected this, his explanatory model too narrowly defined the language
and communication concept from the philosophy of language perspective.
Systematizing the key differences in the various kingdoms of organisms with regard to
the 3 communication types defined  6 (fundamental) form-types of communication which
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have a semicompatible relationship with one another. The briefly outlined, programmatic
determination of the evolutionary novelty of each kingdom was designed to clearly dif-
ferentiate these kingdoms into evolutionary levels in which the kingdom-specific novelty
is missing and those in which it is present.
At best, we humans can hope to achieve a full „understanding“ of our own language (in
the sense of absolute transparency of what is meant or not meant by a linguistic utter-
ance). Even here, we must refer back to the cultural tradition that shapes the respective
language and to a series of situative contexts. The species-specific interaction contexts of
non-human organisms are principally inaccessible to us as humans, and the physical
framework of these contexts is fundamental for the actual constitution of linguistic signs
by real sign users. Therefore, our understanding of non-human languages will be restrict-
ed to comparative analyses of sign-mediated communication processes, to the study of the
rules governing sign use, and to the technical exploitation of individual non-human com-
munication processes. The chapter on the bee language was meant to show that we can in
fact understand languages in nature, albeit only to a limited extent.
On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly likely that we will eventually understand
the universal language of nature. The rapid progress in he field of genetic engineering is
the best evidence for this. Comparative analyses of genetic text sequences in quite differ-
ent life forms are now standard procedure. Such sequence analyses were primarily
designed to decode semantic/pragmatic rules. Nevertheless, it will take a number of years
before the configuration of proteins and, above all, the rules underlying these configura-
tions can be fully decoded.
9.1. Sign-mediated communication as an apriori for evolution
For some time, the many theories that explain the evolution of biological diversity within
the 5 kingdoms of organisms, beginning from one or more primal cells, have relied on the
terms mutation and selection. Specifically, changes in the genetic code due to environ-
mental factors (radiation, chemical substances, etc.) and chance alter the genetic bauplan.
This gives rise to new individuals that differ from their ancestors not only in a species
character but, in extreme cases, even in their membership in one of the 5 kingdoms.
„Since the amino acid sequences in proteins ultimately determine an organism’s appear-
ance and behavior, from the molecular standpoint its evolution is merely the substitution
of one amino acid by another. Understanding the chemical nature of genes also allows us
to explain the occurrence of mutations: A mutation is an error in the sequence of
nucleotide bases in the DNA. Such an error is often limited to an incorrectly inserted
nucleotide base in a codon (point mutation). This can cause one amino acid to be replaced
by another („missense mutation“(...)). Those point mutations that transform an amino
acid codon into a „stop“ codon are termed nonsense mutations. Still other mutations can
lead to the insertion or elimination of a nucleotide from the DNA molecule. Under certain
circumstances, such mutations may alter the entire framework in which the nucleotide
base sequence is read; this effect is typically the result of several missense or nonsense
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mutations. When such mutations occur in the DNA of germ cells, they are passed on to
the next generation. The variation that gives rise to evolution may involve not only modi-
fied gene structure, but also changes in the number and organization of genes. DNA seg-
ments can replicate themselves or become lost. Gene replication is useful in evolution
because the newly added DNA segment can take on new tasks without one of the old
genes having to give up its function. Mutations occur at random, i.e., their potential use-
fulness has no influence on their frequency“ (AYALA, 1978).
The actual survival potential of a newly evolved organism determines whether its newly
acquired abilities and skills are more (or less) advantageous than those of its immediate
predecessors. Should the fitness of the organism that has newly evolved via mutation(s)
be higher, then its probability of producing more viable future generations also increases.
Teleological lines of argumentation can also be found in the theory of evolution:
„The evolution of birds, for example, which stem from reptiles, is marked by a stepwise
transformation of the bones, muscles, and skin of the reptile forelimb, leading to a wing
(...). The sternum increased in size and enabled the attachment of flight muscles. A gen-
eral restructuring of the bones yielded a light yet strong skeleton. The development of
feathers proved to be aerodynamically advantageous while providing a lightweight body
cover. This, however, did not mark the end of the process. 
After adaptation to an airborne mode of life, several birds reversed the process: pinguins
became adapted to life in the water by modifying their wings into paddles and providing
their feathers with a water-repellent film“ (LEWONTIN, 1978).
The qualitative differences and innovative phenomena that evolution yields have been
explained by the enormous quantity of random mutations over unimaginably long time
periods. Selective pressure then sorts out the less useful individuals from the total number
of viable mutations (alleles). „Scientists have been able to show that it is entirely possible
to explain the origin of obvious discontinuities such as new species and new types, or of
innovations like bird wings and lungs, via a step-wise evolution process“ (MAYR, 1978).
Geological history is long enough to effect the selection of the more viable forms.
My thesis is based on the assumption that new life forms do not represent advantageous
(albeit random) mutations in a field of innumerable disadvantageous ones, with the for-
mer asserting themselves in the fight for survival, but rather that new life forms are the
result of advantageous versus less advantageous generative sign processes in the realm
of the genetic text.
Clearly, text-processing enzyme proteins are unable to foresee the prospective level of fit-
ness. Such an interpretation may be intimated by the occasionally anthropomorphic use
of language in molecular biology („restriction enzymes that recognize interrupted palin-
dromes“; WATSON, 1992). In fact, the expression „recognize“ is useful here only in the
metaphoric sense. The enzyme proteins are, however, competent in the realm of efficient
text processing: in producing an enormous amount of generative sign processes, they can
also give rise to processes that are more advantageous than others in the fight for survival.
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My assumption does not direct itself against the explanatory model of the „survival of the
fittest“, but rather only against the assumption that random mutations are sufficient to
explain the evolution of new organisms.
Environmentally induced or chance changes in the genetic text may plausibly explain
evolution on the subspecies level. In the case of the evolution of a new species or even a
new kingdom (for example the step from unicells without true nucleus to unicells with
true nucleus), this explanatory model is no longer sufficient. Paleontological research
indicates that new kingdoms arise discontinuously rather than continuously via innumer-
able small changes in existing members of an antecedent kingdom. At least this is the
interpretation suggested by the paucity of transitional forms in the fossil material.
Rather than yielding better or otherwise fitter specimens of a species, the overwhelming
majority of all mutations observed to date are degenerative or lethal. Thus, the differenti-
ation of new, functional kingdoms and their subgroups is highly improbable.
My premise, therefore, is that viable representatives of a new kingdom or of its subgroups
are the result of generative, sign-mediated text processing by competent enzyme proteins.
These proteins are more likely to be successful in combining existing text sequences into
completely new ones, in synthesizing new ones, and in inserting them into the existing
text in such a manner that, as new characters, they can re-orient and restructure the exist-
ing old ones. I am by no means implying methodological activity by enzyme proteins, but
merely their competence in the realm of genetic text processing and in the realm of both
regulative and generative sign usage.
According to my thesis, the evolution of entirely new species, or even more so of king-
doms, can be interpreted as the differentiation, transformation, change, or expansion of
extant genetic texts by enzyme proteins competent in text processing. In addition to spon-
taneous text generation, communication processes on the intra-, inter-, or metaorganismic
communication level may fuel evolutive text processing: the experiences constituted here
can be identified, in the form of stimulatory patterns (f.e. stress situations), as having text-
processing relevance by enzyme proteins.
„More important was the recognition that behavioral changes are often, perhaps exclu-
sively, the motor behind evolution. The selection of a new habitat or the exploitation of a
new food item create selection pressures and can trigger important adaptational pulses.
There can be little doubt that some of the most important events in the history of life have
been set into motion by behavioral changes, among them conquering the land and the
skys“ (MAYR, 1978).
Contrary to Manfred Eigen’s assumption, the origin of new kingdoms and biological
species, along with the origin of life itself, is a problem relevant to molecular semiotics,
not merely to molecular semantics. Genetic texts do not arise through degenerative
changes or defects in the grammer/semantics of the genetic code. Rather, they arise
through text generation (insofar as they are highly coordinated, which is clearly the case
192
in novel life forms, e.g., the sudden appearance of an astounding species diversity in the
Cambrian); such text generation also underlies pragmatic rules. This no doubt explains
why natural evolution is so successful. Since three levels of evolution can be distin-
guished, confirmation for my thesis can be sought by investigating these three levels.
9.2. Molecular evolution
The evolution of all organisms in every kingdom represents a molecular evolution as well.
New life forms originated by constituting new genetic text sequences or even entirely new
genes. The guiding principle here is: no new biological species without new constitution
and/or new combination of genetic text sequences. According to my thesis, this constitu-
tion or production of new genetic text sequences is carried out by enzyme proteins com-
petent in text processing. Such enzyme proteins were found to be present whenever suc-
cessful text processing occurred. In the molecular realm, they are the actual sign-users of
the nucleic acid language.
„DNA polymerases have such effective methods of proof-reading and error elimi-nation
that they yield stable strand lengths consisting of millions of nucleotides“ (EIGEN et al.,
1981).
They react to stimulatory patterns of a neuronal and/or hormonal nature that - on the
intraorganismic level - represent specific experiences of the overall organism; under cer-
tain circumstances they can use their text-processing competence to code these patterns
into the nucleic acid language (WILSON, 1985).
Two types of text processing can be distinguished. The great majority involve regulative
and constative procedures, i.e., those responsible for normal reproductive processes and
error-free reading of texts; they stabilize the normal intraorganismic functions of the
overall organism. The second type involves text-processing procedures that are subject to
a certain „rule-changing creativity“. In my opinion, this ability is a more plausible basis
for evolution than explanations involving chance „mutations“; the latter are inextricably
mired with preconceptions from continuity theory that are inadequate to explain discon-
tinuous origins (for example the abrupt biodiversity of the Cambrium; compare also
LEVINTON, 1992).
According to my thesis, genetic texts within a genome of an individual of a species in a
particular kingdom are expanded and recombined such that the offspring of this individ-
ual represent a new species (i.e., they stem from the germ line of a member of an extant
species). While the novel organism has biological ancestors, it represents a new biologi-
cal species that differs from its immediate parental individuals and bears characters lack-
ing in the old species.
The fact that such genetic, text-generative processes can also be triggered by inter- or
metaorganismic phenomena changes nothing in our assumption that enzyme proteins
carry out this text processing. 
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Since no transitional fossil forms exist between the various kingdoms, and the new com-
munication forms appear abruptly, we can assume that enzyme proteins use the language
of nature to expand and fundamentally transcend existing rules of language usage. My
thesis therefore states that evolutionary history is basically the history of the acquisi-
tion of text-processing competence by enzyme proteins. The origin of the language of
nature probably marked the onset of this history. Restriction enzymes probably represent
the most competent lineage of enzyme proteins with text-processing competence.
9.2.1. The macromolecular basis of bioevolution
The mid-1980s were characterized by a controversy sparked by the poor fit between the
research results of macromolecular chemistry and the chemical phenomena that neodar-
winistically oriented evolutionary theorists used to support their arguments. Over the last
few decades, macromolecular chemistry has devoted enormous energy to investigating
the reactions in macromolecule genesis and synthesis. This field has a very precise under-
standing of the conditions and laws governing macromolecule formation (and DNA is a
macromolecule) and therefore criticizes that the proponents of current evolutionary theo-
ries largely ignore these prerequisites in their explanatory attempts and models.
In turn, evolutionary theorists argue that the proponents of such a critical macromolecular
chemistry cannot simply transpose the synthesis reactions in their laboratory findings
(regardless of how well they are confirmed) to the biological realm of natural evolution.
An impartial evaluation of this controversy yields insights whose importance should not
be underestimated or neglected: from the vantage point of the present contribution, these
insights address whether living nature is structured and organized in a linguistic and com-
municative manner.
Examining the evolution of life from primitive bacteria to humans without omitting any
known intermediate stage reveals, in the macromolecular realm (particularly in the
DNA), progressively longer DNA chains. In other words, the complexity of the genetic
text sequences increases. The DNA of a modern bacterium is about 1 millimeter long.
This corresponds to several thousand genes or several million nucleotides. The DNA of a
modern mammal has a length of nearly a meter, corresponding to 2 million genes
(VOLLMERT, 1985, p. 111) and (in the case of humans) to 3 billion base pairs.
In order to more clearly define the macromolecular basis of evolution, it is instructive to
concentrate on this DNA chain growth. I expressly wish to exclude the question of the ori-
gin of life from these considerations. Bioevolution is the only relevant topic in the present
framework, i.e., that phase of evolution that followed the first living cell. The focus of the
present contribution is not the origin of life, but rather whether living nature is organized
and structured in a linguistic and communicative manner.
It should be reiterated here that this evolutive elongation of DNA is a historical process
that cannot be experimentally reproduced adlibitum by scientific methodology.
Researchers in the field of macromolecular chemistry agree that mutations can never
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account for the origin of species and, ultimately, of the 5 kingdoms of organisms or 6
communication forms of nature: mutations change existing sequences of the genetic text
but cannot be called upon to explain DNA elongation or the addition of new genes (and
their inclusion into the genome) (ibid. p. 113).
If one interprets the origin of species in Darwin’s sense as a form of self-organization, then
the origin of new genes or genetic text sequences involves, from the macromolecular point of
view, a so-called statistical polycondensation (ibid.). This is considered to be one of the best-
studied synthesis reactions. What, however, distinguishes mutation from polycondensation?
9.2.2.  The difference between mutation and polycondensation
Chance and environmental factors (radiation, chemical substances, etc.) determine how
mutations change parts of the genetic bauplan of an organism´s genome. Gene replica-
tions are also not chain elongations in the strict sense because they do not  lead to new
features and in no way alter or otherwise influence the function of  the original genome.
Polycondensation, however, refers to the process by which DNA elongates itself through
attachment of new genes, whereby the sequence of the original genome initially remains
unchanged. Although we know that  such chain-elongating processes exist,we can only
guess at how they work. For the present purpose, it is irrelevant whether this involves the
addition of single nucleotide building blocks to the original chain, the insertion of entire
genes, or some other mechanism. The decisive factor is that the development of truly
novel organisms required the formation of many new genes with new genetic text
sequences and thus new information.
Clearly, the development of new genes (in the case of mammal evolution, for example)
does not itself represent an evolutive process in the development of a new species. After
all, each gene is only effective in a particular context, in a particular evolutionary situa-
tion and in combination with specific enzymes. These very situations determine whether
a particular new gene, protein or enzyme was already capable of cooperating with other
genes in that situation. In other words, within a pragmatic evolutionary situation, in which
the organism was involved, a gene happened to fit into the existing framework of the
overall genetic text sequence. This was followed by the next gene, etc., all in a very spe-
cific sequence (ibid. 1985, p. 116 f).
Within an evolutive situation, new genes that became attached to the existing DNA chain
and assumed a function had to cooperate with those that were already present. Otherwise,
the development of a new species would not have led to a higher step in evolution. This
merely highlights one problem area in the framework of the actual evolutionary process.
Another consideration is the fact that one new gene in a cell has virtually no effect. As a
rule, at least 10 enzymes are necessary for the synthesis of a single, new, physiologically
active substance. The production of such substances involves a number of intermediate
stages, each of which - in the correct sequence - requires its own enzyme for the appro-
priate chemical reaction. In the genetic text, however, each enzyme corresponds to a sepa-
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rate gene. The various synthesis stages form interconnected series and cycles, resulting in
a spatial and temporal dependence of the reactions. A single reaction, or one cycle without
the succession of the others, is inconsequential for the total cycle and useless for the cell. 
Consequently, in the development of a new cycle leading to a possible new enzyme (which
itself is part of an entire series of enzymes which could constitute a new gene), the new
cycle remains irrelevant and without effect until it is entirely functional, i.e., until it is
constitutive for the structure of the genetic text of the genome. 
In addition, the numerous intermediate products in the biosynthesis of physiologically
active substances are mere intermediate products and themselves have no significance in
changing the feature: only the end product is part of a character- changing cycle. Such
changes in features typically manifest themselves only after cycles of 30 to 50 enzymes
are appended.      
Mutations represent interventions on already established genetic texts. They often lead to
conspicuous alterations of features which, in the sense of Darwin´s survival of the fittest,
inevitably lead to selection. Selection in the case of polycondensation, i.e., in the growth
of DNA chains, however, is not possible because the addition of new genes remains with-
out consequence for the organism until these new genes  express new features. After all,
the addition of new genes does not change the function of established genes or the life of
the cell. Since those new genes, arising from or being attached by a polycondensation,
find no expression, there is no test situation to determine whether that new gene happens
to be adequate and whether it can  enter a cooperative relationship with other, established
genes. No selection can take place in polycondensation processes. The development of
new organisms with new features is therefore not the product of a new gene: a single new
gene cannot create a new substance, much less a new feature. New species require a great
number of new genes. This great number of new genes, however, cannot arise from muta-
tions (changes) of already available genes.
New genes first manifest themselves when their effect leads to the formation of many new
substances which actually alter the phenotype. Only at this time, and no earlier, is the
organism bearing the new features subject to selection. It requires the development of a
harmonious sequence of genes to provide the cell with that protein sequence which, as
enzymes, enable a cooperative, stepwise reaction sequence (including intermediate
stages) leading to new characters.
These intermediate steps themselves are of little value in explaining the origin of new
species, for example in considering the evolutionary pathway from reptiles to birds: all
the intermediate levels have to be tested on land, whereas the complete bird can first be
tested in the air. Intermediate steps that are „not quite yet“ a bird would have only little
selective advantage on the ground (if not a disadvantage, because an animal that is „no
longer a reptile“ can hardly escape selection pressure)(ibid. p. 126). 
The entire sequence of substance modification in the evolutionary process from one
species to the next (along with the corresponding DNA chain growth) had to take place
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without selection. The development of new species had to be preceded  by  the develop-
ment of new genes, in an orderly fashion and in a specific sequence of becoming opera-
tive. This required a large number of new substances, each of which necessitated a syn-
thesis of five to twenty steps. This, in turn, required the repeated occurrence of a
thoroughly improbable event (p. 128 f.)
Mutants, i.e., organisms having undergone changes on the established gene complement,
are in fact subject to selection; this clearly leads to a stronger adaptation to the environ-
ment. This, in turn, inevitably leads to the stabilization of a species, not, however, to the
complex process of DNA chain growth (with all its repercussions) that is responsible for
the origin of new species. Under the perspective of macromolecular chemistry, the
process called upon by evolutionary theorists to explain the higher development of
species (revolutionary-evolutive phase) is actually not responsible for this advanced
development, but rather for the stabilization of a species that has newly arisen (normal-
evolutive phase).
Although I will not discuss the origin of new genes here, the process may well involve an
„illegitimate crossing over“ such as that in meiotic cell division; in any case, enzyme pro-
teins competent in text processing, such as polymerases or ligases, will play a role.
One factor is decisive in the framework of the present topic: from the perspective of
macromolecular chemistry, the origin of new species, especially those that represent a
new kingdom (i.e., something fundamentally novel) cannot proceed via mutation and
selection as envisioned by Neo-Darwinism. These processes can function to stabilize a
species, but not to generate a text.
For every new kingdom, Vollmert assumes an average increase of 10 000 genes in the
length of the DNA. 
„The probability that statistic (i.e., chance) chain growth is responsible for the transition
from one of these evolutionary levels to the next higher one is on the average 10 -40 000. 
Even if one assumes 20 intermediate stages between such levels (of which not a single
one has been found), then the probability per level would still be very low, namely (...)
10 -2000. 
The fact that the whole universe consists of something on the order of only 10 80 atoms
gives an impression of the improbability of such a chain of events“ (ibid. p. 130). 
The assumption that most genes in a genome are redundant (or „silent“) is irrelevant for
our considerations: no one knows precisely how many genes are actually redundant or
that merely appear redundant based on the current status of research.
There are currently no satisfactory explanations for this problem. To date, all models
based on the terms mutation and selection have been unable to provide a satisfactory
answer to the likelihood and mechanism of macromolecular, coordinated DNA chain
growth. Vollmert doubts whether this question can be solved at all using scientific meth-
ods (which rely on reproducable experiments). My intention therefore is to develop some-
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thing along the lines of a hypothesis based on a language-pragmatically oriented philoso-
phy of biology; this should provide a better understanding of the problem than traditional
approaches.
9.2.3. DNA chain growth
9.2.3.1.  DNA chain growth through text-generative genes and enzymes? 
From the vantage point of a language-pragmatic oriented philosophy of biology, the
process of DNA chain growth  is, in all its complexity, the result of enzyme proteins or
enzyme groups exhibiting a text-editing type of competence; this complexity involves not
only growth, but also the coordinated incorporation into the established genome. To date,
such enzyme proteins have only been demonstrated in the areas of productive, regulative,
and constative communication processes of the intra- and intercellular type. These com-
munication processes correspond with the three known and  differentiated code types:
protein code, regulatory code, structure code.
In gene manipulation, certain enzymes are used for the text separation and insertion
processes. They are known to be able to identify insertion sequences as such and are
therefore competent in text splicing or, more broadly, text editing.  Enzymes operating in
this text-generating manner, i.e., which effect DNA chain growth along  with the coordi-
nated intermediate stages so as to give rise to a truly new form of life, have yet to be
demonstrated.  
This may perhaps be due to their being detectable only in a revolutionary-evolutive phase,
during the development of a new species; thereafter they may disappear or remain behind
as gene wrecks after mutations, something we would refer to as useless „junk DNA“.
This would come as no surprise, since the development of a true new species is not a daily
event but rather a historical process occurring during certain times in earth history and
leading to the differentiation of five different organismic kingdoms (or six communica-
tion forms in living nature).  Let us assume the presence of such text-generating enzyme
proteins capable not only of extending available texts, but also of constituting new genes
(I) and inserting them with numerous other enzymes (II) via numerous intermediate
stages (III) at the right place (IV) and right time (V) in the proper sequence (VI).  Then,
we necessarily require genes that are capable of coding these enzyme proteins.  
My hypothesis (Witzany 1993 b) is based on the assumption that specific text-generating
genes must be or must have been present. Within the context of specific, pragmatic interac-
tions which organisms experience, these genes are made available for reading and initiate
the production process of such gene-constituting enzyme proteins competent in text editing.  
Under this aspect it is irrelevant how many generations are required to realize this text
generating process. The text-generating-process is largely independent of selective
processes since no effect on the phenotype and the function of the established genome
occurs up until the corresponding gene sequence is created and inserted into the genome.
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The genetic text creation appears rather suddenly; the resulting organisms of a new
species are (and must be) fully functional, since they are subject to immediate selective
processes after their actual conception.
When a new species (or in extreme cases a new species representing a new organis-mic
kingdom)  enters evolutionary history, this text-generating, text-creative process ceases to
function, and the reading of the text-generating genes is interrupted. This is probably due
to a further special enzyme or enzyme group which stops the expression of the text-gen-
erating genes. Perhaps the production of special gene-constituting or text-generating
enzyme proteins is interrupted when the new genes constituting the new organism are
incorporated or successfully integrated into the genome. At this point a truly new organ-
ism has entered history.  
Only at this juncture do mutation and selection again become important and lead to phe-
notype changes which themselves immediately underlie selective pressure. The stabiliza-
tion phase of a new species can begin. At this point the revolutionary-evolutive phase is
completed and the normal-evolutive phase, which merely serves to improve the proto-
type, is initiated.  In this sense, successful evolutionary processes constitute themselves
through the complementarity of revolutionary- and normal-evolutive phases.
This hypothesis renders several developments understandable: the process of DNA chain
growth in the higher evolutionary development of species and the differentiation of vari-
ous  organismic kingdoms (I), the sudden appearance of new species (II), and the lack of
numerous intermediate stages (III). It also affords an explanation for the absence of
numerous „not-quite-yet“ life forms. In  explanatory attempts based on continuity theory,
such forms should be present in large numbers, but are de facto lacking.
This would also explain the fact that a variety of different prototypes appear whenever a
new species arises, but that only a few are successful. Thus, few rather than many of the
numerous prototypes survive up to the present. For example, we know today that all fos-
sil predecessors of humans - from Homo habilis to Neandertals - in fact represent extinct
prototypes of humans; the branch which gave rise to modern man developed rather
abruptly and without discernible predecessors  approximately 200 000 years ago in
southwest Africa (BUCHER, 1992). 
Notwithstanding the development of the first living cell with functional DNA, the first his-
torically reconstructable revolutionary-evolutive phase is the jump from unicellular organ-
isms without to those with a true nucleus. According to my hypothesis, one or more text-
generating genes must have already been at work in this evolutionary hyper-event. The
origin of such text-generating genes might be sought in the realm of associative processes
of the anucleate unicells giving rise to the basic form of unicells with true nucleus.
Perhaps the so-called junk DNA, i.e., DNA segments to which no particular function or
significance can be attributed, represent evolutionary relicts from a revolutionary-evolu-
tive phase. They may have been destroyed by mutation or rendered inactive in the course
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of the normal-evolutive phase; since the text-generative gene or genes were already
switched off, they were also no longer repaired. After the new species was established,
any repair here became superfluous.
Since the genetic text is complementary yet consists of quite different substructures (pro-
tein code, regulatory code, structure code), one can assume that a comparable innovation
code (which could also be termed as text-generating code, evolution code or creation
code) exists or once existed. No information is available on its substantive structure
because to date no such code has even been postulated. Perhaps it deviates significantly
from conventional, known codes or is subject to completely different rules of expression.
Since its expression involves historically singular events and is not arbitrarily reproduca-
ble, it could have long since disappeared again (with the exeption of remnants) from the
established genome:most of the biological species that appeared during evolutionary his-
tory are already extinct. Today we are witnessing the tail end of biodiversity in Earth’s
history. Perhaps this innovation code lies concealed in those DNA structures that make no
sense to us based on traditional assumptions?
These considerations are admittedly rather speculative. The hypothesis that text-genera-
tive genes and enzymes must exist is definitely worthy of being tested in the context of
the present contribution and would certainly avoid overburdening the terms „mutation“
and „selection“. There is no reason why this hypothesis should not conform with the cri-
teria of macromolecular chemistry.
Ultimately, the task of any hypothesis is to better explain those observations that tradi-
tional approaches have failed to explain satisfactorily, and at the same time to open up
new, innovative arenas of research.
9.2.3.2. Are structured biological languages potentially present
in noncoding DNA sequences ?
The present study makes frequent mention of enzyme proteins that are competent in text
processing, i.e. that precisely identify the splice sites in the genetic text, that cleave these
sites, and that then join together the modified sections (WATSON, 1992, p. 153-171).
Even though such enzyme proteins are the actual sign users in intraorganismic and, above
all, in intracellular communication, one should always bear in mind that genes code for
all known enzyme proteins. The assumption that enzymes are even able to determine the
sequence of amino acids in polypeptide chains inevitably leads to a never ending succes-
sion of sequence- identifying enzymes and enzyme-identifying enzymes (anthropomor-
phically designated as „sequence-recognizing“ enzymes in molecular biology and genet-
ics). J.D.Watson took a similar view:
„Although enzymes completely determine the specificity of the chemical reactions
between small molecules, there is no way that they  can be used to determine the order of
amino acids in the thousands of different proteins that every cell possesses. An average-
sized polypeptide chain contains several hundred amino acids arranged in a unique irreg-
ular sequence. If the ordering of the amino acids in such a chain were carried out by
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enzymes, there would have to be an enormous number of these enzymes, each capable  of
recognizing a large number of contiguous amino acids. In turn, each of these hypothetical
„amino-acid-sequence-recognizing enzymes“ would have to be put together by its own
set of different „sequence-recognizing“ enzymes, and so forth. This type of scheme obvi-
ously cannot work, and we are led to the inescapable conclusion that cells must contain
specific „information bearing“ molecules, analogous perhaps to the molds of the sculptor
or to the master plates of the lithographer. Such molecules must encode the ordering
information so that it can be used to select the correct amino acids in the course of
polypeptide synthesis. These information-bearing molecules, moreover, must somehow
also be able to synthesize new copies of themselves, so that when a growing cell splits
into two daughter cells, each of the progeny cells possesses copies of the master molds (or
templates).“ (WATSON, 1992, p. 6)
Watson himself believes that the chromosomes are these information-bearing molecules:
„We shall in fact soon show that chromosomes contain the information that is used to
determine the order of amino acids in cellular proteins.“ (ibid)  
Is it thinkable that there are other components which could determine this order of amino
acids? 
How can this problem be solved? On the one hand we know that enzyme proteins are
competent in processing genetic texts and that they are defined by genes.  On the other
hand, genes that order polypeptide chains would have had to be present since the origin of
life. Which genes might these have been? Where and how have they  been coded?
One solution may be to assume genetic codes that are not contained in conventional (pro-
tein-, structural-, and regulatory-) codes. Where might such codes be found? How might
they be structured?  And, above all, how can they become effective if not via the known
pathways of gene expression? How might they have been read?
A team of researchers from Boston University and Harvard University subjected a series
of coding and non-coding DNA sequences to linguistic tests  (PENG et al. 1993;
BULDYREV et al. 1993 a; BULDYREV et al. 1993 b; PENG et al. 1994; OSSADNIK et
al. 1994; MANTEGNA et al. 1994; BULDYREV et al. 1995). The results showed that
ordering principles are present even in the non-coding DNA and, furthermore, that these
principles were not much different from those of the coding DNA. While coding DNA  is
predominantly short-range correlated, the order in non-coding DNA is largely deter-
mined by long-range correlations. The above tests revealed that non-coding DNA more
closely resembles colloquial speech, while the structure of coding DNA (which codes for
a particular protein) more closely resembles that of formalizable scientific languages. But
this characterization is a methaphorical one. The unexpected résumé of this research is as
follows:
„These results are consistent with the possible existence of one (or more than one) structured bio-
logical language(s) present in non-coding DNA sequences“ (MANTEGNA et al. 1994, p. 3172).
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A more detailed investigation of which „structured biological language(s) are present in
non-coding DNA sequences“, how they might be read, and whether they may harbor the
postulated innovation code (or perhaps merely ordering principles that can assemble and
activate an innovation code in the known code types, i.e. in the form of a „meta-code“) is
an interesting task and would need to be treated in a separate contribution.
9.2.3.3. The explanation of DNA chain growth  through 
Serial Endosymbiosis Theory (SET)?
The Serial Endysymbiosis Theory (SET) of Lynn Margulis (MARGULIS, 1998) offers a
very interesting possibility to explain DNA chain growth. This theory was rejected for a
long time by  molecular biologists and Neo-Darwinistic evolutionary theoreticists, but  is
nowadays discussed  seriously; her arguments are fascinating because  the SET can
explain numerous of phenomena like the revolutionary evolutive phase from  the unicel-
lular organisms without a nucleus to those with a true nucleus as an associating process
between some unicellular organisms. 
This process must nonetheless have been characterized by very complex, dynamic, sign-
mediated interactions that were successful in encoding their associating efforts. Some
parts of this new DNA text must code for a membrane which establishes a metabolic
world for an individual organism. Prior to this DNA chain growth and the establishment
of a membrane, it is imaginable that the association processes between these unicellular
organisms, i.e. kinds of  bacteria, were historically developed ones within the whole
world of individuals-interacting-in-populations.This means, a long-lasting developmen-
tal history of sign-mediated, rule-governed interactions between these kinds of bacteria
and a long-lasting history of optimizing these interactional quasi-metabolistic processes. 
The revolutionary evolutive phase arose when the associating processes had to change the
rules: not further interacting between individuals-interacting-in-populations, but association
within a new world of metabolism within a membrane with a true nucleus and the crucial
development of encoding this newly developed interaction. This revolutionary evolutive
step (and therefore one of the first processes of DNA growth) is thus the result of rule-
changing creativity in the sign- mediated interactions between bacteria. And these bacteria
had been different microorganisms with a different history and very different competences. 
It is fair to say that revolutionary evolutive processes in the transition stage from unicel-
lular organisms without to those with true nucleus are likely not the result of an innova-
tion code, or creation code which leads to DNA sequences of a new species, but the real
lifeworld (Lebenswelt) of individuals-interacting-in -populations which change their
rules of interaction. And this change is encoded in DNA structure (e.g. through gene
rearrangement or innovation/creation code expressed enzymes). The theory of an innova-
tion code is more likely for encoding sign-mediated interactional processes. 
The result was the very revolutionary evolutive process which has been the presupposi-
tion for  the revolutionary evolutive phases to  create the further organismic kingdoms
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Animalia, Plantae and Fungi. I will not reconstruct the development of the SET theory
here, but there are strong reasons to prefer this theory, which  I tried to enrich  here with
the communication theory I developed in this book: To explain the evolution of unicellu-
lar organisms without to  those with true nucleus through a theory of association is one
aspect. To explain how this association has been developed  as a historical process of indi-
viduals-interacting -in-population is the other aspect.  
9.2.4. Back to Lamarckism ? 
or: forward to new concepts of development and evolution
9.2.4.1. „Intelligent“ alteration of and retroaction on the genetic material?
For traditional molecular biologists these speculations on alteration and lengthening of
DNA sequences or even coding enzymes which use stimulatory patterns or similar cod-
ing-relevant molecular features of the phenotype (e.g. stress situations) as a blueprint are
no doubt unjustifiable and mere nonsense. Such speculations contradict the long-
entrenched one-gene-one protein  dogma (I) and the dogma that the transfer of genetic
information is from nucleic acid to protein, never reverse (II).
Over the last decade, however, numerous investigations have yielded results which are
not understandable by using the central dogmas of molecular biology. Especially in
developmental genetics tmore and more experiences contradict the classical point of view
of molecular biology.
No doubt, the text competence of enzymes plays a key role in  explaining alterations and
evolutionary lengthening of the genetic material. „Although there is a complicated
machinery of enzymes and DNA-binding proteins capable of replicating, recombining
and manipulating DNA, and despite considerable evidence for directed mutation, there is
no hard evidence for an environmentally or somatically guided, „intelligent“ alteration of
and retroaction on the genetic material.“ (RHEINBERGER, 1999, p. 14) Nevertheless,
developmental genetics must not interpret their investigations in the light of classical
molecular biology. „If we look for meaning in the organism, we must look, not at its
genes, but at the multiple interfaces between the genome and the body“ (ibid., p. 15)
Comment on Rheinberger´s  statement  Michael Morange states „However, there are
interesting, recent results (...) which show that organisms are able to adapt their mutation
rates and to recognize their genomes in answer to the environmental conditions“ (with
reference to KELLER, 1992 and SHAPIRO, 1995).
In his own statement, Morange describes the historically important contribution of F.
Jacob and J.Monod, that the genome contains two different kinds of genes, „the structur-
al genes coding for proteins and enzymes, and the regulatory genes coding for repressors,
the only function of which was to control the activity of structural genes.“(MORANGE,
1999, p. 27). The importance of the „developmental gene concept“ is to underline the
pragmatic level of DNA information and the dependency on whose need they are used
„(...) the same functionally equivalent genes control the development of very different
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organisms which are built following different pathways and which have different plans of
organization.“(ibid., p.31 with reference to KENYON, 1994). In these investigations
Morange describes why regulatory genes formerly known as  „master“genes play an
important role in understanding development from genotype to phenotype. It is also
important that some DNA sequences govern their own transcription. „Governors govern
the governor. Regulators must be regulated by factors that are themselves both regulated
and regulators“ (GILBERT, 1999, in his comment on Morange´s statement). At this point
we should recall that some RNA molecules are able to double themselves and  to
rearrange the genetic material (so-called ribozymes). 
9.2.4.2.  Molecular pragmatism: context determines meaning 
Gilbert also recalls the context specificity: „So these developmental genes have to be both
regulators and regulatees. The things they regulate and the things that regulate them are
part of a pathway. In the end, it is not the conservation of the gene that is important, but
the conservation of these developmental pathways that include them. The use of a gene
can depend on its context. In one cell, enolase is a glycolytic enzyme, while in the lens
cell, it´s a structural crystallin. The GSK-3b gene can play a role in the Wnt pathway for
fly segmentation or frog neural axis formation, or it can help regulate glycolysis. Beta
catenin can hold cells together as part of the desmosome or it can be a developmentally
critical transcription factor (Piatigorsky and Wistow, 1991; He et al., 1995; Schneider et
al., 1996). This is to be expected from our knowledge of evolution. As Jacob (1977)
noted, nature should use what it has before inventing something new. Proteins have mul-
tiple sites. The fact that a gene can be used for different purposes within the body should
not be troubling except by those people trying to name the gene.“ (GILBERT, 1999, p. 45). 
This corroborates my contentions in chapters 4 to 7: The situational context, i.e. the prag-
matic sign-using communication process in and between cells determines the meaning,
i.e. the real processed enzyme protein and its function. Molecular pragmatism helps to
understand why this enzyme is produced and no other. 
The dogma of information flow from DNA to protein, never reverse, is  reductionistic.
Real life processes are more complex than a reductionistic point of view could explain
adequately. Today developmental genetics acknowledge that cellular development
depends not only on genetic information but also on cellular interactivities, „... complex
biochemical structures or networks constituted of proteins, RNA molecules, and metabo-
lites which often, although certainly not always, executing their tasks in interaction with
particular stretches of DNA. (Note: Executing a task means processing data provided
both by the DNA and by the products of other programs - i.e. by information given in
nucleotide sequences, chromosomal structure, gradients of proteins and RNA molecules,
the structure of protein complexes etc.)“ (KELLER, 1999, p. 56). It is the dependency of
genes on cellular context that I attempted to exemplify in chapters 4 to 7.
The working group on „Gene Concepts in Development and Evolution“ at the Max
Planck Institute for the History of Science in 1999 discussed whether the Gene Concept is
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still adequate today. Several years before, the  results of developmental genetics - espe-
cially the „posttranslational modifications“ of proteins after synthesis - led to headlines
like „Entering the Postgenome Era“ or „From Genome to Proteome: Looking at a Cell´s
Proteins“ (SCIENCE, Vol. 270, 1995, p. 368 f).
The above-mentioned working group treated special themes like the post-translational
changes in structure and the subsequent secondary effects of cytoplasmic interactions
with the polypeptide, the circumstance that eukaryotic cells can process the newly formed
messenger RNA by cutting and removing internal sections known as introns, the one
locus- multiple product dilemma and the special case of overlapping genes or alternative
splicing. These show that a new kind of explanation and understanding of life is called
for, and in my opinion interpretations ancored in  pragmatics of language may be helpful. 
If the locus is important for the meaning of the data, then the „grammar“ and the  seman-
tics deduced from it are less useful for evaluating the meaning. „If loci are contextually
dependent for structural and functional evaluation, then it is unclear how a fully realized,
or at least richly detailed, theoretical presentation would be possible using genes as an
explanatory manipulative.
Coding information acts within a co-dependent cellular setting: localized sites of expres-
sion interacting among DNA demains and contingent upon genomic composition. Here,
the term genome means more than a collective set of molecular genes of the organism; it
refers to the rich tapestry of DNA domains that weave a pattern of expression.“ (FOGLE
1999, p. 84)
9.2.4.3. The concept of „downward causation“
The results of developmental genetics are completed by new concepts of evolution. In his
article „A unified view of the gene, or how to overcome reductionism“, P.J. Beurton
(BEURTON, 1999, p. 97 f) also questions  the sense of the traditional gene concept.
Especially the „gene-in-pieces“ concept, introduced in the second half of the 1970s, made
clear the need for a new concept because „a gene may consist of a mosaic of coding and
noncoding sequences called `exons´and  ìntrons´“ and if the introns are highly repetitive
sequences they „tend to be non-coding. They then hardly fulfil the criteria necessary for
calling them genes.“ Genes-in-pieces are the rule not the exception in eukaryotes. „By the
mid 1980s the first instance was recorded of the same exon occurring in different genes
and thus coding for the same functional element in different proteins (Gilbert, 1985).
Finally, it was found that exon shuffling is a process widely distributed among verte-
brates. The important general insight was that gene shuffling through phylogeny could
explosively increase the amount of protein diversity.“ (ibid., p. 104).
The so-called „pseudogenes“are interesting as well. Do they play a role in the evolution
of new genes?  Perhaps during revolutionary-evolutive phases (chap. 9.2.2 this book) they
take up their place in genomes, where later real coding sequences must be installed, or
they mark potential insertion places. „Pseudogenes resemble active genes, but are ren-
dered nonfunctional, for instance, by mutations that affect transcription or translation.
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They arise, for instance, from unsuccessful gene duplication, either as a result of unequal
crossing over or by retroposition, that is, reverse transcription of RNA intermediates into
DNA.“ (ibid., p. 103).
No  less interesting are the so-called „overlapping genes“. „Two reading frames may
overlap so that in such area of overlap a single DNA sequence gives rise to parts of two
proteins. Instead of comprising a single gene, such a DNA sequence suddenly turns out to
stand in the services of two different genes!“ (ibid.)
Variations in the genetic material are crucial for evolutionary processes. And these varia-
tions are caused not only by DNA sequences, but also by interactions between DNA
material and the complex interactional levels in the cytoplasm. These levels in the  cyto-
plasm are no doubt influenced  by the  interaction between the environment and the whole
organism, i.e. by how the intraorganismic communication reacts to environmental influ-
ences. These very complex demands need equivalences in protein differentiations, espe-
cially during developmental stages. One equivalence may be introduced by the discovery
of „alternative splicing“. „Alternative splicing is the most dramatic discovery up to date
in the context of genes-in-pieces. Not only do genes come in pieces, but during develop-
ment alternative samples of exons from any one gene´s primary RNA transcript may be
pieced together to form a mature mRNA. A single gene, then, may yield varying assem-
blages of exons or different protein  isoforms to meet the demands of the developmental
stage in question.“(ibid., p. 105).
Beurton explains the gene-generating processes in evolution in the following manner:
Besides neutral mutations we have to propose new factors for  disintegrating and varying
genes, like the above-described ones (pseudogenes, overlapping genes, etc.).
Environmental influences on the organism and the processual molecular representation
(stimulatory patterns) are components of materializing into genes. Beurton is not alone
with his risky speculations: „For instance, unsuccessful gene duplications by retroposi-
tion have been said to `keep the genome in flux ... they can be considered a shotgun
approach of nature wherein the majority of these genetic elements are inactive and left to
rot in the genomic soil. Nevertheless, some seeds will integrate near a fertile genomic
environment giving rise ... to new genes or gene domains ...´(Brosius, 1991, p. 753). It
follows from such and similar processes that `in principle, any string of nucleotides in a
genome may be recruited as part of a novel coding region or regulatory element.´
(Brosius and Gould, 1992, p. 10708).“ (ibid, p. 109)
Beurton thus presumed correctly, that „natural selection is differential reproduction initi-
ated by individuals“. Individuals of adaptation processes, which have selectional power.
And these processes differ like the situational contexts of living beings specifically
through their individual position while they interact within a population. Beurton there
seems to find one crucial point of generating genes: „A difference in adaptive perform-
ance may then induce a hardening, or individuation, of both, the underlying genomic dif-
ference into a gene and of the adaptive difference into a trait.“(ibid., p. 110).  In this sense
it is correct to say „... the genome is, to some extent, a condensed history of what has been
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going in populations“ (ibid. 111). The interactional history in populations (i.e. also the
„sociology“ of populations) materializing into genes may happen. „Only in the context of
selective spreading of genetic material in populations does the justification arise to talk of
adaptive differences materializing into genes rather than the other way round. This hori-
zontal dimension in populations is crucial for understanding downwards causation and
how populations bring into being genes.“ (ibid., p. 112).
Beurton´s line of argumentation of  becomes increasingly. „Downward causation“ is the
model of explanation which could  successfully explain what Lamarck wanted to express,
and that for which he has been criticised  until the present day. He was unable to foresee
what developmental genetics would discover. „Downward causation“ is a hopeful trial for
thinking beyond reductionism. It opens the possibility to also introduce  the importance
of sign-mediated, rule-governed interaction in intra-, inter- and metaorganismic commu-
nication into crucial evolutionary processes by  reflecting on the history and dynamics of
populations. „My claim that genes come into being only in the context of the horizontal
dimension in populations is, in turn, equal to saying that no piece of DNA possesses in
and of itself the capacity to form a gene. A piece of DNA, being inherently chemical, may
take on the function of a gene and thus turn biological by imposition from above, that is,
by coming to qualify as a unit of selection. This is no inborn characteristic of DNA,
rather, it arises from downward causation.“(ibid., p. 113 f), and later coming to the point:
„Not only are the selective values of genes emergent properties, but the genes themselves
emerge from interactive processes in populations. Once it is possible to show that genes
are products of populations, reductionism becomes evidently emptied of all content.“
(ibid., p. 114). This point of view perhaps has the power to turn around the perspective on
evolutionary processes. „There are `last organic particles´called genes; yet there is some-
thing behind them: the whole world of individuals-interacting-in-populations. Genes are
not the product of human abstraction, but they become real in a process of material con-
densation taking place in populations of evolving organisms.“ (ibid. p. 116)
At this point we seem to have overcome both reductionsm and the classical Lamarckism.
The understanding of these interactional processes is not improved through experiments,
but this new approach can orientate many coherent ways of constructing experiments
which could improve the model. This point of view may open a new way of thinking
about evolution  which avoids the explanatory  deficits of traditional evolution theory.
9.2.4.4.  The concept of „adaptive mutation“
The „adaptive mutation“ concept of  J.A. Shapiro (SHAPIRO, 1995) is an additionally
useful approach. Here, not the blind watchmaker but „natural genetic engineering“ is
important for evolutionary change. Adaptive mutations are not directed mutations, but
they play an important overall role for mutations. „Because biochemical complexes that
act on the genome are subject to physiological regulation like all cellular functions, it is
logical that they display much more activity under certain conditions. For example, plas-
mid transfer and RecA function are regulated by cellular control circuits responding to
oxidative metabolism, DNA damage, and carbohydrate starvation.“(ibid. p. 374). Shapiro
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further concludes  „That genetic change in bacteria is often multicellular. DNA rearrange-
ments can occur in one cell and be transferred to another before a clone of  `mutant´ bac-
teria proliferates on selective medium.“ Such „altruistic mutational events“ are found not
only on the level of bacteria, but also in cells of higher organisms „and the cells of most
organisms can take up and integrate foreign DNA under certain circumstances. In stress
situations, likely to prevail at critical episodes of evolution, intercellular genetic exchange
may well be more common than we have believed.“ (ibid).
The reductionistic point of view is increasingly becoming irrelevant for explaining evolu-
tionary processes. „The discovery that cells use biochemical systems to change their
DNA in response to physiological inputs moves mutation beyond the realm of `blind´ sto-
chastic events and provides a mechanistic basis for understanding how biological require-
ments can feed back onto genome structure.“ (ibid.).
9.2.4.5.  Homeotic genes and evolution
The discovery of the homeotic genes was crucial for understanding  the dominant role of
the regulatory code for evolutionary processes. Especially the explanation of arthropos
and chordate evolution of  in the light of homeotic genes was very helpful and shows
again: the context determines the meaning, i.e. the morphological evolution of animals
strongly depends on homeotic gene expression. „Clusters of homeotic genes sculpt the
morphology of animal body plans and body parts. Different body patterns may evolve
through changes in homeotic gene number, regulation or function. Recent evidence sug-
gests that homeotic gene clusters were duplicated early in vertebrate evolution, but the
generation of arthropod and tetrapod diversity has largely involved regulatory changes in
the expression of conserved arrays of homeotic genes and the evolution of interactions
between homeotic proteins and the genes they regulate.“(CARROLL, 1995, p. 479). 
Hox genes are important constituents in the genomes of all animals. „Three remarkable
conserved features unite the Hox genes of higher animals: (1) their organization in gene
complexes, (2) their expression in discrete regions in the same relative order along the
main (A-P) body axis; and (3) their possession of a sequence of 180 base pairs (the home-
obox) encoding a DNA-binding motif (the homeodomain).“ (ibid.) Most animals have the
same array of Hox genes, and they are expressed in a relative order along the main body
axis. It was therefore clear that Hox genes „act only to demarcate relative positions in ani-
mals rather than to specify any particular structure.“(ibid.). 
The same DNA sequence has different meanings in different contexts. „Between species,
the same Hox gene can regulate the homologous segment or body region in different
ways. The key to understanding how Hox genes control morphology and diversity is
based on their action as regulatory proteins and the wide range of target genes regulated
by different Hox genes in one animal, and by the same Hox gene in different animals.“
(ibid.). The Hox genes are no instructional code type, but they are important in explaining
large-scale morphological evolution because they determine, through the upstream regu-
lators, whether changes in axial morphology as well as in limb patterns occur. „The earli-
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est tetrapod-like fossils suggest that the vertebrate hindlimb evolved first from the pelvic
fin of fish, with the forelimb evolving subsequently from the pectoral fin.“ (ibid., p. 483).
It has been postulated that there must also  be changes in the „response of Hox genes to
these regulators“. It becomes increasingly clear  that there is primacy of regulatory evolu-
tion and the strong relationship to developmental genes. „The phylogeny of Hox genes
and the many examples cited above of large-scale morphological changes associated with
diversity in Hox gene regulation and target regulation suggest that the primary genetic
mechanism enabling morphological diversity among arthropods and vertebrates is regula-
tory evolution.
The anatomical complexity of vertebrates, reflected by a larger relative number of differ-
ent cell types, may be a consequence of a greater number of developmental genes.“ (ibid.,
p. 484).
So we have strong reasons for believing that the Hox genes determine the large-scale
morphological evolution in animals and that there is a creative change of rules of the
interacting Hox gene expression and a response of the Hox gene expression to the regula-
tors which induce the expression. „How can regulatory evolution be sufficient to explain
the differences between trilobites and butterflies, or dinosaurs and sparrows? The creative
potential of regulatory evolution lies in the hierarchical and combinatorial nature of the
regulatory networks that guide the organization of body plans and the morphogenesis of
body parts. We now know that Hox genes are regulated by many upstream factors, and
that Hox proteins act as sculptors that modify the basic arthropod or chordate metamere
by modulating the expression of potentially dozens of interacting genes, the products of
which determine the cellular events of morphogenesis.“ (ibid.).
The interacting processes are undoubtedly sign-mediated, rule-governed interaction
processes which have grammatical, semantic and (context dependency) pragmatic levels.
Especially the pragmatic level decides which function should arise, i.e. which „meaning“
a product of gene expression should fulfil.The evolution of Hox genes plays a key role in
the revolutionary evolutive phases of the diversity of the animal kingdom.
9.2.4.6.  The importance of gene rearrangement in evolution
For more than 30 years, A.C. Wilson has worked on concepts of evolution stressing strong
interactional moments between chromosomal evolution and anatomical evolution. What I
have  outlined in chapter  9 - the paradigmatic  change in explaining and understanding
evolutionary processes - Wilson anticipated several decades ago. Wilson´s  team com-
pared „the relative rates of protein evolution and chromosomal evolution in frogs and
mammals. The average rate of change in chromosome number has been about 20 times
faster in mammals than in frogs. Whereas it takes only 3.5 million years, on the average,
for a pair of mammal species to develop a difference in chromosome number, the corre-
sponding period for frogs is 70 million years. In contrast, the rate of protein evolution in
mammals has been roughly equal to that in frogs. The rapid rate of gene rearrangement in
mammals parallels both their rapid anatomical evolution and their rapid evolutionary loss
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of the potential for interspecific hybridization. This, gene rearrangement may be more
important than point mutations as sources for evolutionary changes in anatomy and way
of life.“ (WILSON et al., 1974, p. 3028).
What might be the reason for such relatively rapid evolutionary  changes in the chromo-
some number of mammals versus frogs?  The protein evolution in mammals has not been
accelerated, but the „rapid chromosomal evolution in mammals parallels their rapid
anatomical evolution.“(ibid, p. 3029). „A contrast between protein evolution and chromo-
somal evolution is also evident from studies conducted by population geneticists.
Although it is rare to find cases of intraspecific variation in chromosome number, it is
now well established that populations often exhibit other types of karyotic variation, for
example inversion or translocation of small chromosomal segments.“ (ibid.).
In the early 1970s Wilson discovered the important role of gene rearrangement for regu-
latory evolution, „thus, mammals appear to have undergone both rapid regulatory evolu-
tion and rapid rearrangement of genes. This correlation may indicate that gene rearrange-
ment provides an important means of achieving new patterns of regulation.“ (ibid, p.
3030). He postulates that rearrangements of genes are more important than point muta-
tions. „It may be useful, then, to regard adaptive evolution as resulting primarily from
changes in the expression of genes relative to one another rather than from amino-acid
substitutions in the products of those genes. Adaptation is probably a complex process
requiring new interactions among many genes.“ (ibid.).
9.2.4.7.  Informational transfer from protein to DNA
Evelyn Fox Keller (KELLER, 1992) investigated the question of directed mutations. She
initially studied  a paper by Salvador Luria and Max Delbruck of 1943, who „examined
the origin of mutations rendering E.coli resistant to infection by the bacterial virus that is
now called T1 and concluded that the presence of the selective agent (in this case the
virus itself) had no influence on the emergence of these particular bacterial mutants.“
(ibid, p. 293).  Keller reported that this work was „taken as conclusive demonstration that
even bacteria (which Luria himself described as `the last stronghold of Lamarckism´)
were organized by genes subject to spontaneous mutation and hence to the conventional
process of natural selection.“(ibid.). Cairns et al. published a critical review on the
Luria/Delbruck experiment  in Nature (1988) and described their own experiments which
suggest „that bacteria may in fact be able to `choose which mutations they should pro-
duce´“(ibid.). The experiments by Cairns et al. opened the horizon for a less dogmatic
view on genetic information flow. Keller cites them „`Now almost anything seems possi-
ble. In certain systems, information freely flows back from RNA to DNA; genomic insta-
bility can be switched on under conditions of stress, and switched off when the stress is
over; and instances exist where cells are able to generate extreme variability in localized
regions of their genome´“. (ibid.).
This article produced turbulances among the community of molecular biologists. Keller
described that the article was sharply critisized, but the interesting thing was that the
Luria/Delbruck experiment was good enough to show that the Darwinian paradigma did
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not allow one to detect „`the existence of a non-random, possibly product-oriented form
of mutation´“(p. 294)
Keller clarified the different point of views on these experiments by distinguishing
between „(a) the observations, (b) the phenomenon inferred from the observations, and
(c) the mechanisms hypothesized to account for such a phenomenon as each of these
appears in the original paper by Cairns et al“(p.295). Interesting for the present  investi-
gation is Keller´s note on how  Cairns et al. interpreted  their experiments, i.e. speculat-
ing, that „`the cell could produce a highly variable set of mRNA molecules and then
reverse-transcribe the one that made the best protein.´, or, more simply, `that made it able
to grow´. For this, the cell would need `some element that somehow monitors the protein
product and determines whether the mRNA should go on being translated or should be
transcribed into DNA ... in effect´, they conclude, `provid(ing) a mechanism for the inher-
itance of acquired characteristics´“ (p. 296).
In the responses, Keller describes that of Franklin Stahl, who proposes a „trial-and-error“
mechanism. In his opinion the production of  nonspecific mutants is the result of a dis-
turbed correction system of the normal mechanisms of mismatch repair . The mechanism
is performed by „`post-replicative mismatch-correction enzymes´“ and Keller  notes cor-
rectly „The underlying question is whether one can encompass mutations that are prefer-
entially induced or stabilized in a Darwinian framework, relying solely on the language
of chance and selection, or whether it is necessary to have recourse to a Lamarckian lan-
guage of purpose and choice.“ (p. 297)
In the further discussion the terms „selective transcription“ and „preferential mutations“
were raised by other authors, but, from the view of the present theory of communicative
nature the arguments of Keller and Cairns et al. strengthen the argument that evolutionary
processes are processed by text generative enzymes. Cairns concludes: „We now know
that, in the processing of biological information, almost anything is possible. Sequences
are spliced, rearranged, cast aside, resurrected, and to a limited extent may even be invent-
ed when the need arises, and so it should not be difficult for an organism to devise a way of
testing phentotype before adopting the new genotype. It therefore seems almost perverse
to maintain, as a matter of principle, that such a mechanism has never evolved.“ (p. 298).
Keller´s historical reconstruction of this discussion shows that on the level of bacterial
evolution there are phenomena that can be explained if one supposes a flexible informa-
tion flow not only from DNA to protein, but also vice versa. Ultimately we must accept
that the dogmatism of Neo-Darwinism has failed; A reformulation of Neo-Lamarckian
positions, however, must keep in mind that the circumstances of reverse transformation
flow remain to be identified in their full complexity. We may assume that specific stimu-
latory patterns (e.g. stress) are part of such circumstances.
9.2.4.8.  Back to Lamarckism?  
We have shown that there are many efforts to explain how influences on the individuals-
interacting-in-populations are  encoded in the genomes of such  individuals and that this
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encoding processes led to higher rates of evolutionary processes. We need not return to
traditional Lamarckism, but traditional Neo Darwinistic concepts are clearly no longer
useful for explaining and understanding evolutionary processes, especially revolutionary
evolutive phases.
That these processes are structured and organized in a language-like and communicatve
manner is evident, and the discovery and investigation of sign- mediated interaction
processes in and between cells has grown enormously in the last decade. Interaction in
and between cells and organisms-in-populations cannot be described sufficiently without
semiotic terms and without language-pragmatic philosophy of biology.  If we wish to
understand rule-changing creativity in sign- mediated interactions, especially in evolu-
tionary processes, this interdisciplinary concept of life and its communicative structure is
indispensable.  
9.3. Organismic evolution
The interaction of organisms via inter- and metaorganismic sign-mediated communica-
tion processes also leads to the differentiation of specific behavior patterns; in the form of
neuronal stimulatory patterns (e.g. stress situations), these can be identified through cel-
lular control circuits as being relevant and be genetically coded by enzyme proteins com-
petent in text processing (or an ensemble of enzymes, each competent in splicing, rear-
ranging or similar  abilities). Thus, the evolutionary dynamics of certain members of a
kingdom are strongly oriented according to the brain’s capacity for intraorganismic com-
munication (WILSON, 1985).
Since neuronal stimulatory patterns in the brain can be particularly relevant for generative
genetic text-processing, the phenotypic diversity in the animal kingdom is most conspic-
uous in cases where brain size is relatively large compared with body size. Specifically,
research has shown that the average speed of anatomical evolution in mammals and
songbirds increases with relative brain size (BONNER, 1983 b; WYLES, KUNKEL &
WILSON, 1984; WILSON, 1985).
Modified behavior patterns (in response to the demands of a stimulus-rich environment)
as well as imitatory behavior can give rise to new organismic stimulatory patterns that
induce enzyme proteins to code them. For example, the ability of human adults to meta-
bolize lactose is 90% genetically fixed in peoples with a long history of dairy farming,
while it is almost entirely lacking in peoples who rarely if ever drink milk. The generative
cultural communication processes that the brain has enabled can promote organismic
evolution processes (WILSON, 1985).
9.4. Cultural evolution
Organisms with a capacity for highly complex neuronal and therefore complex interor-
ganismic communication processes can initiate cultural developments that can be passed
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on to their descendents by species-specific forms of socialization. Rather than being
genetically coded, such cultural achievements are reproduced from generation to genera-
tion in the form of culture-specific rules of behavior (which can be changed and expand-
ed as needed, or occasionally even dropped).
One of the best known and most thoroughly studied examples in non-human organisms
involves blue-tit populations in England. Some of these birds discovered that they could
gain access to the cream in milk bottles (delivered to the doorsteps of households) by
piercing the foil cap with their beaks. Within no time at all, millions of blue-tits imitated
this discovery, and in the course of a few decades this behavior successfully spread
throughout England, necessitating putting the bottles into containers (WILSON, 1985).
Cultural evolution can also be found in other members of the animal kingdom, e.g., in the
social behavior of cetaceans or elephants. These achievements go beyond metaorganis-
mic strategies such as symbiosis, parasitism, or the virtually ubiquitous attack and
defense strategies and that are passed on to descendants via specific forms of socializa-
tion. In the case of cetaceans we know that brain capacity is on par with that of humans,
even though their external habitus has differentiated along a dramatically different path.
We humans perceive ourselves to be the epitome of cultural evolution. We explain this by
our rationality and our specifically human linguistic competence and performance, all of
which enable us to determine our own development in a free and deliberate manner that
strives to conform with the respective culturally evolved rationality types. The attempt to
systematically promote cultural evolution (for example in the non-violent solution of con-
flicts in the political arena) is designed to orient the ongoing development of advanta-
geous values and norms. Human cultural evolution also occasionally requires a change,
expansion, or transformation of existing values and norms (see, for example, the dynam-
ics of theories in science). Research in the field of science history has proven beyond a
doubt that the most important steps in this evolution are discontinuous and do not arise as
induction or deduction from previously existing research material (KUHN, 1970).
As the argumentation outlined above hopes to show, the decisive evolutionary steps on
these three levels proceed via generative sign use or sign processes (semioses); using a
finite number of signs and finite number of grammatic, semantic, and pragmatic rules,
existing rules of sign use can be indefinitely expanded, altered and/or newly combined
to yield new genetic texts, new kingdoms of organisms, new forms of behavior, and new
norms of actions (in humans).
Whenever such novel blueprints help optimize the „overall fitness“ of sign processes in
intra-, inter-, and metaorganismic communication types, then the living representatives
bearing these new blueprints will have a greater reproductive success.
Cultural evolution in humans has taken on a life of its own; it has increasingly decoupled
itself from molecular and organismic evolution to the point that mankind must develop
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culturally in order to survive. Thus, the mounting irreversible damage to the very founda-
tions of our existence calls for action: there is widespread recognition that a „business as
usual“ approach to contaminants will make life for future generations impossible (POS-
NER, 1990 a).
Evolution, as briefly outlined above, is not the result of mutation and selection as has
been assumed by the biological sciences. Rather, it is the product of sign-mediated com-
munication and the selection of the produced communication forms.
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10. Nature as a norm subject
„We term `nature as productivity´ `nature as subject´“. Schelling’s statement takes on a
new perspective in the framework of the present contribution. If we focus on the realm of
living nature, then „productivity“ in our sense would mean: communication processes
carried out by communication-competent individuals in a variety of communication
media, each reflecting its own real life-world (Lebenswelt). This encompasses the realm
of intra-, inter-, and metaorganismic communication (3 types of communication) and is
set in the framework of a broad phenotypic diversity which can be systematized into six
basic, semicompatible forms of communication (Chapter 8).
Just as this semicompatibility indicates successive phylogenetic origins, it equally pro-
vides evidence for the evolution of organisms that, compared with existing forms, repre-
sent a novum. The origin of the novel entity has been explained by evolutionary theory in
the form of an exhaustively discussed explanatory model based on continuity theory. Its
central concepts are „mutation“ and „selection“.
The inevitable problems associated with the continuity theory vanish in the framework of
a „theory of communicative nature“: A characteristic feature of any language use in com-
munication processes is that a finite number of signs governed by a finite number of rules
principally enables existing rules and sign sequences to be expanded and/or changed. The
abrupt appearance of new biological species, even the semicompatibility of the six funda-
mental communication forms in nature, can be plausibly explained and understood if one
assumes that living nature is structured and organized in a communicative manner. Thirty
years of research in the field of language and communications theory has enabled us, as
humans, to ever more clearly recognize these abilities of linguistic communication in
both human and animal (compare the comprehensive research on zoosemiotics) commu-
nities.
(A similar phenomenon is evident in the field of science. In analysing epistemological
progress, the discussions of the 1970s and 1980s on science theory showed that explanato-
ry attempts based on the theory of continuity have been superceded by the recognition that
revolutionary scientific phases and knowledge are abrupt, discontinuous phenomena).
When communication processes in living nature go awry, a wide range of organisms will
suffer negative repercussions. Virtually every species will be affected because the „living
nature as a global community of communication“ is subdivided into an almost impene-
trable maze of communication links and relationships involving even the smallest specif-
ic communicating populations, each of which is anchored in the three communication
types. (The systems-theoretical metaphor „network“ may have a certain illustrative value;
on the other hand, as was demonstrated in Chapter 6 where Manfred Eigen’s language
and communication concepts were critically analyzed, systems theoretical and informa-
tion theoretical tools are fundamentally insufficient to fully back up these two terms and
justify their application to the realm of living nature.)
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As far as the three communication types are concerned, humans are also entwined in this
communicative web. Above all, the human element has introduced a new quality into
the productivity of nature: In the form of human self-consciousness, nature is in a
position to be aware of itself. This logically occurs against the interpretational backdrop
of evolved cultural traditions, each with its own genesis of unique cultural norms.
Scientific research, on the other hand, involves abstracting from this specific, culturally
determined interpretational horizon and operating according to the respective state of
objectivating knowledge.
At the same time, such scientific criteria also represent a relative evaluatory scheme that
can be changed, expanded, or even become superfluous. The pathway to scientific under-
standing of nature can serve as an example: it ranges from the metaphysical study of
nature by Greek philosophy to the crypto-metaphysical science theories of logical
empiricism and to the hermeneutic-pragmatic reflection on language as a precondition for
the possibility of intellectual reflection.
Human self-consciousness, which continues to develop linguistically and communica-
tively, has not yet attained a stage in which cultural norm genesis has institutionalized a
special consensus of norms: This point must be reached before the communicative rela-
tionship between human culture to non-human nature reaches fruitition, i.e., before the
human species not only finds successful solutions to the ecological crisis, but finds these
solutions in time and can fully implement them.
The cultural evolution this will require of humans still lies ahead. Mankind’s own fate
rests on this future achievement: if we are unable to solve the ecological crisis in time,
then we will destroy the cornerstone of our own existence. A detailed blueprint setting the
course for a sound cultural evolution goes beyond the scope of this book. Nonetheless, we
can postulate three procedural steps that offer hope for a cultural evolution of the required
scale:
a) rational definition of living nature as a norm subject 
b) genesis of norms in shaping generally acceptable political ideas 
c) institutionalizing the results of this norm genesis in the form of
internationally binding, enforceable legal norms.
It cannot be the task of the present contribution to elaborate these (potential) procedural
steps, nor is it within the scope of the book to provide a rational foundation of  living
nature as a norm subject. This is the task of ecological ethics.
However, the results of this book enable us to evaluate the communicative relationship
between humans and (living) non-human nature. Specifically, in which cases and under
which conditions do we humans behave toward non-human organisms in a communica-
tively appropriate or in a communicatively pathological manner? This recognition
could provide the basis for dialog within ecological ethics and contribute to a rational def-
inition of living nature as a norm subject.
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10.1. The communicative relationship between man and nature
10.1.1. Intraorganismic communication in humans is almost exclusively 
a natural phenomenon
As is the case in all organisms, humans are also anchored in the three communication
types of living nature. Our own evolution no doubt owes much to evolution in the realm
of our three communication types. Human intraorganismic communication, which is far
more a natural than a culturally derived phenomenon (perhaps with the exception of the
human brain), differs only minimally from that of our closest primate relatives (the DNA
in chimpanzees and humans differs by a mere 1.2%; GHIGLIERI, 1985). This is the type
of communication in which we most closely resemble our closest relatives in the animal
kingdom.
On the other hand, the complexity of the brain also represents a distinct difference bio-
logically and probably contributed considerably to the independent development of the
human race. Thus, the text-processing competence of cooperating enzyme proteins has no
doubt reached an evolutionary peak in humans („Hamilton draws our attention to the fact
that the highest degree of cooperation can, in fact, be found in colonies of genetically
identical cells such as those that shape the human body“; SMITH, 1985, p. 164).
10.1.2. Interorganismic communication in humans is largely 
a cultural phenomenon
The realm of interorganismic communication differs quite distinctly from the aforemen-
tioned case. In humans, this realm has also been the subject of the most intense scientific
inquiry. The unique capacity of humans for language and communication has enabled us
to undergo a culturally derived, linguistically mediated development. Of course, we are
still in the dark about the origins of human language (GAMKRELIDSE, 1990; ROSS,
1991; CAVALLI-SFORZA, 1991). „Despite a wealth of imaginative studies, mystery still
surrounds the origin of the human capacity for language. Fossil remains also fail to pro-
vide any clues. Yet, language was probably the decisive factor in the accelerated develop-
ment of mankind“ (WASHBURN, 1978)
Our brain enabled us to develop what we term human language, reason, consciousness,
and the capacity for abstract thought. It also gave rise to a normative awareness of values
in coordinating our actions and forming associations. Rather than being biologically
inheritable, these moral values are a cultural variant, i.e., they are passed down from the
older to the younger generation of a social and cultural community in the form of linguis-
tic-cultural tradition and a mixture of demonstrative role models and emulation.
Approximately 5000 different human languages are currently known. They represent
evolved cultural traditions and culture-specific lifestyles that the „social animal“ man has
differentiated. Each of these cultural communities fosters its cultural traditions in its own
manner. Religious, ritual, and mythological moral concepts and norms shape social and
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individual life, as does the confrontation with the universalized, modern moral concepts
associated with the techno-scientifically oriented, enlightened society.
Interorganismic communication in humans (to which we as humans have privileged
access) is uniquely suited to highlight the power of language and communication: using a
finite number of signs and finite number of rules, they not only shape and regulate the
structure and organization of individual and social life, but, above all, alter, expand, trans-
form, and even revise them. 
Our interorganismic communication enables us to formulate our empirical (I) and tran-
scendental-reflective (II) self-understanding (Selbstverständnis). 
It is precisely in the organization of social and cultural life that humans differ so distinct-
ly from analogous organizational structures in their closest biological relatives. At the
same time, this communication level has a broad cultural variability. While in earlier
times and even today there are human cultural traditions that are cosmocentric rather than
anthropocentric, others are explicitly anthropocentric, i.e., cultures in which „humans are
the measure of all things“. Even in the latter norm tradition one can differentiate (in the
framework of  political ideology, for example) an individual-based anthropocentricism
and a collective anthropocentricism.
This range of cultural norm traditions in the realm of interorganismic comunication (the
type of communication with which humans discuss their social organization in a species-
specific manner using the same or compatible repertoire of signs and rules) helps deter-
mine the norms according to which humans interact with non-human nature. These norms
belong in the realm of metaorganismic communication.
10.1.3. Cultural tradition plays an important role in orienting 
metaorganismic communication
Humans differ distinctly from their closest biological relatives on this level as well: they
are in a position to technically decipher and strategically utilize every communication
form found in living nature. Humans generally interact with other species in the frame-
work of culturally determined moral concepts.
Thus, the diet of certain cultures consists exclusively of vegetable foodstuffs, while others
eat meat as well. What some consider to be a delicacy, others strictly reject (e.g., pork,
turtle meat). In some peoples, cultural norms justify only absolute essential interventions
into the natural environment; others produce food surpluses that go to waste. 
When felling a tree or killing an animal, for example, animistic or spiritistically oriented
cultural communities often apologize or make a sacrificial offering to the „spirit“ that
„resides“ in the particular organism. In enlightened, techno-scientific society, trees and
animals are defined as commercially calculable and exploitable objects, and there is little
understanding for the normative behavioral codex of animistic or spiritistic cultural tradi-
tions. This can lead to a considerable clash of moral concepts (cutting down rain forests
or mining uranium in environments occupied by indigenous peoples).
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The above represents little more than an arbitrary slice in the spectrum of culturally deter-
mined value systems. I base my discussion of the communicative relationship between
humans and non-human nature on the norms and underlying values of contemporary, sci-
entific-technically oriented civilization. There can be no doubt that this civilization bears
the prime responsibility for the current ecological crisis, a crisis that will necessitate rapid
cultural evolution in our relationship with living nature.
10.2. Remedying the human (metaorganismic) communication pathology 
towards living nature as a necessary step in cultural evolution
Mankind uses technical means to subjugate non-human nature for its purposes and takes
advantage of „natural resources“ to realize its directed short-, medium-, and long-term
goals. We are the only life form to extend our sphere of interest to representatives of all
kingdoms (prokaryotes/bacteria: sewage plants, pharmaceutics, etc.; protoctists: medical
preparations; animals: meat production; fungi: antibiotic cultures, bread baking, cheese
making, beer brewing; plants: plant cultures).
Providing food for the 10 to 15 billion people inhabiting our planet requires clearing
gigantic areas of cultivable land. This cannot but reduce overall biological diversity and
reduce the global communication community of living nature by tens of thousands of
member species. The natural balance of mutually stabilizing communicative relation-
ships is disturbed and would have to be stabilized by strategic-technical interventions.
Failure would jeopardize the survival of the global  community of communication as a
whole. Can our human community, with its system of values, assume responsibility for
such a development? Who will actually bear the responsibility if such strategies fail?
These are the types of questions raised by an ecologically oriented ethics.
On the other hand, a „theory of communicative nature“, whose systematic details remain
to be elaborated, could help us determine the communicative relationship between
humans and non-human nature, provided that true communication is involved rather than
distorted communication in the form of a monological relationship based on cultural val-
ues and norms; deformed communication such as that appearing in the psychosomatic
realm; terminated communication, for example due to special scientific methodologies;
or - and this is probably the crux of the urgent cultural evolution needed to solve the eco-
logical crisis in time - forms of communication pathology. Such forms of pathology
must be assumed to exist in cases where the habitats of  biological species are destroyed,
casting doubt on the future of nature as a global community of communication. 
The culturally variable system of moral concepts and norms which determines the rela-
tionship between humans and non-human nature is being replaced by the universalized
values and norms of techno-scientific society, foremost by economic reason. This trans-
mits an anthropocentric relationship to nature, in which living nature is merely an
exploitable resource subject to cost-benefit analyses, to all other cultures. This colonial
cultural view must therefore be revised in the course of remedying our pathological com-
munication behavior toward non-human nature. The vehicle for this is the indispensable
cultural evolution of universally valid values and norms. Otherwise, we run the risk that
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uncoordinated, culturally varied values and norms will not only fail to rectify this patho-
logical communication, but may even exacerbate our anthropocentric relationship with
non-human nature.
To be more precise, the cultural evolution necessitated by the ecological crisis and called
upon to newly define the relationship with living (non-human) nature begins with the
internalization of systems of values and norms, systems that are capable of counteracting
- in a timely manner - the consequences of techno-scientific anthropocentrism and its
inherent communication pathology. Recognizing living (non-human) nature as a norm
subject is a way forward: as long as the various cultural traditions are willing to accept the
global environmental crisis as fact, they should be open to a plausible explanation of our
communication pathology toward living nature from the perspective of living nature as a
global  community of communication“.
Under the assumption that nature is a  global community of communication, non-human
nature becomes definable as a norm subject in the interplay of nature’s semicompatible
communication forms. Therefore we cannot assume that non-human nature will treat us
as a subject of equal rank, nor can we attribute non-human nature with an consciousness
of norms (this would give rise to the absurd situation that norm violations by organisms
would be punishable in the framework of the human legal system).
Humans, by applying their powers of reason, are in a position to recognize how signifi-
cant the complementarity of the communicative interrelationships is for ecological stabil-
ity. They can also correct this relationship with non-human nature, because they can rec-
ognize how dependent communication within non-human nature is on this prevailing
complementarity (which mankind is in the process of destroying).
Since human development is largely oriented according to cultural values and norms, we
(or our reason) are called upon to consider the consequences of our actions, for example
as they pertain to future generations of all biological species. The potential overkill of
technical threats endangers the very survival of living nature and makes the use of reason
the perhaps single most important action that must be set in our recent evolutionary his-
tory.
Massive and potentially irreversible damage to the complementary interactions and func-
tions between and within kingdoms of organisms endangers the cultural and even the bio-
logical reproductive ability of the entire human species. At no other time in history has
the entire biosphere been threatened to such a degree. Our techno-scientific civilization
must solve the problems it has triggered by (a) changing its system of cultural values and
norms and (b) changing the programs and activities stemming from these concepts.
Should the requisite coordinated action lag behind the level of threat, then the cliché (or
our image of ourselves) as the „crown jewel of evolution“ might flip to the opposite
extreme (mankind as the „curse of evolution“).
The moral concepts and norms of modern techno-scientific civilization are spreading
unabated across the globe and colonizing traditional cultural societies to their core. In
220
many respects, this enlightened consciousness toward nature has supported our struggle
against the forces of nature. Modern medicine is only one of the factors that have
increased our life expectency considerably: we are no longer at the mercy of diseases
against which there was little chance of survival in earlier times. On the other hand, our
achievements have led to a series of threats unknown in the past, such as overpopulation
of the planet. The relationship between humans and non-human nature is developing
along new lines due to the immense scale of the human factor.
Ultimately, we can interpret our ability to apply reason as an expression of the type of
nature´s productivity (in the sense of Schelling)  that has led nature to differentiate - albeit
by other mechanisms - all other biological species: none of this would have been possible
without the formative potential of the nucleic acid language. Should we be unable to mas-
ter the ecological crisis and should our activities be the prime force behind the collapse of
the global biosphere, then mankind could no longer define itself as an integral part of
nature’s productivity. Why? Because the fundamental feature of this productivity is that
communication interlinks are stabilized by being multiplied. The communcation patholo-
gy towards living (non-human) nature would disqualify nature that has attained con-
sciousness (humans) vis-à-vis nature that has not attained such consciousness. Mankind
would lose its status of „nature as subject“ (in the sense of Schelling) to non-human
nature.
Our opportunity to continue to view ourselves as „nature as subject“ lies in cultural evo-
lution. This evolution would dismantle the current communication pathology toward liv-
ing nature in favor of conduct that fosters communication, would master the ecological
crisis, and would be the expression of an adequate, productive form of nature that
enhances overall survival.
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